Innovative Financing for Development: Scalable Business Models that Produce Economic, Social, and Environmental Outcomes12
How it achieves outcomes: An effectively designed AMC
creates value for consumers by making essential goods
available and by lowering prices, and creates value for pro-
ducers by creating a market for the good. Ideally, the prede-
termined price for the good or service would be calibrated
so that the provider has incentives to produce the good but
does not earn excessive profits—but this calibration is dif-
ficult to achieve in practice. For example, the designers of
the Pneumococcal AMC did not (and could not) know the
necessary capital expenditure and unit costs of scaling up
production of the vaccine when they set the upfront sub-
sidy and purchase price. As a result, they established prices
that they believed would attract suppliers to the market
while maximizing value for money.
14
The Pneumococcal AMC was the first attempt to use
an AMC to accelerate the introduction of a vaccine in
developing countries. Since its launch, two suppliers -
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Pfizer - have produced and
distributed 82 million doses of PCV to 24 low-income coun-
tries. While precise return data is not available, an indepen-
dent evaluation found that manufacturers likely earn returns
that are at or above 10-20% per year, which is consistent
with historic industry performance.
15
The AMC combined long-term commitments and tem-
porary subsidies to lower prices and create a market for
health commodities. Since its launch, participating suppliers
have expanded capacity and additional manufacturers have
expressed interest in joining the initiative. It is impossible to
know if the opportunity to provide the vaccine to millions of
people in new markets would have been enough to entice
low-cost manufacturers to participate without the advance
guarantee that vaccines would be purchased.
How it can be replicated: Beyond the pneumococcal
example, few AMCs have been considered as success-
ful in furthering development goals.
16
An AMC is a useful
innovative financing tool when private suppliers of goods or
services are involved, when providing the good or service
requires a high fixed-cost investment, and when demand
risk makes private companies reluctant to make the upfront
investment. However, when only these three criteria exist,
the AMC funder would typically find it more efficient to
14 See the pneumococcal AMC process and design evaluation (http://
www.gavialliance.org/results/evaluations/pneumococcal-amc-process-
design-evaluation/) for a more detailed discussion of the challenges of
designing the pneumococcal AMC.
15 (Chau, 2013)
16 In addition to the Pneumococcal AMC, there has been discussions of
using an AMC for rural energy in Rwanda and bioenergy in Sri Lanka.
offer a more traditional forward contract or a volume
guarantee with a single supplier. For example, power-
purchase agreements, in which a power purchaser (often
a state-owned utility) agrees to purchase energy from a
power utility for the next 10-20 years, are common tools
for financing electricity generating investments, including
renewable energy. Unlike advance market commitments,
power-purchase agreements do not aim to create a market
with multiple participants.
The more complex advance market commitment structure
is useful when the funders want to create a market in addi-
tion to providing a good and service. Specifically, AMCs are
well-suited for challenges with the following characteristics:
first, when private suppliers are not willing to be or cannot
be transparent about their costs. As a result, it is difficult
to determine the fair price that will attract new suppliers to
the market. Second, when payers can calculate a financial
benefit that allows them to set a price based on benefits
and not costs. This allows the donor that issues the AMC
to determine the ceiling of how much it is willing to pay to
induce market entry. Finally, AMCs are appropriate when
there is a benefit in having multiple companies compete for
the market rather than a funder partnering with one or two
organizations upfront. For some development challenges,
such as providing health commodities, donors will want to
work with multiple suppliers to avoid being dependent on
a single supplier. In other circumstances, such as provid-
ing electricity, the nature of the product requires a limited
number of suppliers.
Outcomes for National Governments
Innovative financing has attracted private resources
to fund development projects and public goods.
Successful innovative financing mechanisms create incen-
tives for private companies to invest in projects that benefit
people in developing countries, in particular people at the
base of the pyramid. These incentives include: enhancing
profit margins by blending capital from socially motivated
investors with more profit-oriented organizations, enhanc-
ing credit by shifting project risk to organizations with more
creditworthy balance sheets, and creating marketing op-
portunities by being associated with socially responsible in-
vestments. We provide examples of different mechanisms
that provide these incentives for private companies below.
Case study 2: Capital for investments in low-carbon
infrastructure through green bonds.
How it works: The World Bank first issued green bonds in
2008 to finance investments in low-carbon infrastructure,