Blended Finance Solutions for Clean Energy in Humanitarian and Displacement Settings
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4. Blended nance solutions for energy programming in displacement settings
savings, better well-being and increased livelihood
opportunities. The program is targeting three product
segments: improved cooking solutions, SHS and mini-
grids and hopes to impact as many as 1.5 million
people. To reach this target, BRILHO works with
selected companies to provide a mix of catalytic grants
and RBF in order to reduce the risks associated with
providing energy solutions to low-income markets (e.g.,
default risk, etc.) and ensure an attractive commercial
return.
The BRILHO programme pays a participating company
a cash incentive of around 40% of the product cost
(base amount) for each sale of a designated energy
access product to a rural customer after submitting
proof of sale, which a third party usually veries. On top
of this base amount, BRILHO provides additional bonus
incentives for products that provide a higher tier of
energy access (based on the Energy Sector Management
Assistance Program Multi-tier framework), for sales in
underserved areas, or for sales of products intended
to be used for productive uses and income generation.
Underserved areas are categorized and ranked based
on a Vulnerability Access Index. By June 2021, BRILHO
had reached over 33,000 clients/households across the
country and supported the purchase of a SHS.
LESSONS LEARNT
RBF schemes can be very effective at incentivising
market participants to enter underserved areas such
as displacement settings by focusing attention on
the delivery of results, and by creating a conducive
environment for adaptation and experimentation.
Although they may be less effective than conventional
approaches if the recipient lacks the capacity, incentive,
or access to capital necessary to deliver the agreed
outputs or outcomes (ESMAP, 2015).
RBF can reduce the time and resources that
humanitarian partners spend monitoring processes and
checking that resources are being spent appropriately.
While the value of measuring outcomes may be
apparent, what is less clear is how to go about doing
it, as measuring outcomes is not easy. As a result,
greater expenditure may be required on independent
verication. In addition, in situations where there are
multiple incentive schemes available, there is a risk of
double-dipping or over-incentivising the market, leading
to adverse consequences such as manipulation and
fraudulent claims. It has, however, been argued that
RBF can reduce the risk of corruption, as money is only
disbursed when results are delivered.
While RBF addresses the supply side for energy
products and services in underserved markets, it does
not increase the affordability of products for bottom-
of-pyramid customers in displacement settings. In
order to mitigate this challenge, RBF should be bundled
with other mechanisms which can support the lowest-
income customers, such as loan guarantees, exible
payment terms, payment nancing, PAYG models, and
guarantee funds for defaulting accounts.
RBF programmes should also be combined with
minimum product standards and quality approval
policies to ensure that the products sold meet
international standards and do not create an adverse
incentive for the dumping of sub-par products onto low-
income markets.
4.4.3. Impact Bonds
WHAT IS IT AND HOW DOES IT WORK?
Impact bonds are outcomes-based contracts. They
use private funding from investors to cover the upfront
capital required for a provider to set up and deliver a
service. The service is designed to achieve measurable
outcomes specied by the commissioner. The investor
is repaid only if these outcomes are achieved.
Impact bonds bring together three key partners to
deliver better outcomes for a target group: the outcome
payer, the service provider, and the investor.
Social impact bonds (SIBs) refer to impact bonds in
which the outcome payer is the government which
represents the target group. Development impact
bonds (DIBs) refer to impact bonds in which the
outcome payer is an external donor - an aid agency of
a government or multilateral agency or a philanthropic
organisation (Global Outcomes Lab, 2021).
HOW CAN IT BE APPLIED TO DISPLACED
SETTINGS?
Impact bonds may not be best suited for conicts or
fast-moving crises as they can take too long to set up.
They could, however, support protracted humanitarian
situations, especially projects aimed at providing
infrastructure or delivering services, including those
associated with energy (New Humanitarian, 2019).
EXAMPLE PROJECT: ICRC’S HUMANITARIAN
IMPACT BOND
In 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) launched the rst “Humanitarian Impact Bond”
(HIB) with the goal of nancing the construction of three
new physical rehabilitation programme centres in Mali,
Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The HIB
mechanism allowed ICRC to mobilize 26 million Swiss
francs of social investments from the private sector to
support these rehabilitation programmes and directly
benet tens of thousands of persons with physical
disabilities due to conict within these three countries
(ICRC, 2017). The HIB is structured similarly to a loan
but with added incentives to drive positive outcomes
and penalties for poor performance.
The “Outcome Funders” comprised of the governments
of Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom,
and the La Caixa Banking Foundation based in Spain.
They pledged to pay ICRC for the concrete results
achieved over a period of ve years. This impact
was measured using an output metric called Staff
Eciency Ratio (SER), which is calculated by the
number of beneciaries having regained mobility
thanks to a mobility device, divided by the number of
local rehabilitation professionals employed by the
centres. “Social Investors” initially loaned the ICRC
the money required for the project and comprised of
New Reinsurance Company (a subsidiary of Munich
Re), Lombard Odier pension fund, and several other
charitable foundations (Ecorys, undated).
At the end of the ve-year term, the Outcome Funders
pay ICRC, based on the results measured and impact
assessed. Using the funds received from the Outcome
Funders, ICRC then repays the Social Investors. In
the best-case scenario, if there is an 80% or greater
performance improvement in the SER ratio compared
to previous rehabilitation centres, the investors will
earn an annual return of 7.0% per year (34.5% over
ve years). In the worst-case scenario, the investors
can lose up to 11.3% per year (or 40% overall) if the
SER performance worsens relative to the benchmark
(Ecorys, undated).
LESSONS LEARNT
Impact bonds are relatively complicated when
compared to other nancing mechanisms. They take
time to develop, resulting in higher administrative costs
(Princeton University, 2014). They are, therefore, best
suited for multi-year, longer-term projects that can
contribute to achieving durable solutions. As soon
as the metrics have been established, however, and
awareness is raised, the costs of developing impact
bonds should reduce (UNDP, 2016). The model of
payment for success does, however, spare funders the
cost of failed programs.
In addition, impact bonds should be developed to
meet a specic need. In the case of the ICRC HIB, it
was rst decided to use a HIB, which then lead to the
development of the project.
There needs to be exibility in terms of understanding
of what an impact bond is. Not all components will
be applicable to all contexts and organisations.
Organisations take part in impact bonds for different
reasons, and the impact bond needs to be adapted with
this in mind. Investors do, however, want to be involved
earlier, so that they are able to feed into the design of
the terms and conditions of the IB.
It is unlikely to see many projects similar to the ICRC
as most organisations in the United Nations or typical
NGO’s are not allowed to enter into any nancial
agreements that are similar to a loan.
4.4.4. Enterprise Challenge Fund
WHAT IS IT AND HOW DOES IT WORK?
An enterprise challenge fund is a funding instrument
that operates by distributing grants (or concessional
nance) to prot-seeking projects on a competitive
basis (UNDP, 2016). The competition for funding is
usually focused on a broad sector, such as energy, to
solicit innovative proposals that may not otherwise be
discovered through more traditional grant-making or
funding mechanisms.
Such a fund supports private investment with a
measurable social and/or environmental outcome.
A challenge fund will typically utilise public sector or
private foundation funds for a competitive market-
based or incentive-driven solution. As such, enterprise
challenge funds help mitigate market risks, while
“challenging” the private sector to innovate for the
public good.
The grants (or concessional nance) are risk-sharing
subsidies since the private rm co-invests its own
resources. Challenge funds can thus leverage public
nancing to achieve better developmental outcomes,
while inuencing market behaviours through
demonstration and imitation effects. The latter is linked
to the promotion of sustainable and inclusive business
by inuencing the private sector to adopt business
models that respond to the needs of the poor (UNDP,
2016).
Three elements characterise challenge funds. Firstly,
the private sector drives the solution’s design, co-
nancing and implementation. Secondly, grant funding
is awarded through a competitive process. And lastly,
the “challenge” provides a broad development and
commercial focus that awards innovation.
Once capitalized, challenge funds operate through calls
for proposals, which are assessed competitively and
according to established criteria. Performance-based
grants or concessional nancing is offered to the best
proposals.
HOW CAN IT BE APPLIED TO DISPLACED
SETTINGS?
An enterprise challenge could be used in displacement
settings to engage the private sector in addressing the
challenges in such locations. In doing so, the results can