2022 SPECIAL REPORT - New threats to human security in the

2022 SPECIAL REPORT

New threats to human security

in the Anthropocene

Demanding greater solidarity

New threats to human security in the Anthropocene

Demanding greater solidarity

By the United Nations Development Programme

1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017 USA

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New threats to

human security in the

Anthropocene

Demanding greater solidarity

SPECIAL REPORT 2022

Empowered lives.

Resilient nations.

SPECIAL REPORT 2022

Team

The report was prepared by a team led by Heriberto Tapia under the

guidance of Pedro Conceição. The core team was composed of Ricardo

Fuentes-Nieva, Moumita Ghorai, Yu-Chieh Hsu, Admir Jahic, Christina

Lengfelder, Rehana Mohammed, Tanni Mukhopadhyay, Shivani Nayyar,

Camila Olate, Josefin Pasanen, Fernanda Pavez Esbry, Mihail Peleah and

Carolina Rivera Vázquez. Communications, operations, and research and

production support were provided by Dayana Benny, Allison Bostrom,

Mriga Chowdhary, Maximilian Feichtner, Rezarta Godo, Jonathan Hall,

Seockhwan Bryce Hwang, Fe Juarez Shanahan, Chin Shian Lee, Jeremy

Marand, Sarantuya Mend, Stephen Sepaniak, Anupama Shroff, Marium

Soomro and I Younan An.

The High-Level Advisory Panel of Eminent Experts provided support and

guidance: Laura Chinchilla and Keizo Takemi (co-chairs), Amat Al Alim

Alsoswa, Kaushik Basu, Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Ilwad Elman, María Fernanda

Espinosa Garcés, Haishan Fu, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Amy Jadesimi, Jennifer

Leaning and Belinda Reyers.

ii NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

We are faced with a development paradox. Even though

people are on average living longer, healthier and wealthier

lives, these advances have not succeeded in increasing peo-

ple’s sense of security. This holds true for countries all around

the world and was taking hold even before the uncertainty

wrought by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The pandemic has increased this uncertainty. It has imper-

iled every dimension of our wellbeing and amplified a sense

of fear across the globe. This, in tandem with rising geopo-

litical tensions, growing inequalities, democratic backsliding

and devastating climate change-related weather events,

threatens to reverse decades of development gains, throw

progress on the Sustainable Development Goals even fur-

ther off track, and delay the urgent need for a greener, more

inclusive and just transition.

Against this backdrop, I welcome the Special Report

on New threats to human security in the Anthropocene:

Demanding greater solidarity, produced by the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The report

explains this paradox, highlighting the strong association

between declining levels of trust and increased feelings of

insecurity.

It suggests that during the Anthropocene—a term pro-

posed to describe the era in which humans have become

central drivers of planetary change, radically altering the

earth’s biosphere—people have good reason to feel inse-

cure. Multiple threats from COVID-19, digital technology,

climate change, and biodiversity loss, have become more

prominent or taken new forms in recent years.

In short, humankind is making the world an increasingly

insecure and precarious place. The report links these new

threats with the disconnect between people and planet,

arguing that they—like the Anthropocene itself—are deeply

entwined with increasing planetary pressure.

The contribution of this report is to update the concept

of human security to reflect this new reality. This implies

moving beyond considering the security of individuals and

communities, to also consider the interdependence among

people, and between people and planet, as reflected in the

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In doing so, the report offers a way forward to tackle to-

day’s interconnected threats. First, by pursuing human secu-

rity strategies that affirm the importance of solidarity, since

we are all vulnerable to the unprecedented process of plan-

etary change we are experiencing during the Anthropocene.

And second, by treating people not as helpless patients, but

agents of change and action capable of shaping their own

futures and course correcting.

The findings in the report echo some of the key themes

in my report on Our Common Agenda, including the impor-

tance of investing in prevention and resilience, the protection

of our planet, and rebuilding equity and trust at a global

scale through solidarity and a renewed social contract.

The United Nations offers a natural platform to advance

these core objectives with the involvement of all relevant

stakeholders. This report offers valuable insights and analy-

ses, and I commend it to a wide global audience as we strive

to advance Our Common Agenda and to use the concept of

human security as a tool to accelerate the achievement of

the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

António Guterres

Secretary-General

United Nations

Foreword

iiiFOREWORD

Acknowledgements

This Report builds on cumulative contributions over close

to three decades that started with the seminal 1994 Human

Development Report (led by Mahbub ul Haq), which popu-

larized the concept of human security, continuing with the

groundbreaking work of the Human Security Commission,

led by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, published in 2003.

The preparation of this Report would not have been pos-

sible without the support, ideas and advice from numerous

individuals and organizations.

The Report benefited deeply from the intellectual advice,

guidance and continuous encouragement provided by

the High-Level Advisory Panel of Eminent Experts. We are

particularly grateful to Co-Chairs Laura Chinchilla and Keizo

Takemi for their intellectual leadership, commitment and

hard work through countless sessions (virtual, hybrid and in

person) throughout 2021. The other members of the Advisory

Board were Amat Al Alim Alsoswa, Kaushik Basu, Abdoulaye

Mar Dieye, Ilwad Elman, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés,

Haishan Fu, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Amy Jadesimi, Jennifer

Leaning and Belinda Reyers.

We are grateful to the participants of the virtual sympo-

sium, A New Generation of Human Security, held 8–11 June

2021, including Vaqar Ahmed, Michael Barnett, Lincoln C.

Chen, Alison Fahey, Andreas Feldmann, James Foster, Des

Gasper

, Rachel Gisselquist, Anne-Marie Goetz, Oscar A.

Gómez

*†

, Toshiya Hoshino

*†

, Mary Kaldor, Raúl Katz, Erika

Kraemer-Mbula, Staffan Lindberg, Koji Makino

†

, Vivienne

Ming, Joana Monteiro, Toby Ord, Racha Ramadan, Uma

Rani

†

, Pablo Ruiz Hiebra, Siri Aas Rustad

, Joaquin Salido

Marcos, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Dan Smith, Frances Stewart,

Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

†

, Tildy Stokes, Yukio Takasu, Am-

brose Otau Talisuna and Shen Xiaomeng.

We are thankful for especially close collaborations with

our partners: the Climate Impact Lab (a consortium formed

by the University of California, Berkeley; the Energy Policy In-

stitute at the University of Chicago; the Rhodium Group; and

Rutgers University), the Human Development and Capability

Association, the International Labour Organization, the Ja-

pan International Cooperation Agency, the Migration Policy

* Also author of a background paper.

† Also a peer reviewer.

Institute, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, the United Nations

Children’s Fund, the United Nations Human Security Unit, the

United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation and the

World Bank Group.

We also extended our appreciation for all the data, writ-

ten inputs, background papers and peer reviews of draft

chapters to the Report, including those by Faisal Abbas,

Enrico Calandro, Cedric de Coning, Andrew Crabtree,

Karen Eggleston, Erle C. Ellis, Andreas Feldman, Juliana de

Paula Filleti, Pamina Firchow, Rana Gautam, Jose Gómez,

Daniela S. Gorayeb, Martin Hilbert, Daniel M. Hofling, Flo-

rian Krampe, Martin Medina, John Morrissey, Ryutaro Mu-

rotani, Ilwa Nuzul Rahma, Ilse Oosterlaken, Monika Peruffo,

Thomas Probert, Sanjana Ravi, Diego Sánchez-Ancochea,

Tobias Schillings, Parita Shah, Amrikha Singh, Mirjana

Stankovic, Behnam Taebi, Jeroen Van Den Hoven and Yuko

Yokoi.

Several virtual consultations with thematic and regional

experts were held between October and December 2021.

We are grateful for inputs during these consultations. Further

support was also extended by others too numerous to men-

tion here. Consultations are listed at http://hdr.undp.org/en/

new-gen-human-security. Contributions, support and assis-

tance from partnering institutions, including UNDP regional

bureaus and country offices, are also acknowledged with

much gratitude.

Our deep appreciation to Hajime Kishimori and Hiroshi

Kuwata for their strategic and logistical support throughout

the process leading to this Report. Many UNDP colleagues

provided advice, support for consultations and encourage-

ment. We are grateful to Ludo Bok, Khalida Bouzar, Cecilia

Calderón, Michele Candotti, Christine Chan, Joseph D’Cruz,

Mandeep Dhaliwal, Keiko Egusa, Almudena Fernández,

Ayako Hatano, Tatsuya Hayase, Boyan Konstantinov, Raquel

Lagunas

†

, Luis Felipe López-Calva, Tasneem Mirza, Ulrika

Modeer, Paola Pagliani, Maria Nathalia Ramirez, Noella Rich-

ard, Isabel Saint Malo, Ben Slay, Mirjana Spoljaric Egger, Ma-

ria Stage, Bishwa Tiwari, Hisae Toyoshima, Swarnim Wagle,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v

Kanni Wignaraja, Lesley Wright, Yoko Yoshihara and Yan-

chun Zhang.

The preparation of this Report is part of the work lead-

ing to the 2021/2022 Human Development Report. The

Human Development Report Office extends its sincere

gratitude for the financial contributions from the Govern-

ment of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Government

of Sweden.

We are grateful for the highly professional work of Stronger

Stories on strategic narratives and of the editors and layout

artists at Communications Development Incorporated —

led by Bruce Ross-Larson with Joe Caponio, Mike Crumplar,

Christopher Trott and Elaine Wilson. A special word of

gratitude to Bruce, who brought unparalleled scrutiny and

wisdom — and a bridge to history, as the editor of both the

1994 Human Development Report and the 2003 Ogata-Sen

report.

To conclude, we are extremely grateful to UNDP Admini-

strator Achim Steiner, for giving us the space, encourage-

ment and support to write this report on human security and

for pushing us to make sense of the insecurities faced by

people everywhere in our interconnected planet, which we

hope will help set the foundations for a new generation of

human security strategies.

Pedro Conceição

Director

Human Development Report Office

vi NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Contents

Foreword iii

Acknowledgements v

Overview 1

PART I

Expanding human security through greater solidarity in the

Anthropocene 9

CHAPTER 1

Human security: Apermanent and universal imperative 11

Becoming richer amid a vast sea of human insecurity 15

Towards human security through the “eyes of humankind” 24

Annex 1.1. A brief account of the origins, achievements and

challenges of the human security concept 34

Annex 1.2. The Index of Perceived Human Insecurity 38

CHAPTER 2

The Anthropocene context is reshaping human security 43

The self-reinforcing interaction between dangerous planetary

changes and social imbalances 46

Compounding threats to human security 50

Human security in the Anthropocene context 58

PART II

Tackling a new generation of threats to human security 63

CHAPTER 3

Digital technology’s threats to human security 65

Cyberinsecurity and unintended consequences of technology 67

Upholding human rights in addressing harms on social media 68

Artificial intelligence–based decisionmaking can undermine

human security 70

Uneven access to technological innovation 73

CHAPTER 4

Unearthing the human dimension of violentconflict 77

Systemic interaction of conflict with threats to human security

calls for systemic responses 79

Agency connects empowerment and protection for peaceful lives 83

The dynamics of violent conflict are evolving under the new

generation of human security threats 83

Putting people at the heart of conflict analysis, conflict

prevention and sustaining peace shows the power of the

human security approach 87

CHAPTER 5

Inequalities and the assault on human dignity 91

Horizontal inequalities undermine human dignity 93

Threats to human security along the lifecycle 94

Violence and economic discriminations harm the human

security of women and girls 98

Inequalities in power across race and ethnicity hurt everyone’s

human security 100

People on the move can be forced to follow paths of human

insecurity 102

Ending discrimination against different expressions,

behaviours or bodies enhances human security for all 105

Eliminating horizontal inequalities to advance human security:

The salience of agency and the imperative of solidarity 107

CHAPTER 6

Healthcare systems outmatched by new human security

challenges 117

As economies bounce back from the Covid-19 pandemic,

people’s health remains under threat 120

An evolving disease burden is driving adjustments to

healthcare systems 123

Reinforcing human security though enhanced healthcare

systems 125

Strategies to enhance human security based on solidarity:

Towards the new generation of universalism in healthcare

systems 128

Annex 6.1. The Healthcare Universalism Index: Coverage,

equity and generosity 136

CONCLUSION

Greater solidarity: Towards human development with

humansecurity 139

Notes 144

References 155

BOXES

1.1 The Covid-19 pandemic as a deep human security crisis

continues into 2022 13

1.2 Trust’s many faces 19

1.3 Agency in policy design: An example of participatory

development 26

1.4 Human security and the Sustainable Development Goals 32

2.1 Human security for a more-than-human world 45

2.2 Biodiversity loss, food security and disaster risk reduction 53

3.1 Estonia’s e-governance: Technology follows values 69

CONTENTS vii

3.2 Facial recognition technology: dangerous and largely unregulated 71

4.1 Adaptive peacebuilding: Insights from complexity theory

for strengthening the resilience and sustainability of social-

ecological systems 81

4.2 Social protests have intensified over the past three years 86

4.3 Measuring conflict-affected populations 88

4.4 Everyday Peace Indicators 90

5.1 Femicide: The killing of women and girls because of their gender 101

5.2 Understanding transfemicide 106

6.1 The mental health crisis is a human security emergency 124

6.2 From global institutional weakness to the last pandemic 134

FIGURES

1 Perceptions of human insecurity are widespread worldwide 4

2 The Covid-19 pandemic has caused an unprecedented decline

in Human Development Index values 5

3 The new generation of human security threats 6

4 Enriching human security for the Anthropocene 7

1.1 Even in very high Human Development Index countries, less

than a quarter of people feel secure 17

1.2 Human insecurity tends to be higher in countries with lower

Human Development Index values 17

1.3 Human insecurity is increasing in most countries— and surging

in some very high Human Development Index countries 18

1.4 Where human security is higher, trust tends to be higher,

regardless of satisfaction with one’s financial situation 18

1.5 A new generation of threats to human security is playing out

in the unprecedented context of the Anthropocene 21

1.6 Higher Human Development Index values have come with

higher planetary pressures 22

1.7 Nonstate conflict fatalities have been increasing in high

Human Development Index countries 23

1.8 The virtuous cycle of agency, empowerment and protection 27

1.9 Advancing human security in the Anthropocene context:

Adding solidarity to protection and empowerment 30

2.1 The Anthropocene context is reshaping human security

through the interaction of dangerous planetary changes and

social imbalances 46

2.2 The destabilizing dynamic of climate change: More developed

countries tend to capture more benefits from planetary

pressures and less of their costs 48

2.3 Increasing asymmetries—net lives saved by mitigation 49

2.4 The distribution of mortality risks caused by climate change is

expected to be unequal between and within countries 50

2.5 A large fraction of the population facing water shortage lives

in subnational territories with low Human Development Index

values and high gender inequality 51

2.6 Hunger and food insecurity are on the rise 52

2.7 In a very high emissions scenario some regions of the world

might face climate change–induced mortality rates similar to

those of the main causes of deaths today 54

2.8 The Anthropocene context affects forced internal displacements 56

2.9 Climate change is expected to affect’s people ability to work 57

3.1 Digital labour platforms are growing 72

3.2 Covid-19 vaccine-related patents are concentrated in just a

few countries 74

4.1 Violent conflict is increasing in parallel with progress in human

development 79

4.2 The number of violent conflicts is rising again 87

4.3 The number of forcibly displaced people is at a record high 89

5.1 Different groups of people experience new threats to human

security differently 95

5.2 The change in functional capacity over the lifecycle has

different implications for human security challenges and thus

requires different policies 96

5.3 There is great inequality between high-income and low-

income countries in young people’s internet access at home 96

5.4 Different forms of violence against women and girls: Linking

the iceberg model to the violence triangle 100

5.5 Migration and displacement on a path of insecurity 103

5.6 Black women have higher unemployment rates in Brazil and

South Africa, first quarter of 2021 107

5.7 Building blocks to advance human security by reducing

horizontal inequalities 108

S5.2.1 A new generation of human security threats for children 113

6.1 The global economy is recovering, but people’s health is not 121

6.2 The disparities in Covid-19 vaccination across countries are stark 122

6.3 More people are dying from noncommunicable diseases

today than in the past 123

6.4 Progress with inequality: Widening gaps in healthcare over time 130

6.5 There is a strong negative association between Healthcare

Universalism Index value and child probability of death up to

an index value of around 0.6 130

6.6 At a Healthcare Universalism Index value of about 0.4 and

higher, the probability of death at ages 50–80 drops quickly

as index value increases 131

6.7 As Healthcare Universalism Index value increases

from 0.5, there is a strong relationship between it and

noncommunicable disease–related deaths 131

6.8 Up to a value of about 0.4, Healthcare Universalism Index value

is not associated with Global Health Security Index value, but

above that level, the relationship is strongly positive and significant 132

6.9 The greatest threats to human security in the Anthropocene

context are likely to be experienced where Healthcare

Universalism Index values are lower 132

A6.1 Dimensions and indicators used to calculate the Healthcare

Universalism Index 136

SPOTLIGHTS

1.1 Exploring how the human security approach can illuminate

the overlaps between the response to Covid-19 pandemic and

climate change 40

5.1 A feminist perspective on the concept of human security 110

5.2 Children and human security 113

TABLES

1.1 Evolution of the action framework for human security in the

Anthropocene context 31

A1.2.1 Dimensions and subdimensions of the Index of Perceived

Human Insecurity 38

S1.1 Promoting empowerment, protection and solidarity in a world

of interconnected threats: Example 41

5.1 Number of people age 65 or older, by geographic region, 2019

and 2050 97

A6.1 Limits of the generosity and equity indices 137

viii NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

OVERVIEW

New threats to

human security in

the Anthropocene:

Demanding greater

solidarity

2 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

OVERVIEW

New threats to human security in the Anthropocene:

Demanding greater solidarity

As the Covid-19 pandemic got under way, the world

had been reaching unprecedented heights on the

Human Development Index (HDI). People were, on

average, living healthier, wealthier and better lives

for longer than ever. But under the surface a growing

sense of insecurity had been taking root. An estimat-

ed six of every seven people across the world already

felt insecure in the years leading up to the pandemic

(gure 1). And this feeling of insecurity was not only

high — it had been growing in most countries with

data, including a surge in some countries with the

highest HDI values.

The Covid-19 pandemic has now aected every-

one, imperilling every dimension of our wellbeing

and injecting an acute sense of fear across the globe.

For the rst time, indicators of human development

have declined — drastically, unlike anything experi-

enced in other recent global crises. The pandemic

has infected and killed millions of people worldwide.

It has upended the global economy, interrupted ed-

ucation dreams, delayed the administration of vac-

cines and medical treatment and disrupted lives and

livelihoods. In 2021, even with the availability of very

unequally distributed Covid-19 vaccines, the eco-

nomic recovery that started in many countries and

the partial return to schools, the crisis deepened in

health, with a drop in life expectancy at birth. And the

HDI, adjusted for Covid-19, had yet to recover about

ve years of progress, according to new simulations

(gure 2).

It is not hard to understand how Covid-19 has

made people feel more insecure. But what accounts

for the startling bifurcation between improvements

in wellbeing achievements and declines in people’s

perception of security? That is the motivating ques-

tion for this Report. In addressing it, we hope to avoid

returning to pathways of human development with

human insecurity.

In the background of the human development–

human security disconnect looms the Anthropocene,

the age of humans disrupting planetary processes.

Development approaches with a strong focus on eco-

nomic growth and much less attention to equitable

human development have produced stark and grow-

ing inequalities and destabilizing and dangerous

planetary change. Climate change is an example, and

Covid-19 may very well be. The 2020 Human Devel-

opment Report showed that no country has achieved

a very high HDI value without contributing heavily

to pressures driving dangerous planetary change. In

addition to climate change and more frequent dis-

ease outbreaks that are linked to planetary pressures,

we confront biodiversity losses and threats to key

ecosystems, from tropical forests to the oceans. Our

pursuit of development has neglected our embedded-

ness in nature, leading to new threats as a by-product

of development: new health threats, increased food

insecurity and more frequent disasters, among many

others. Recognizing that our development patterns

drive human insecurity forces us to revisit the human

security concept and understand what it implies for

the Anthropocene.

When introduced in 1994, the human security ap-

proach refocused the security debate from territori-

al security to people’s security. This idea, which the

UN General Assembly endorsed in 2012, invited se-

curity scholars and policymakers to look beyond pro-

tecting the nation-state to protecting what we care

most about in our lives: our basic needs, our physical

integrity, our human dignity. It emphasized the im-

portance of everyone’s right to freedom from fear,

freedom from want and freedom from indignity. It

highlighted the close connection among security, de-

velopment and the protection and empowerment of

individuals and communities. This Report explores

how the new generation of interacting threats, play-

ing out in the Anthropocene context, aect human

security and what to do about it.

Part I of the Report shows how the human security

concept helps identify blind spots when development

is assessed simply by measuring achievements in

wellbeing and suggests ways to enrich the human se-

curity frame to account for the unprecedented chal-

lenges of the Anthropocene context. Part II discusses

four threats to human security that are superimposed

on the Anthropocene context (gure 3): the down-

sides of digital technology, violent conict, horizon-

tal inequalities, and evolving challenges to healthcare

systems. While the underlying challenge of each

threat taken individually is not new, the threats are

novel in the expression that they acquire in the An-

thropocene context and their interlinked nature,

which has been building over time. Current develop-

ment journeys have often missed that point, focusing

on addressing problems in silos when designing or

evaluating policy.

OVERVIEW 3

Figure 1 Perceptions of human insecurity are widespread worldwide

Source: 



People feeling secure

People feeling moderately or

very insecure

Low and medium

HDI countries

High

HDI countries

Very high

HDI countries

Out of 100 people

More than 6 in 7 people worldwide perceived feeling moderately or very insecure

just before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

4 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

The Covid-19 pandemic makes these interconnec-

tions more apparent and unmasks new accumulat-

ing threats to human security. The uneven pain and

devastation have been widely documented. Women

face the brunt of adaptations to remote work and the

dramatic increase in violence against them. Informal

workers are left outside social protection systems.

People living in urban poverty are hit particularly

hard by the health and economic consequences of the

pandemic. Yet Covid-19 is only one manifestation of

the new Anthropocene context. The Report includes

novel work and estimates of the scale of the threats in

the Anthropocene context.

• Hunger is on the rise, reaching around 800 million

people in 2020, and about 2.4 billion people now

suer food insecurity, the result of cumulative so-

cioeconomic and environmental eects that had

been building before 2019 but were boosted by the

pandemic in 2020 and 2021.

• Climate change will continue to aect people’s vital

core. Even in a scenario with moderate mitigation,

around 40 million people worldwide could die,

mostly in developing countries, as a result of higher

temperatures from now to the end of the century.

• The number of forcibly displaced people has dou-

bled in the past decade, reaching a record high of

82.4 million in 2020.



And forced displacement may

be further accelerated as long as climate change

remains unmitigated.



• Digital technologies can help meet many of the

Anthropocene challenges, but the rapid pace of

digital expansion comes with new threats that

may exacerbate ongoing problems related to, for

example, inequalities and violent conict. Not only

did the ongoing pandemic accelerate a digital shift

in the productive economy, but cybercrime also

skyrocketed, with annual costs projected to reach

$6 trillion by the end of 2021.

• The number of people aected by conict is reach-

ing record highs: today approximately 1.2 billion

people live in conict-aected areas, 560 million of

them outside fragile settings, reecting the spread

of dierent forms violent conict.

• Inequalities are an assault to human dignity.

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex

people and members of other sexual minorities

face particular risks of harm to their person in soci-

eties where diversity is not tolerated.



In 87 percent

of 193 countries,



they lack the right of recognition

of their identity and full citizenship.

• Violence against women and girls is one of the cru-

ellest forms of women’s disempowerment.



Subtle

Figure 2 The Covid-19 pandemic has caused an unprecedented decline in Human Development Index values

Source: 

0.600

0.620

0.640

0.660

0.680

0.700

0.720

0.740

0.760

The global

financial crisis

Covid-19-adjusted

Human Development Index value

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1990

Covid-19

OVERVIEW 5

forms of violence and so called microaggressions

build up to such severe forms of violence as rape

and femicide.



In 2020, 47,000 women and girls

were intentionally killed by their intimate partner

or their family. On average, a woman or girl is killed

every 11 minutes by an intimate partner or family

member.



• The gap is large and growing between very high

and low HDI countries in the universalism of

healthcare systems. Countries with weaker, less

universal healthcare systems also face the great-

est challenges in health: the increasing burden

of noncommunicable diseases and the eects of

pandemics.

The Report argues for expanding the human secu-

rity frame in the face of the new generation of inter-

connected threats playing out in the context of the

Anthropocene. It proposes adding solidarity to the

human security strategies of protection and empow-

erment proposed by the 2003 Ogata-Sen report.



Solidarity recognizes that human security in the

Anthropocene must go beyond securing individu-

als and their communities for institutions and poli-

cies to systematically consider the interdependence

across all people and between people and the planet.

For each of us to live free from want, from fear and

anxiety and from indignity, all three strategies must

be deployed — for it is protection, empowerment and

solidarity working together that advances human

security in the Anthropocene. Agency (the ability to

hold values and make commitments, regardless of

whether they advance one’s wellbeing, and to act ac-

cordingly in making one’s own choices or in partici-

pating in collective decisionmaking) lies at the core

of this framework (gure 4). Emphasizing agency is a

reminder that wellbeing achievements alone are not

all we should consider when evaluating policies or as-

sessing progress. Agency will also help avoid the pit-

falls of partial solutions, such as delivering protection

with no attention to disempowerment or committing

to solidarity while leaving some lacking protection.

This proposal for enriching the human securi-

ty frame is made in a very particular context, where

perceptions of human insecurity are associated with

low impersonal trust, independent of one’s nancial

situation.



People facing higher perceived human

insecurity are three times less likely to nd others

trustworthy,



a trend particularly strong in very high

HDI countries. Trust is multifaceted and essential for

everyday life, but given this association, trust — across

Figure 3 The new generation of human security threats

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Digital

technology

threats

Health

threats

Inequalities

Violent

conflict

Other

threats

6 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

people, between people and institutions, across

countries — may enable or hamper the implementa-

tion of protection, empowerment and solidarity strat-

egies to enhance human security.



The Anthropocene context, with interlinked

human security threats, calls for a bold agenda to

match the magnitude of the challenges, put forward

with humility in the face of the unknown. The alter-

native is accepting fragmented security approaches,

with responses likely de-equalizing, likely reactive,

likely late and likely ineective in the long term. Per-

manent and universal attention to an enriched frame

of human security can end the pathways of human

development with human insecurity that created the

conditions for the Covid-19 pandemic, the chang-

ing climate and the broader predicaments of the

Anthropocene.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

and the Sustainable Development Goals provide an

ambitious set of multidimensional objectives that

inform action at all levels (from the local to the na-

tional) and mobilize the international communi-

ty. But eorts remain largely compartmentalized,

dealing separately with climate change, biodiversity

loss, conicts, migration, refugees, pandemics and

data protection. Those eorts should be strength-

ened, but tackling them in silos appears insucient

in the Anthropocene context. It is imperative to go

beyond fragmented eorts, to rearm the principles

of the founding documents of the United Nations,

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

UN Charter, which are also the central ideas un-

derpinning the concept of human security. Echoing

the UN Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda,

doing so in the Anthropocene implies a systematic,

permanent and universal attention to solidarity —

not as optional charity or something that subsumes

the individual to the interests of a collective, but as

a call to pursue human security through “the eyes of

humankind.”

Figure 4 Enriching human security for the Anthropocene

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Protection

Empowerment

Solidarity

Agency

Enables

Promotes Promotes

Enables

Trust

Enables Promotes

OVERVIEW 7

Expanding

human security

through greater

solidarity in the

Anthropocene

PART

Human security:

Apermanent and

universal imperative



CHAPTER

12 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

CHAPTER 1

Human security: A permanent and universal

imperative

Just before the Covid-19 pandemic hit, as the world

reached unprecedented development levels, six of

every seven people around the world felt insecure.

Indeed, as many development indicators were mov-

ing up, people’s sense of security was coming down.

The pandemic put a stop to progress in human devel-

opment, deepening the continuing onslaught on peo-

ple’s perceptions of security (box 1.1).

It is not hard to understand how Covid-19 has led

people to feel more insecure.



But what accounts for

Box 1.1 The Covid-19 pandemic as a deep human security crisis continues into 2022

The Covid-19 pandemic has affected nearly everyone

and turned into a full-fledged human security and

human development crisis. The most tragic impact

has been a worldwide death toll of more than 10 mil-

lion (the excess mortality in 2020–2021).

But impacts

go well beyond this distressing record. Most countries

have suffered acute recessions. School closures and

restrictions on people’s movement have disrupted

the education of millions of children worldwide, with

the resulting costs to learning still to be assessed.

Many countries turned to remote learning, but an

estimated two-thirds of the world’s school-age chil-

dren lack internet access in their homes.

There have

been serious setbacks in women’s empowerment

and gender equality and increasing violence against

women.

Women have also been disproportionately

affected by job losses.

It is possible to track part of the pandemic’s effects

on human development through the Covid-19-adjusted

Human Development Index. The index retains the

standard Human Development Index (HDI) dimen-

sions but modifies the expected years of schooling

indicator to reflect the effects of school closures and

the availability of online learning on effective at-

tendance rates. In 2020 there was a sharp reduction

across all the three dimensions of the HDI: health,

knowledge and living standards.

The crisis continued in 2021, with human develop-

ment levels (as measured by the Covid-19-adjusted

HDI) remaining well below pre-Covid-19 levels. Even

with the availability of — very unequally distributed

— Covid-19 vaccines, the economic recovery that

started in many countries and the partial adaptation

of education systems, the crisis deepened in health,

with a continued decline in life expectancy at birth. In

2021 the global Covid-19-adjusted HDI value had yet

to recover the equivalent of approximately 5 years of

progress, according to new simulations (see figure).

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused an unprecedented decline in Human Development Index values

Source:

Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, the International Monetary Fund, International Telecommunication Union, the Human Mortality Data-

base, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Notes

1.IHME 2021. 2.UNICEF and ITU 2020. 2.UN Women 2021b; Vaeza 2020. 3.ILO 2021a.

0.600

0.620

0.640

0.660

0.680

0.700

0.720

0.740

0.760

The global

financial crisis

Covid-19-adjusted Human

Development Index value

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

1990

Covid-19

 13

the startling bifurcation between the improvements

in people’s wellbeing and the declines in their per-

ception of security that was unfolding before the pan-

demic? That is the question that animates this Report.

To address it, the Report takes the premise that

the concept of human security provides a unique per-

spective that is both insightful and fruitful in suggest-

ing how to advance human development with less

insecurity. And in so doing, building on decades of

analytical and policy work, the Report also aims to

enrich the frame of human security.

“

The Report takes the premise that the

concept of human security provides a

unique perspective that is both insightful

and fruitful in suggesting how to advance

human development with less insecurity

There may be many reasons for people to feel inse-

cure, and they will vary according to social and indi-

vidual contexts. They are manifestations of objective

threats. Some social imbalances



have been build-

ing for decades, as the 2019 Human Development

Report highlighted.



But awareness is now growing

about dangerous planetary changes that compound

other well-identied drivers of human insecurity. For

example, social tensions and their implications for

conict interact both with climate hazards (droughts,

wildres, storms) and with what the energy transition

means for jobs and opportunities. Or indeed, how a

global pandemic that followed more frequent out-

breaks of new or emerging zoonotic diseases is linked

to pressures on biodiversity.



As pandemic response

veteran Richard Hatchett notes, “Except we’re now

in a dierent world. This is denitely not a once-in-

a-century problem. Covid-19 is the seventh global

infectious-disease crisis of the 21st century: SARS,

avian inuenza, swine u, MERS, Ebola and Zika

preceded it. It looks like roughly every three years

you’re going to have a global infectious-disease crisis,

and that tempo is probably increasing.”



As the 2020 Human Development Report ex-

plored,



dangerous planetary changes result from

human pressures on planetary processes — from the

climate system to material cycles disrupted by the use

and introduction of materials at an unprecedented

scale and speed and to the threats to the integrity of

ecosystems from tropical forests to coral reefs and to

entire oceans. Those changes are so unprecedented

in human history and in the 4.6 billion year geological

timeline of the planet that they have been described

as a new geological epoch or event: the Anthropo-

cene, the age of humans. There are glaring inequali-

ties in contributions to planetary pressures — now and

historically — and in power between those overextract-

ing and those bearing the consequences. This hap-

pens across countries but, crucially, within countries

as well, with some groups systemically more aect-

ed than others. Human rights violations overlap with

the destruction of ecosystems, as with the forced and

slave labour in the very shing eets that are destroy-

ing ocean ecosystems. Biodiversity losses often par-

allel not only the destruction of livelihoods but also

cultural losses, such as the disappearance of languag-

es, aecting many indigenous peoples and local com-

munities. Collective decisions, national and global,

that could ease planetary pressures are more dicult

to reach and implement, thus slowing, or even pre-

venting, action to ease planetary pressures.

With this the dichotomy of “human development

with human insecurity” may appear far less puzzling

— because the patterns of development that we have

been pursuing inict many of the drivers of insecu-

rity we are confronting. This chapter explores how

the human security concept is a useful lens through

which to understand this new context, elaborated

further in chapter 2, and how the human security

frame can be enriched to provide new perspectives

on specic threats to human security that play out in

this new context and are interconnected, global and

mostly human-made — threats explored in part II of

the Report.

This chapter has two main ndings. First, the

human security frame points to the limitations of

evaluating policies and measuring progress by look-

ing at wellbeing achievements alone. The chapter

identies the neglect of agency as a major blind spot

and suggests making agency a central focus of atten-

tion for decisionmakers. Second, the human securi-

ty frame itself can be enriched by addressing a blind

spot of its own: the neglect of the new Anthropocene

reality and what that implies. The chapter rearms

the relevance of the individually centred approaches

of protection and empowerment to advance human

security. It suggests adding an approach based on

solidarity — beyond borders and across peoples,

14 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

cognizant of our interdependencies in a globalized

world and our common fate on a planet undergoing

dangerous changes as a result of our actions.

Becoming richer amid a vast

sea of human insecurity

An age of widespread — and growing —

perceptions of human insecurity

Human security is about living free from want, free

from fear and free from indignity. It is about protect-

ing what we humans care most about in our lives. In

2012 the UN General Assembly reected a consensus

that human security would be considered, “The right

of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from

poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular

vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear

and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity

to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human

potential.”



Annex 1.1 provides a brief account about

the origins and progression of the human security

concept, which continues to evolve.

“

Human security is about living free

from want, free from fear and free from

indignity. It is about protecting what we

humans care most about in our lives

When the human security concept was introduced

in the 1994 Human Development Report,



it was

rapidly recognized as a radical departure from the

predominant view of security at the time, because it

shifted the focus towards the real subjects — people —

and away from territorial security. That seminal work

also emphasized three additional characteristics of

human security — universal, multidimensional and

systemic — which have heightened relevance today

as issues aecting people’s security become part of a

new set of interlinked threats on a planet undergoing

dangerous changes because of human pressures.

Using a human security lens implies considering

people’s views.



What constitutes fear, want and dig-

nity depends largely on people’s beliefs, which are

formulated based on a combination of very specic

and objective factors, along with elements that may

be more subjective. But this is not a problem because

attention to subjectivities — considering how people

themselves view and understand their situation, vul-

nerabilities and limits — is core to the analytical fram-

ing of human security.



As argued in more detail later

in the chapter, beliefs are important elements inu-

encing people’s choices, values and commitments.

In fact, Kaushik Basu, in exploring the relationship

between law and economics, has argued for the cen-

tral role of beliefs in shaping even attitudes towards

the law:

“The might of the law, even though it may be

backed by handcus, jails, and guns, is, in its ele-

mental form, rooted in beliefs carried in the heads

of people in society — from ordinary civilians to the

police, politicians and judges, intertwining with

and weaving into one another, reinforcing some

and whittling down others, creating enormous ed-

ices of force and power, at times so strong that

they seem to transcend all individuals, and create

the illusion of some mysterious diktat enforced

from above. In truth, the most important ingredi-

ents of a republic, including its power and might,

reside in nothing more than the beliefs and expec-

tations of ordinary people going about their daily

lives and quotidian chores.”



So, it is useful to explore how living free from

want, living free from fear and living free from indig-

nity relate to beliefs and interact with one another,

starting by considering dignity, which is most direct-

ly a belief.

• Dignity. Dignity is grounded on the universal belief

that everyone has equal inherent worth and value,

enshrined in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free

and equal in dignity and rights.”



Its importance

was reiterated as a central aspiration of the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development: “to ensure

that all human beings can full their potential in

dignity.”



Threats to one’s dignity emanate not only

from objective deprivations (such as not having

basic needs met, linking to the aspiration of being

free from want) but also from stigma. Sometimes,

the very interventions that seek to address material

deprivations may hurt people’s dignity by stigma-

tizing them and inducing emotions of shame,



especially when poverty is attributed to negative

individual dispositions.



Dignity goes beyond

 15

avoiding being physically harmed or shamed to

having autonomy



and agency — a central idea

that is the core of arguments developed later in the

chapter. Implications of this understanding of dig-

nity include that interventions aimed at addressing

freedom from want with dignity imply the need to

both mitigate stigma and promote empowerment

and that interventions need to be culturally sensi-

tive and responsive.



• Fear. Beliefs are also important in triggering emo-

tions (even if not the only determinant; percep-

tual elements also matter). The emotion of fear

involves beliefs about bad things that may happen

in the future (if something bad is certain to happen,

it is likely to trigger an emotion of despair),



often

associated with perceiving “low certainty and low

sense of control.”



Thus, the emotion of fear, a

powerful driver of behaviour,



is inuenced by a

host of factors, from individual cognitive processes

to external and contextual conditions. People form

beliefs about the possibility that painful and harm-

ful events may unfold in the future, often based on

objective elements that can give them reason to be

fearful.



This includes the possibility of suering

“assaults on their sense of dignity,”



once again

showing the interlinkages across the three aspira-

tions that dene human security.

• Want. Beliefs also come into play when assessing

want, which is determined not only by meeting

basic metabolic needs but also by individual aspi-

rations and relative assessments of what people in

a community are expected to achieve. As Amartya

Sen has often reminded us, Adam Smith’s deni-

tion of not being in poverty was to be able to wear

a linen shirt — not because linen protects someone

from the elements but because it is required to

interact socially in the community, without shame.

Thus, there are interlinkages between freedom

from want and living in dignity. This echoes anthro-

pological perspectives on want. As Mary Douglas

put it, “At the local level, wants are part of a feed-

back cycle between the relations of production and

consumption. Wants and needs are not ordered

according to private preferences. Other people

collectively try to solve problems of coordination,

the solutions impose ordering on ego’s preferences.

The cultural process denes wants, and poverty is

culturally constructed.”



“

In addition to being high, the perception

of human insecurity has increased over time

for most countries with comparable data

The formulation of beliefs is thus clearly the result

of a complex constellation of factors. It is not easy,

and it may be impossible, to measure beliefs with

the precision that we can assign to objective indica-

tors such as income or education achievements. But

that does not imply that there are not objective vul-

nerabilities that stimulate particular beliefs and that

this is often the result of well-reasoned processes. As

argued later in the chapter, and more extensively in

chapter 2, there are strong reasons to associate the

new context of the Anthropocene, and the inequali-

ties that characterize it, as the background against

which a new generation of threats to human security

is playing out.

The Index of Perceived Human Insecurity

To get a sense of how people understand and per-

ceive their security beyond what can be grasped from

objective indicators of achievements in wellbeing,

this Report introduces the Index of Perceived Human

Insecurity (I-PHI; see annex 1.2 for details).



It is

based on population- representative data from the

World Values Survey for 74 countries and territories

covering more than 80 percent of the world’s people.

It captures perceived threats across dierent dimen-

sions of daily life in citizen security, socioeconomic

security and violent conict.

The results are striking.

Most people in the world feel insecure: fewer than 1

in 7 people at the global level feel secure or relatively

secure.



More than half of the global population feels

aected by very high human insecurity, as specied

on the I-PHI.



Perceived human insecurity is high across all

Human Development Index (HDI) groups, with more

than three-quarters of the population feeling inse-

cure, even in very high HDI countries (gure 1.1). But

lower HDI countries register even higher perceived

human security, suggesting a negative association be-

tween HDI value and I-PHI value (gure 1.2).

In addition to being high, the perception of human

insecurity has increased over time for most countries

with comparable data. This increase registered across

16 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

all HDI groups, but some of the largest increases were

in very high HDI countries (gure 1.3).

This suggests that the positive association be-

tween HDI value and I-PHI value gleaned from the

cross-sectional analysis may not reveal much about

the extent to which achievements in wellbeing can

insulate people from feeling insecure. In fact, when

individuals, rather than countries, are grouped by

I-PHI value, the higher the perception of human se-

curity, the higher the level of trust in others tends to

be, a result that holds for dierent levels of satisfac-

tion with the nancial situation (gure 1.4). But the

opposite is not the case: for people who feel very in-

secure, greater nancial satisfaction is not associated

Figure 1.1 Even in very high Human Development Index countries, less than a quarter of people feel secure

Source: Human Development Report Office, based on World Values Survey, latest available wave.

29%

64%

Low and

medium Human

Development

Index

Secure Moderately insecure Very insecure

14%

31%

55%

23%

40%

37%

High

Human

Development

Index

Very high

Human

Development

Index

Perceived insecurity:

Figure 1.2 Human insecurity tends to be higher in countries with lower Human Development Index values

Source: 

Index of Perceived Human Insecurity value, most recent year

0.8

0.500 0.600 0.900 1.0000.700 0.800

Human Development Index value, 2019

0.6

0.4

0.2

 17

Figure 1.3 Human insecurity is increasing in most countries— and surging in some very high Human

Development Index countries

Note: Bubble size represents the country population.

a. Refers to the change between waves 6 and 7 of the World Values Survey for countries with comparable data.

Source: 

Change in Index of Perceived

Human Insecurity value

0.500 0.600 0.900 1.0000.700 0.800

Human Development Index (HDI) value, 2019

Increase in

perceived

insecurity

Reduction in

perceived

insecurity

Very high

HDI countries

0.15

0.10

0.05

–0.05

–0.10

Figure 1.4 Where human security is higher, trust tends to be higher, regardless of satisfaction with one’s

financial situation

Note: Pooled individual-based data with equal weights across countries.

0.13

0.19

0.26

0.15

0.24

0.35

0.16

0.25

0.44

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4

Dissatisfied

Moderately

dissatisfied Satisfied

Relatively secure

Perception of insecurity

Moderately insecure

Very insecure

Satisfaction with financial situation

Level of trust

Level of trust Level of trust

18 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

with a signicant jump in trust. This strong link be-

tween human security and trust also holds when in-

come and life satisfaction are controlled for.



Given

the importance of this nding for the conclusions

later in the chapter, it is crucial to be clear about the

meaning that emanates from answers to the World

Values Survey’s trust question, how it can be inter-

preted and the cautions that must be borne in mind.

What is trust?

Trust is yet another belief.



But what is trust, exact-

ly? It has been dened in multiple ways in dierent

contexts (box 1.2). In the context of the World Val-

ues Survey, it is measured by answering the ques-

tion, “Generally speaking, would you say that most

people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful

Box 1.2 Trust’s many faces

Trust is a complex concept. As sociologist Blaine

Robbins wrote, “Despite decades of interdisciplinary

research on trust, the literature remains fragmented

and balkanized with little consensus regarding

its origins.”

Even with this lack of consensus in

the definition and origins, there is widespread

belief that trust has been an important element in

the development and sophistication of societies

throughout history — mainly because it has been

essential for cooperation and collective action.

One of the purported paradoxes around trust

relates to there being higher trust than a rational

agent model where people pursue their self-interest

would suggest. Most economic theory assumes

that trust arises when people are optimistic about

the trustworthiness of others, but evidence shows

that people trust at higher rates than predicted

by reasons to be trustworthy (including past

behaviour). This excess trust seems to be driven by

norms — either social or moral.

This result provides

reason for optimism: this excess trust could be a

lever for increased cooperation among strangers

and beyond the close ties usually associated with

reciprocal relationships.

The result has been reflected, for instance, in

the voluntary payment of taxes. In 1972 Michael

Allingham and Agnar Sandmo modelled tax evasion

under a standard rational utility maximization

framework where the agent conducts a cost-benefit

calculation between the cost of being caught

evading tax systems and the monetary benefit of

the evasion.

But empirical evidence has shown that

the model consistently underestimates the amount

of taxes people pay. This paradox has promoted the

literature on tax morale — or the reasons beyond

pure rational maximization of self-interest driving

people to comply with the tax authorities.

Trust has been important both in interpersonal

relations and in institution building. Institutional

evolution is closely linked to trust in at least two ways,

as Benjamin Ho explains. First is that institutions rely

on trust to function — modern money, for instance,

depends on the belief that it will be accepted as a

medium of exchange regularly and independent

of who carries it. The second is that institutions are

often designed to create and facilitate trust, in ever

expanding scales of complexity.

Not all trust is good, though, and institutional

development has been imperfect across time and

countries. Some institutions have been designed

to expand trust among groups sharing similar

traits — known as in-group trust. In-group trust can

thus promote polarization, be detrimental to equity

and democracy and be exploited by some political

leaders.

The challenge when promoting trust in the

context of human security strategies is to promote,

support and use existing generalized trust and

address the behavioural biases and institutional

designs that favour in-group trust. Cosmopolitan

views and moral universalism — altruism towards

strangers compared with altruism towards in-group

members — may be invoked when designing and

implementing strategies to advance human security,

as elaborated later in the chapter. Some evidence

shows that universalist views are associated

with demographic characteristics: age, place of

residence, religious beliefs and income level.

Yet a

recent study by the United Nations Children’s Fund

and Gallup shows that young people are almost

twice as likely as older people to declare their

identification with the world as opposed to local or

national community.

Notes

1.2.Dunning and others

2014. 3.Allingam and Sandmo 1972. 4.Ho 2021. 5.Gjoneska and

others 2019. 6. Enke, Rodriguez-Padilla and Zimmermann 2021.

7.UNICEF and Gallup 2021.

 19

in dealing with people?” The answer appears to con-

form to actual behaviour when people interact with

others.



It captures what has been characterized as

generalized trust (the trust placed in others in general

and not for a particular reason or interest



) or imper-

sonal trust (establishing a default way of interacting

with strangers



Understood in this way, it is clear that social life,

in any context, would be very dicult, if not impos-

sible, without impersonal trust.



Trust matters be-

cause it enables cooperation, which “is conditional

on the belief that the other party is not a sucker (is not

disposed to grant trust blindly), but also on the belief

that the other will be well disposed towards us if we

make the right move.”



Therefore, trust is not some-

thing that should always be maximized: even for in-

dividual welfare too much or too little trust is shown

to be harmful.



And we may want less trust among

groups that are threatening us (when engaged in illicit

activities, for instance), so it is not possible to say that

more trust is always desirable.



Given the importance of trust for cooperation, dif-

ferences in impersonal trust across countries are as-

sociated with several economic and social outcomes.

Higher average impersonal trust for countries is posi-

tively correlated with income, economic productivity

and government eectiveness and negatively correlat-

ed with corruption. Evidence suggests that impersonal

trust is part of a cultural and psychological package of

pro-social norms, expectations and motivations that

are historical antecedents of these outcomes.



This cross-country analysis needs to be interpret-

ed carefully, for trust increases when individuals are

socially closer.



And the answer to the World Values

Survey question in some contexts — particularly in

East Asia — is interpreted as trusting others premised

on the existence of dense social networks that create

social and economic interdependence, as opposed

to trusting “strangers” unconditionally. More impor-

tant, there are very large dierences in trust within

countries, even larger than across countries.



Factors

associated with individual preference “types” (being

more or less altruistic, for instance) appear to account

for a large amount of variation in trust across people,

more than can be explained by the country where

people live.



In this context it is crucial to emphasize

again that the ndings of an association between high

human insecurity and low interpersonal trust are at

the level of individuals — not based on a cross-country

analysis.

The individual-level association between human

insecurity and impersonal trust matters for four main

reasons.

• First, evidence suggests that there are low and

declining levels of trust related to important in-

stitutions and policy outcomes, especially those

predicated on cooperation.



• Second, while motives, interests and incentives

are crucial for cooperation, even if people (or

countries) have the appropriate motives and inter-

ests, they still need to “know about each other’s

motives and trust each other”



— this takes us back

to Kaushik Basu’s emphasis on the importance of

beliefs noted earlier in the chapter — even if laws

are codied and enforced.

“

A human- development- with- human- insecurity

duality emerges from how the advancement of

human development has been pursued and from

fragmented security approaches that focus on

wellbeing achievements while neglecting agency

• Third, as this chapter develops later, agency is

central to implementing strategies to advance

human security. It is predicated on people having

freedoms, which include the possibility of disap-

pointing and frustrating others. That is why trust is

closely associated with freedom, having even been

described as a “device for coping with the freedom

of others,”



something that acquires heightened

relevance in contexts of uncertainty.



• Fourth, the importance of trust is likely to increase

in coming years, given that “in the twenty-rst

century, remote collaboration with both unknown

and known counterparts is increasing (in part due

to the recent pandemic), and much economic life is

now happening outside the boundaries of organiza-

tions, regions, and nations, making trust a ubiqui-

tous concern.”



Reasons to feel insecure: The Anthropocene context

and a new generation of threats to human security

This section argues that a human- development- with-

human- insecurity duality emerges from how the

20 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

advancement of human development has been pur-

sued and from fragmented security approaches that

focus on wellbeing achievements while neglecting

agency. Along with a persistent upward trend in well-

being achievements across regions, a new generation

of human insecurities has been emerging, to a signi-

cant degree as a byproduct of how development was

being pursued. This is evident from the emergence

of the Anthropocene context, in which new threats

to human security emerge, all linked to human ac-

tion and, for the most part, to activities that have until

now fuelled improvements in wellbeing.

The unprecedented context of the Anthropocene

is the backdrop for a new generation of threats that

are global, systemic and interlinked. This new reali-

ty gives strong objective reasons for people not only

to perceive high human insecurity but also to believe

that wellbeing achievements — previously conceived

of as development achievements — are insucient to

address human security concerns. This section high-

lights threats related to digital technologies (though

much good can also come out of their diusion), vi-

olent conict, inequalities across groups (to focus

on the notion of social imbalance) and inadequacies

in current healthcare systems. All these exhibit new

characteristics compared with what was covered in

previous seminal reports on human security, nota-

bly the 1994 Human Development Report and the

2003 Ogata-Sen report,



but are not meant to be an

exhaustive list. Rather than organize the discussion

around groups of people, the focus is on these four

threats, as elaborated in part II of the Report, be-

cause this approach allows for a more exible under-

standing of the structural challenges and the possible

structural responses (gure 1.5).

“

Ensuring that people live free from want,

fear and indignity requires a comprehensive,

systemic approach. We have come to realize

that higher incomes, for instance, do not

automatically bring about peace and that a

society without violent conict is not a sucient

condition for people to live in dignity

These four threats, in their interconnectedness,

present a growing challenge for decisionmakers, for

the development journeys unfolding have often un-

derplayed not only agency but also the interactions

across threats. The attention of the public and pol-

icymakers has been on separate aspects when de-

signing or evaluating policy, leading to the pursuit of

solutions to problems in silos, failing to recognize the

possibility that each solution may have unintended

consequences and may exacerbate other problems.

To address this challenge, the relevance of the

human security concept becomes apparent in part

because one of the most important aspects empha-

sized since its inception is the recognition that the

three aspirations that dene it cannot be thought of

independently, as noted above.



Ensuring that peo-

ple live free from want, fear and indignity requires a

comprehensive, systemic approach. We have come to

realize that higher incomes, for instance, do not auto-

matically bring about peace and that a society with-

out violent conict is not a sucient condition for

people to live in dignity.



As Oscar Gomez and Des

Gasper write, “Even a human development perspec-

tive, focused on improvement for persons in all major

areas of life which they have good reason to value,

rather than centred on measured economic growth or

technological display, is insucient for dealing with

Figure 1.5 A new generation of threats to human security

is playing out in the unprecedented context of the

Anthropocene

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Digital

technology

threats

Health

threats

Inequalities

Violent

conflict

Other

threats

 21

the real world of interconnecting threats and recur-

rent crises, if it retains the linear model.”



One could argue that everything has always been

connected to everything else, but the Anthropocene

context heightens the importance of recognizing

these interdependencies. Virtually all people’s eorts

to nd solutions to development problems result in

actions that are mounting planetary pressures in one

way or another.



The 2020 Human Development

Report argued that industrial societies today meet

their energy and material needs in ways that result in

planetary pressures that drive dangerous planetary

change.



To meet our energy needs, we continue to

rely primarily on fossil fuels, which results in green-

house gas emissions that are driving climate change.

And we use materials with little concern for the dis-

ruptions to material cycles: the use of nitrogen in fer-

tilizer is just one example. For an illustration of how

the solving-one-problem-at-a-time approach may be

problematic, consider how the increased use of re-

newable energy and batteries is leading to increased

extraction of minerals that we know are limited and

for which we have few substitutes at present, often in

contexts where there are massive threats to biodiver-

sity and violations of human rights.

As countries have increased their Human Devel-

opment Index value, planetary pressures have inten-

sied, on average, as measured by a new index of

planetary pressures (gure 1.6). This index combines

two indicators, carbon dioxide emissions (to account

for the pressures emanating from the reliance on fos-

sil fuels for energy) and material footprint (to indicate

the extent to which we do not consider the disrup-

tion to material cycles). No country has been able to

reach a very high HDI value without exerting high

planetary pressures. These pressures are now causing

new forms of risks linked to climate change (storms,

oods, heat waves), biodiversity loss (irreparable but

also with implications for the productivity and resil-

ience of ecosystems) and zoonotic diseases (of which

Covid-19 is the latest in a series of more frequent

events).



“

No country has been able to reach a very

high HDI value without exerting high planetary

pressures. These pressures are now causing new

forms of risks linked to climate change (storms,

oods, heat waves), biodiversity loss (irreparable

but also with implications for the productivity and

resilience of ecosystems) and zoonotic diseases

It is against this background that part II of the Re-

port explores the nature and implications of four

types of threats to human security.

• Digital technology threats. Advances in digital

technologies have been key to advances in many

dimensions of human development (from access

to health and education services to fostering

capabilities linked to access to information and

communication), but they carry signicant risks.

Some aspects of new information and digital

technologies are reshaping social and family inter-

actions, working conditions and leisure activities.

The concentration of power among some new

corporate players and the speed of the changes un-

folding create challenges for policymakers and so-

cieties. These dynamics aect those immersed in

the digital world as well as those outside (3 billion

people without access to internet).



Some of these

changes present negative side eects on many

fronts: abuse of power and political domination

can result from the concentration of the control of

information and data by technological providers

Figure 1.6 Higher Human Development Index

values have come with higher planetary pressures

Note: The index of planetary pressures is based on carbon dioxide



Source: 

Low HDI

Medium HDI

High

HDI

Very high

HDI

Index of planetary pressures value

0.200 1.000

Human Development Index (HDI) value,

1990–2019

0.400 0.600 0.800

0.200

0.150

0.100

0.050

0.000

22 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

and governments, curtailing liberties, widening

inequalities and spreading misinformation that

fuels polarization.

• Violent conict. Higher income co-exists with

growing numbers of people aected by conict —

today, more than one in four people in the world is

aected by conict. In 2020 the number of forcibly

displaced people — many of whom are eeing from

violent conict — reached 82.4 million,



twice the

level in 2010.



Killings of environmental activists

(linked again to the intersection of violence and

the Anthropocene context) have risen consistently

over the last two decades.



Nonstate conict fatal-

ities have shot up in high HDI countries (gure 1.7).

• Inequalities across groups. This Report primarily

explores inequalities across groups as assaults on

dignity because there is no reason to treat people in

a discriminatory way simply because they choose

to self-identify as a member of or are otherwise

associated with a group (among possibly many

others). These inequalities remain pervasive today.

This is true across countries but also within coun-

tries. Inequalities in power relations also hurt the

dignity of people, sometimes independent of their

socioeconomic status, if they are insuciently

empowered. The #MeToo movement has shown

the pervasive gender inequalities across industries

and societies. Even a group of highly accomplished

women faced hidden forms of violence and, for

a long time, did not believe that conditions per-

mitted them to expose their aggressors. That this

happened in the high-prole entertainment in-

dustry, where women are visible and have millions

listening to what they say, highlights the day-to-

day abuse elsewhere when women are voiceless.

It is also a reminder that what we consider success

often hides areas of deep insecurity, and it pro-

vides a concrete example of the duality of human

insecurity with income achievements. This Report

shows how many other groups remain consistently

and historically marginalized, suering systematic

assaults on their dignity and therefore their human

security.

• Healthcare systems. The eects of Covid-19, de-

clared a pandemic in March 2020, have spread

to nearly everyone in the world, attacking all

Figure 1.7 Nonstate conflict fatalities have been increasing in high Human Development Index countries

Note: Excludes very high Human Development Index countries because of the lack of reported data over time. The very high HDI countries







Source: Human Development Report Office based on Uppsala Conflict Data Program Non-State Conflict Dataset version 21.1.

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

Low Medium

Human Development Index group

High

Nonstate conflict fatalities

 23

dimensions of human development.



By the sec-

ond quarter of 2020, most economies were con-

tracting at record rates, and 90 percent of children

were unable to physically attend schools. This is

unprecedented because it was mediated by a high-

ly interconnected and globalized world with the

highest level of human development on record. It

exposed the limitations of health systems, nation-

ally and internationally, especially the widespread

lack of coordination at many scales, reected more

glaringly in large disparities in vaccine access

across countries and in vaccine use within some

countries.

The corollary is that improvements in wellbeing,

measured by, say, the HDI, do not guarantee human

security.



And this gap between human develop-

ment and human security could be exacerbated by

the reinforcing dynamics among the four threats.

For example, climate change adds pressure to the

forces displacing people and to the scarcity of some

resources. However, this does not imply that human

development should not be pursued or that human

development never promotes human security. To the

contrary, the two can be compatible and complemen-

tary. That is why, in advancing human development,

human security should be a consistent — indeed a

permanent — focus of attention.

“

Not every “security action” leads to greater

human security, particularly if it leads to

greater security for one group at the expense

of the security of other groups or if it promotes

some freedoms while restricting others

However, the human security concept’s ability to

account for the complexity of today’s world and gen-

erate agency cannot be taken for granted. Not every

“security action” leads to greater human security,

particularly if it leads to greater security for one group

at the expense of the security of other groups or if it

promotes some freedoms while restricting others.

Take the siloed or fragmented views of security.

Policies for food security can increase planetary pres-

sures through deforestation and single crop practic-

es, resulting in greater risks due to climate change

and biodiversity loss. Policies to enhance economic

security, such as expanding nancial markets to di-

versify risks and smooth consumption, can become

procyclical and increase systemic risks. National se-

curity policies can generate an arms race, diverting

resources from human needs. Another case is the

use of the security narrative to justify hegemony.



other words we cannot rule out that the true motive

behind a security policy (including one labelled as a

human security policy)



is to entrench power in po-

litical, economic and social institutions. States, com-

panies, political actors and patriarchal structures can

use “security concerns” to defend or promote priv-

ileges. In such cases short-term protection can be

achieved at the expense of long-term agency.

The rest of the chapter shows how the human se-

curity concept can illuminate how the gap emerges

between wellbeing achievements and perceptions of

human insecurity and how the human security frame

itself may need to be enriched to account for the new

planetary and social reality of the Anthropocene.

Towards human security through

the “eyes of humankind”

The heightened relevance of human

security: Bringing agency to the fore

The concept of human security is almost three dec-

ades old. It came about in a very specic context of

geopolitical change. After the fall of the Berlin Wall,

there was a renewed sense of possibility — with the

expectation of a new era of peace, including a repur-

posing of military spending for other goals, since the

cloud of military confrontation between two major

powers had cleared (see annex 1.1). So, what makes

it relevant today, in a very dierent world, with so

many of the hopeful expectations of the mid-1990s

shattered?

It is relevant because the expectation — or maybe

hope — that higher incomes would, by themselves,

bring about human security has been clearly dashed.

As documented in part II of the Report, military

spending shows no signs of abating — instead of a

peace dividend, we confront a world with violent con-

ict aicting more than a billion people. As argued

in the preceding sections, even before the Covid-19

pandemic perceptions of human insecurity were high

and growing — and surging in places with the highest

HDI values. And in 2021, with the world hitting re-

cord high GDPs per capita, deaths related to Covid-19

24 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

surpassed 5 million people.



Poverty and hunger are

greater than just ve years ago, and a generation-wide

education crisis will have long-lasting consequences.

Moreover, the human security concept was not fro-

zen in 1994. Many scholars and practitioners have

added nuance, extensions and claims that it repre-

sented something that was important to them. It

evolved to an extent that, as Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh

put it, “What was supposed to be a simple, noble and

obvious idea soon became engulfed in a cacophony

of political and academic debates centred on its de-

nitions, their advantages and weak points, and on its

theoretical and practical applicability.”



“

Under the background of the Anthropocene

context, threats to human security are interlinked

And yet the concept survives and gains salience —

perhaps primarily because it captures the core of the

intersection of human rights, peace and develop-

ment, building on the UN foundational documents:

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

UN Charter. Many national governments and inter-

national organizations, as well as civil society and

academia, have devoted considerable energy and re-

sources to making human security a central part of

the debate on international cooperation. Over time

the human security concept has evolved towards

what may be better described as a discourse with

many dierent strands — as a concept and objective,

as an analytical frame, as a policy philosophy and as

a policy planning approach.



These dierent strands

remain anchored on a set of ideas tied to the UN

foundational documents that will continue to evolve.

So, in using the term “human security frame,” this

Report means those foundational ideas, which have

been used in dierent ways to arm dierent im-

plementation principles:



people-centred, compre-

hensive, context-specic, prevention-oriented and

focused on promoting protection and empowerment.

The previous section showed the relevance of being

people-centred and having a comprehensive perspec-

tive, under the background of the Anthropocene con-

text, where threats to human security are interlinked.

The frame of human security acquires heightened

relevance in light of the protection and empower-

ment strategies underscored in the 2003 Ogata-Sen

report. In their own words: “Protection strategies,

set up by states, international agencies, NGOs [non-

governmental organizations] and the private sector,

shield people from menaces. Empowerment strat-

egies enable people to develop their resilience to dif-

cult conditions.”



The preceding section, and the

analysis in part II of the Report, make abundantly

clear the major shortcomings that exist today in pro-

tecting and empowering people. So it is crucial not

only to rearm the importance of these strategies

for human security but also to strengthen them in the

face of a planet undergoing dangerous changes for

people and many other forms of life.

These dangerous planetary changes are the result

of actions by people themselves. The main threats to

human security today, in the Anthropocene context,

do not emanate from a massive volcanic eruption or

an asteroid hitting Earth — which we may even be able

to prevent. Toby Ord has estimated that, for the rst

time in human history, existential threats to human-

kind are anthropogenic, as opposed to being linked

to natural hazards.



As chapter 2 makes clear, the

implications of these dangerous planetary changes

are being felt all around, and in many cases they are

exacerbating inequalities — even if people with high

incomes are not spared from the harmful eects, as

they too report feeling insecure, despite having the

means to cope with many of the threats.

If people are the drivers of dangerous planetary

changes, they have to be the agents that bring about

what it takes to implement protection and empow-

erment strategies. It is in this context that agency

acquires central importance. Agency is used here

as dened by Amartya Sen: “someone who acts and

brings about change, and whose achievements can

be judged in terms of her own values and objectives,

whether or not we assess them in terms of some ex-

ternal criteria as well.”



What is agency?

Agency is instrumental in enacting protection and

empowerment strategies, and in part it means

meaningful participation at dierent levels of deci-

sionmaking. When this happens, tensions between

protection and empowerment may be more appar-

ent than real, because agency implies that protection

is provided in a context of participation, deliberation

and dialogue. This is not a mere abstraction (box 1.3),

 25

nor does it imply that designing or implementing

strategies with broad participation, deliberation and

dialogue is easy. Still, the challenges should not limit

the ambition of participatory processes and commu-

nity engagement. Some international conventions

have paved the road for active participation of groups

in matters that aect them directly. The International

Labour Organization’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples

Convention — commonly referred to by the number,

169 — includes a clear directive on the participation

of indigenous peoples in identifying priorities and

designing policies through free, prior and informed

consent.



A focus on agency thus brings legitimacy to specif-

ic strategies and initiatives. A way of summarizing

the importance of the instrumental role of agency

for human security is to consider it an enabler of pro-

tection and empowerment strategies that are legiti-

mate and eective. Achievements related to agency

do not necessarily overlap with those related to well-

being: people can act based on values and commit-

ments that may or may not advance their wellbeing.

For instance, people care about how others are treat-

ed and about what they see as fair and may care in-

trinsically about many aspects of nature, even if that

has no bearing on their wellbeing — and may even be

detrimental to it. If we measure development pro-

gress, or evaluate policies, on the basis of wellbeing

achievements alone, we can neglect — or even ignore

— agency. That blind spot was revealed in the preced-

ing sections, and the exploration of human security in

this section helps illuminate it.

“

Agency is instrumental in enacting

protection and empowerment strategies, and

in part it means meaningful participation

at dierent levels of decisionmaking

In addition, as Amartya Sen argued forcefully,

agency matters beyond the achievements that emerge

from people acting on their value and commitments.

Not only is it crucial to illuminate the blind spots left

when outcomes linked to agency are neglected, but

it is also central to consider the freedoms that people

Box 1.3 Agency in policy design: An example of participatory development

How could agency and active participation look in

policy design?

There are some useful examples on environ-

mental policy. Claudia Pahl-Wostl describes the

European water policy under the Water Framework

Directive, which “requires public information and

participation and encourages the active involve-

ment of all affected parties in the development of

the management plan.”

Pahl-Wostl clearly differentiates between par-

ticipation of the general public and participation of

stakeholders. In her words:

• “General public: Citizen participation involving

the public at large in issues of general concern

e.g., citizens in their role as voters who have to

decide on adopting energy taxes.”

• “Stakeholder participation: involving specific

stakeholder groups — the various groups are ad-

dressed in their specific roles and relative to their

stakes in a particular environmental issue — e.g.,

the inhabitants of an area directly affected by

an air pollution problem.”

An additional aspect of the participatory frame-

work refers to the stage of the decisionmaking

process that will require the participation of the

general public and stakeholders. These stages, ac-

cording to Pahl-Wostl, are:

• “Agenda setting: an early stage of issue definition

as soon as a problem enters the public agenda.

The goal of the participatory process here is to

map out the diversity of arguments and opinions

on the issue.”

• “Shaping the issue: developing a plan for resolving

the issue, when implementing an integrated river

basin management plan for example. The goal

of the participatory process here is to guarantee

that the management plan takes the various

perspectives into account.”

• “Implementation: in conflict situations arising from

specific issues in relation to the implementation

of certain measures. The goal of the participatory

process here is to achieve consensus to emerge

with a set of measures that can be realized.”

Elements of the participatory framework can

easily be exported to issues beyond environmental

policy.

Notes

1.Pahl-Wostl 2002. p. 5. 2.Pahl-Wostl 2002. p. 5. 3.Pahl-Wostl 2002. p. 5.

26 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

have to think and deliberate, whether they decide to

act or not: “Greater freedom enhances the ability of

people to help themselves and also to inuence the

world, and these matters are central to the process

of development.”



To achieve these freedoms, pro-

tection and empowerment are often essential. There

is thus a loop: agency is an enabler of protection and

empowerment, and protection and empowerment

provide conditions under which agency can be pro-

moted (gure 1.8). Because agency matters intrinsi-

cally (not only instrumentally), human security needs

to be a focus of permanent concern, something also

already recognized in the 2003 Ogata- Sen report.



The discussion thus far has rearmed the central-

ity of empowerment and protection and justied the

heightened relevance of the human security frame

for today’s world. But it did so within already estab-

lished frames for the human security concept — in

particular, the 2003 Ogata-Sen report. In the next

section the chapter concludes by exploring how to

further enrich the frame of human security for the

Anthropocene context and how to address more eq-

uitably and eectively the new threats discussed in

part II of the Report.

Affirming our common humanity on a changing

planet demands greater solidarity

The virtuous loop between human agency, on the

one hand, and empowerment and protection, on

the other, is focused mostly on individuals (or the

communities they form). But Oscar Gomez and Des

Gasper have emphasized the need to recognize that

human security depends on what happens across

communities that are connected: “One group can

typically only be secure if the groups with whom it is

signicantly connected are secure too.”



More fun-

damentally, the human security concept is founded

in part on highlighting “human interconnectedness,

including the interconnections of nations.”



The

universality of human security was already acknowl-

edged in the 1994 Human Development Report, even

if its instrumentalization has been rather slow.



Many aspects of these interconnections are not

new. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, we

have all heard that if the virus is spreading some-

where, people everywhere are vulnerable. But the

movement of people has spread new and old commu-

nicable diseases across continents for millennia. Still,

in today’s world this interconnection is global and ex-

panding to more aspects of life, as a large literature on

globalization has documented. How to ensure human

security in this interconnected world? Who partici-

pates in, designs and implements the protection and

empowerment strategies? Clearly, each sovereign

state has a central responsibility, with some arguing

that “human security is best guaranteed in the sov-

ereign state which is governed under the rule of law

with full respect for the human rights and fundamen-

tal freedoms of those who reside in its territory.”



States, each on its own, cannot

guarantee human security

But can each sovereign state, on its own, full this re-

sponsibility? The answer in our interconnected world

is clearly no, and it is possible to learn about how to

enhance human security in an interconnected world

from several eorts exploring how to “manage glo-

balization” in a world governed by sovereign states.

For example, the recognition of the need to provide

global public goods can enhance, rather than con-

strain, sovereignty.



Or how global governance is

already characterized by an intricate network of mul-

tiple actors.



Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Tharman Shan-

mugaratnam and Larry Summers set out a series of

specic proposals on how to transform multilateral-

ism for what they call a pandemic era — placing the

Covid-19 pandemic in a broader context of short-

comings in the provision of global public goods.



Figure 1.8 The virtuous cycle of agency, empowerment

and protection

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Protection

Empowerment

Agency

Enables

Promotes Promotes

Enables

 27

Recognizing that each state alone cannot fully

guarantee human security does not absolve states of

the responsibility to pursue it. Many — if not most —

of the practical actions that advance human security

are within the purview of national and subnational

governments, including local governments. And civil

society has a key role at the local level, including in

violent conict settings. As Mary Kaldor argued while

defending a broad denition of civil society, “I refer

to civilians or active citizens who are not involved in

ghting and who are concerned about the public in-

terest, especially women, and who oer a political al-

ternative to sectarian identities.”



“

As a new generation of threats to human

security looms large under the Anthropocene

context, the response needs to recognize that much

depends on the relationship between state and

society — and on the mutual trust between the two

Accepting that several actors and entities are at play

in enhancing human security, as a new generation of

threats to human security looms large under the An-

thropocene context, the response needs to recognize

that much depends on the relationship between state

and society — and on the mutual trust between the

two. A good deal has been made about the erosion of

trust in government institutions, dicult though it is

to dene with clarity the actual subject of trust. Is it

competence? Honesty? Military institutions are often

among the most trusted but also the most feared in

some countries. Is this high degree of trust in insti-

tutions a good thing?



To complicate things further,

evidence suggests that government institutions lack

trust in people’s ability to interpret information and

act responsibly and therefore to overprescribe with

much precision the behaviours to follow, further

hurting trust in government institutions.



Enhanced social contracts are not enough

One compelling way of strengthening this relation-

ship is renewing the social contract between the

state and people, as argued forcefully by UN Secre-

tary-General António Guterres in the 2020 Nelson

Mandela Annual Lecture: “A New Social Contract

within societies will enable young people to live in

dignity; will ensure women have the same prospects

and opportunities as men; and will protect the sick,

the vulnerable, and minorities of all kinds….Peo-

ple want social and economic systems that work for

everyone. They want their human rights and funda-

mental freedoms to be respected. They want a say in

decisions that aect their lives.”



In that same lecture Guterres recognized that en-

hanced social contracts are not enough and argued

for a “new global deal,” reecting that sovereign

states need to come together in some way to address

challenges related to our global interconnected-

ness. In Our Common Agenda, the Secretary-General

eshed out this broad notion in a series of more con-

crete recommendations, some resonating with the

reections noted above about how to manage glo-

balization in a world governed by nation-states.



is urgent to pursue this agenda, and, as argued next,

the human security frame can support this eort, es-

pecially if enriched to account for the Anthropocene

context.

Before elaborating on the implications of the An-

thropocene context, it is useful to reect further on

why better social contracts alone are not enough.

One reason is practical, as already noted. In an in-

terconnected world of sovereign states, internation-

al organizations, treaties and incentives must be

mobilized to bring states together to address shared

challenges. But Amartya Sen, in The Idea of Justice, ar-

ticulated a more fundamental set of reasons: “Assess-

ment of justice demands engagement with the eyes

of mankind. First, because we may variously identify

with the others elsewhere and not just with our local

community; second, because our choices and actions

may aect the lives of others far as well as near; and

third, because of what they see from their respective

perspectives of history and geography may help us to

overcome our own parochialism.”



Sen’s argument is in the context of the require-

ments for determining the conditions under which

ethical claims can be seen as impartial and fair, but

his caution about the limitations of a contractual ap-

proach can apply with force to a reection on human

security in today’s world. This is because, as argued

in this chapter, the world is not only interconnected

but also characterized by deep interdependencies

across people as well as between people and the plan-

et. The Anthropocene context gives greater urgen-

cy to recognizing these interdependencies using the

28 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

“eyes of humankind” as we consider how to enhance

human security.

Enter solidarity

When it comes to strategies to promote human se-

curity, protection and empowerment may not have

sucient force to enable us to enhance human secu-

rity through the “eyes of humankind.” It is not easy

or obvious what should be added or how. But here we

propose two elements as a contribution to enriching

the human security frame. First, to retain the central-

ity of agency, given that the arguments in the preced-

ing section remain even more relevant in light of this

discussion. Second, we propose to complement pro-

tection and empowerment strategies with solidari-

ty, understood as a commitment to work together to

navigate the challenges of the Anthropocene. Sol-

idarity sometimes connotes charity, an option that

people may or may not feel inclined to pursue, or im-

plies the need for collectivized actions that subsume

the interests of the individual to a collective pursuit —

neither is implied here. To be clear, solidarity in our

proposal takes the meaning suggested by Caesar Atu-

ire and Nicole Hassoun: “broadly, a sympathetic and

imaginative enactment of collaborative measures to

enhance our given or acquired relatedness so that to-

gether we fare well enough.”



Central to this under-

standing is that solidarity in this context binds us in

our shared humanity, above and beyond the many

reasons for having solidarity within groups.



“

We propose to complement protection

and empowerment strategies with solidarity,

understood as a commitment to work together

to navigate the challenges of the Anthropocene

The relevance of solidarity echoes the UN Secre-

tary-General’s appeal in Our Common Agenda



and

links to the concept of common security articulated

by Oscar Gomez and Des Gasper.



A commitment

to solidarity may appear as something inadequate in

the face of the unprecedented reality of the Anthro-

pocene and the new generation of threats to human

security explored in this Report. A more concrete

recommendation for something more binding and

denitive certainly has great appeal. But recall the

quote by Kaushik Basu at the outset of this chapter,

which reminds us how much we depend on beliefs,

including when we think about laws and the institu-

tions with the power to enforce them. In addition,

appeals to protect others from threats appear to be a

more evocative and powerful motivator for eliciting

“cosmopolitan behaviour” — meaning, caring more

about the world as a whole than one’s national in-

group — than appeals to transfer from the well-o to

those less privileged.



In other words appeals grant-

ing security to others are more powerful than appeals

to redistribute benets.

Moreover, the unprecedented nature of the

Anthropocene — and the commitments to transform

our economies and societies — implies uncertainty

that might even make it impossible to specify with

precision the policies and institutions needed. Some

may have to be created from scratch. Adding solidari-

ty to empowerment and protection may not give con-

crete answers about what these might be, but doing

so may still provide for a systematic commitment to

consider the reality of dangerous planetary chang-

es. What is important to safeguard is the process

that enables public deliberation and reasoning from

where institutions and policies emerge to respond to

evolving threats to human security, recognizing that

people, in the words of Albert O. Hirschman, are

“self-evaluating beings.”



At the same time, as with the 1994 Human Devel-

opment Report, this proposal is made in a very spe-

cic context. Today we confront a context with, as

documented earlier in the chapter, a strong associa-

tion between perceptions of lack of human security

and low interpersonal trust. It is dicult to establish

causality in this relationship, though it probably runs

both ways. On the one hand, evidence suggests that

when insecurity increases, trust goes down. On the

other, low interpersonal trust spills over to low trust

in many government institutions and governments

themselves, creating conditions under which peo-

ple may feel less secure. As discussed earlier in the

chapter, trust is complex and multifaceted, with great

diversity in interpersonal trust across and within

countries. But it is not dicult to accept that, for the

most part, with the prevailing levels of interpersonal

trust and other types of trust today, it might be di-

cult to make systematic commitments to solidarity.

This section concludes by bringing together the

threads that led to the proposal to enrich the frame

 29

of human security (gure 1.9). Agency remains cen-

tral for human security but is something that enables

not only empowerment and protection but also soli-

darity. Solidarity, in turn, promotes agency in a way

that is mindful of the deep interdependencies across

people, and between people and development, in the

Anthropocene. In the current context trust demands

concern and attention. It is not added structural-

ly to the framing, because other relevant issues may

emerge over time that determine how the framework

functions — and because, from a more hopeful per-

spective, it may improve to levels that no longer make

it a concern. What remain central, however, are agen-

cy and the pursuit of protection, empowerment and

solidarity to advance human security in the Anthro-

pocene context.

Towards the next generation of human

security: From strategies to actions

The analysis of the previous sections species the

three main strategies for human security in the An-

thropocene: protection, empowerment and solidarity,

boosted by enhanced agency. But practical questions

remain about action and implementation: Who acts?

For whom? Why? How? And with which objective?

“

On the one hand, evidence suggests that

when insecurity increases, trust goes down. On

the other, low interpersonal trust spills over to

low trust in many government institutions and

governments themselves, creating conditions

under which people may feel less secure

A revised framework for action in the next gener-

ation of human security is built on the shoulders of

the 1994 Human Development Report,



the 2003

Ogata-Sen report



and the UN Secretary-General’s

2013 report on human security.



The innovations re-

ect not only the analysis previously presented in this

chapter but also the cumulative learning over the last

decade, including insights from the Human Security

Handbook,



relevant academic work and discussions

at the June 2021 Symposium on Human Security con-

vened to inform the preparation of this Report.

The human security concept — based on freedom

from want, freedom from fear and freedom from

Figure 1.9 Advancing human security in the Anthropocene context: Adding solidarity to protection and

empowerment

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Protection

Empowerment

Solidarity

Agency

Enables

Promotes Promotes

Enables

Trust

Enables Promotes

30 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

indignity — and main principles for action — people-

centred, comprehensive, context-specic and

prevention-oriented — continue to be as relevant as

ever (table 1.1).

But the analysis in this Report suggests possible up-

dates in emphasis and some new elements.

• On the agents: Move beyond traditional agents for

change. While governments and multilateral or-

ganizations retain their fundamental roles, the

next generation of human security builds on the

role of a wider set of agents acting in new ways. For

instance, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown how

everyone can be an active agent of human security

by following rules of social behaviour. Similarly, in-

digenous groups should be acknowledged as agents

of human security through their local actions in the

sustainable management of forests.

• On the targets: Move beyond human security for

developing countries. The Anthropocene is global,

with dierentiated (and often interconnected)

local eects. Several of the compounded eects of

climate change, biodiversity loss, technology-led

threats, conicts, forced displacement, inequalities

and pandemics require action of global scope from

multilateral organizations, national governments

and local actors. This new view should strengthen

action for human security in developing countries

— but as part of a broader framework that stresses

both the universal and intrinsic importance of

human security and its instrumental role. The

Covid-19 pandemic shows how the local contain-

ment of new variants can have positive global

eects.

“

Move beyond traditional agents for

change: While governments and multilateral

organizations retain their fundamental roles, the

next generation of human security builds on the

role of a wider set of agents acting in new ways

• On the threats: Move beyond siloed security ap-

proaches. Human security in the face of the in-

terlinked threats of the Anthropocene context

cannot be attained in silos. The human security

framework for action can be an integrator. Again,

the health shock of the Covid-19 pandemic aect-

ed all dimensions of human development. Future

preventive approaches should be integrated across

Table 1.1 Evolution of the action framework for human security in the Anthropocene context

Component Existing Next generation

Principles  People-centred

 Comprehensive

 Context-specific

 Prevention-oriented

 People-centred

 Comprehensive

 Context-specific

 Prevention-oriented

Agents  Governments and UN entities

 Nongovernmental actors

 Governments and UN entities

 Nongovernmental actors

 Enhanced role for the agency of people everywhere.

Integrated networks of agents: networked multilateralism,

greater emphasis on collective action and greater space for

social norms at the local and global levels.

Targets  Universality

 People, mainly in developing countries

 Universality

 People everywhere through common security, for one’s

security depends on the security of others.

 Reduce planetary pressures.

 Enhance resilience of ecosystems

Threats  Widespread in communities, cross-cutting across





 Widespread in communities, cross-cutting across sectors,





 Anthropocene context of compounded threats

 Anthropocene risks

 Advanced technologies

 Inequalities as an assault to dignity

 Violent conflict

 New health challenges

Key strategies  Protection–empowerment  Protection–empowerment–solidarity

 Foster agency to strengthen the links among protection,

empowerment and solidarity

Source: 

 31

sectors, with a global view. For instance, the ine-

quality in the distribution of vaccines in 2021 can

have enormous costs for human security in com-

ing years if it contributes to the emergence of new

variants.

“

Move beyond siloed security approaches:

Human security in the face of the interlinked

threats of the Anthropocene context cannot

be attained in silos. The human security

framework for action can be an integrator

• On the key strategies: Add solidarity for human

security in an interconnected world. Agency simul-

taneously boosts the strategies of protection, em-

powerment and solidarity. These strategies can be

expanded and scaled up under a human security

policy framework if they are backed by a broader

set of implementation tools. At the global level the

key strategies should lead to the adequate and eq-

uitable provision of global public goods.

Human security is an intrinsic complement to

human development in the Anthropocene context.

Permanent and universal attention to the next gen-

eration of human security can end the development-

with-human insecurity pathways that produce

pandemics, climate change and the broader predic-

aments of the Anthropocene. The 2030 Agenda for

Sustainable Development and the Sustainable De-

velopment Goals set ambitious multidimensional ob-

jectives that not only inform action at these levels but

also mobilize the international community. But cur-

rent eorts are still largely compartmentalized, deal-

ing separately with climate change, biodiversity loss,

conicts, migration, refugees, pandemics and data

protection. Those eorts should be strengthened, but

tackling them in silos is insucient in the Anthropo-

cene. The next generation of human security should

Box 1.4 Human security and the Sustainable Development Goals

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were

agreed in September 2015

because of the rec-

ognition that the world would not be sustainable

unless “we the peoples” take transformative steps

in mindset, norms and lifestyle. The 2030 target

seemed symbolic, but it turned out to be prescient.

If we, everyone on the planet, fail to change course,

we may miss the last opportunity to make our world

sustainable. The 2030 Agenda resolution stressed

this point succinctly:

Today we are also taking a decision of great his-

toric significance. We resolve to build a better fu-

ture for all people, including the millions who have

been denied the chance to lead decent, dignified

and rewarding lives and to achieve their full hu-

man potential. We can be the first generation to

succeed in ending poverty; just as we may be the

last to have a chance of saving the planet. The

world will be a better place in 2030 if we succeed

in our objectives.

The resolution stresses that “the dignity of the hu-

man person is fundamental,” that “we wish to see the

Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples

and for all segments of society” and that “we will

endeavour to reach the furthest behind first.” It also

includes elements of resilience and prevention as

part of the SDGs, though none of the 17 goals refers

explicitly to crisis management or shock responses.

A systemic approach and a consultative nature are

two common guiding features from the SDGs and

of policies inspired by the human security concept.

The SDGs explicitly recognize the interlinkages of

current threats and challenges. Moreover, the 2030

Agenda was the result of a consultative process

— and the ideas of collaboration and partnership

are embedded in SDG 17. The SDGs also recognize

multilayered responsibilities and actions to tackle

current threats.

Successful implementation of both the 2030

Agenda and the pursuit of human security would

benefit from the constant learning between the two

connected and similar, if distinctive, approaches.

Specifically, SDG reporting, analysis and policy

design can use some ideas explored in human

security analysis: asking people about their

perceptions of priority values, threats and security;

identifying hotspots and using indexes; alternating

comprehensive comparative studies with in-depth

studies focusing on priorities (an approach called

flexible focusing); and systematically comparing

alternative policy routes.

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Notes

1.UN 2015a, para. 4. 2.Gasper 2011.

32 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

match the interlinked nature of the Sustainable De-

velopment Goals with comprehensive action that has

a system view (box 1.4).

“

Human security is an intrinsic complement

to human development in the Anthropocene

context. Permanent and universal attention to the

next generation of human security can end the

development-with-human insecurity pathways

that produce pandemics, climate change and

the broader predicaments of the Anthropocene

The role of human security as an integrator is not

simple — because social and natural systems are

complex, with high nonlinear interrelations among

their elements. Sensible implementation warrants

constant identication of the dynamics within the

system, by decisionmakers, stakeholders and citi-

zens. And the action framework needs to be embed-

ded within the dierent layers — local, national and

global — that aect people’s human security. It is a

high challenge but one that, as the Covid-19 pandem-

ic has shown us, cannot be avoided.

The human-development-with-human-insecurity

pathway, paired with the new generation of threats to

humanity, are powerful drivers to reassess and rethink

how we take action to ensure that all of humanity lives

free from want, free from fear and free from indigni-

ty. The rest of this Report uses integrated analysis of

compounding threats to show how we may respond to

the epochal changes in the way humans live — together

and in relation to our natural environment.

 33

Annex 1.1. A brief account of the

origins, achievements and challenges

of the human security concept

Based on Fuentes-Nieva and Lengfelder (2021).

The origins and the 1994 Human Development Report

The 1994 Human Development Report introduced

the modern concept of human security with a simple

central idea: moving away from national protection

towards individual security.



It was initially based

on the goals of freedom from want and freedom from

fear that were part of the foundational narrative be-

hind the creation of the international institutions of

the post–World War 2 era, including the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, whose preamble en-

visioned “a world in which human beings shall enjoy

the freedom of speech and belief and freedom from

fear and want has been proclaimed the highest aspi-

ration of the common people.”



By 1994 the end of the Cold War had created enor-

mous opportunities to rethink elements of the world

order. It was time, the 1994 Human Development Re-

port argued, to move away from the discussion of nu-

clear threats and potential conict between states and

to start paying attention to the day-to-day plight of

people around the world. In the report’s own words:

“For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more

from worries about daily life than from the dread of

a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their fami-

lies have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will

their streets and neighbourhoods be safe from crime?

Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they

become a victim of violence because of their gender?

Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for

persecution?”



The eort to put the individual at the centre of

security discussions and policies was a radical one

at the time. As later observers noted, “The overall

goal was to expand the concept of security, which

had ‘for too long been interpreted narrowly, as secu-

rity of territory from external aggression, or as pro-

tection of national interests in foreign policy or as

global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust.’

Human security was thus meant to change the ref-

erent object of security ‘from an exclusive stress on

territorial security to a much greater stress on peo-

ple’s security.’”



The human security concept was conceived as a

central part of an ambitious policy agenda under the

proposal of a new world social charter. This overar-

ching proposal included specic recommendations

such as increased resources for closing gaps in human

development to meet a set of global targets (a precur-

sor to the Millennium Development Goals), a global

human security fund to nance responses to crises

with a global logic and the establishment of the UN

Economic Security Council “to review the threats to

global human security and agree on the necessary

actions.”



A fundamental point in the 1994 Human Develop-

ment Report was capturing the peace dividend (the

savings from military spending) to support human

development. During the Cold War a large share of

scal resources were devoted to maintaining the mil-

itary balance, with an ensuing arms race. But total

military spending fell by 15 percent in industrialized

countries between 1987 (when it peaked) and 1991.

This change in spending priorities created an oppor-

tunity to relocate these resources elsewhere (and to

reduce decits). Most military spending focused on

national security, and merely suggesting to use some

of these resources to nance individual wellbeing

was important. The proposal included setting aside

this money in a demilitarization fund and then identi-

fying the development needs on where to use them.



The 1994 Human Development Report highlighted

four key characteristics of human security: universal-

ism, interdependence, prevention and people-cen-

tredness. Seven dimensions were identied as part of

a people-centred concept of security:

• Economic security (an assured basic livelihood de-

rived from work or reliable social safety nets).

• Food security (ready physical and economic access

to basic food).

• Health security (access to personal healthcare and

protective public health regimens).

• Environmental security (safety from natural disas-

ters and resource scarcity attendant upon environ-

mental degradation).

• Personal security (physical safety from violent

conict, human rights abuses, domestic violence,

crime, child abuse and self- inicted violence, as in

drug abuse).

34 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

• Community security (safety from oppressive com-

munity practices and from ethnic conict).

• Political security (freedom from state oppression

and abuses of human rights).

This characterization — admittedly overlapping

and incomplete — was eective to communicate the

idea of human security on several fronts, by match-

ing common policy portfolios (linked to ministries or

department titles) and facilitating the generation of

sectoral agendas.



Evolution of the concept: The 2003 Ogata-Sen

report and the UN General Assembly definition

The opportunity to revise the human security con-

cept came in the context of the 2000 UN Millennium

Summit, as UN Secretary-General Ko Annan called

for a world free of want and free of fear. In response,

the Commission on Human Security was established

in January 2001, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and

Amartya Sen. Its nal report, Human Security Now,

was presented in May 2003.



Human Security Now oered a new denition of

human security centred around ensuring the integ-

rity of a “vital core” in human lives, often interpret-

ed as set of basic capabilities: “to protect the vital

core of all human lives in ways that enhance human

freedoms and human fullment. Human security

means protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms

that are the essence of life. It means protecting peo-

ple from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread)

threats and situations. It means using processes that

build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means

creating political, social, environmental, economic,

military and cultural systems that together give peo-

ple the building blocks of survival, livelihood and

dignity.”



This denition was not static; it was meant to be

adapted to dierent contexts and to evolve over time:

“The vital core of life is a set of elementary rights and

freedoms people enjoy. What people consider to be

‘vital’ — what they consider to be ‘of the essence of

life’ and ‘crucially important’ — varies across individ-

uals and societies. That is why any concept of ‘human

security’ must be dynamic. And that is why we refrain

from proposing an itemized list of what makes up

human security.”



The report also pushed for two reinforcing spaces

of action. First, empowerment strategies, enabling

people to act on their behalf — and on behalf of others

— to develop resilience to dicult conditions. People

are agents of their destiny if given the tools. Agen-

cy, dignity and opportunities are particularly crucial

for people facing vulnerability. Second, protection

strategies, setting up institutions to shield people

from menaces beyond their control. The report em-

phasized the complementarity of both strategies:

“People protected can exercise many choices. And

people empowered can avoid some risks and demand

improvements in the system of protection.”



In so

doing, the report sought to bridge the gap between

those working in the humanitarian space and those

working in the development space. Conventional

approaches had followed separate tracks, with hu-

manitarian crisis responses getting immediate, short-

term, reactive support that was politically driven and

the development interventions seen as the outcome

benets that accrued to, and was aorded by, stable

countries already on the path towards peace and eco-

nomic prosperity. What was highlighted was the in-

trinsic humanitarian–development–peace nexus: that

peace was necessary for spurring development and

that development was critical for establishing lasting

peace, which the human security approach eectively

pointed out.

Building on the Ogata-Sen report, in 2012 the UN

General Assembly reected a consensus that human

security would be considered “the right of people to

live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and

despair. All individuals, in particular those facing

vulnerability, are entitled to freedom from fear and

freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to

enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human

potential.”



As researchers have argued, since the (re)inception

of the idea of human security in the 1994 Human De-

velopment Report, three elements are constant in the

discussion: freedom from want, freedom from fear,

and human dignity.



• Freedom from want: conditions that allow for pro-

tection of basic needs, quality of life, livelihoods

and enhanced human welfare.

• Freedom from fear: conditions that allow indi-

viduals and groups protection from direct threats

to their safety and physical integrity, including

 35

various forms of direct and indirect violence, in-

tended or not.

• Freedom from indignity (human dignity): condi-

tions where individuals and groups are assured

of the protection of their fundamental rights and

allowed to make choices and take advantage of

opportunities in their everyday lives.

These three elements, acknowledged by the UN

General Assembly’s denition, are the basis for

current work on human security by international

organizations.



Human security in practice

The human security approach has shown practical

value. First, it appeals to numerous national govern-

ments and international organizations. In the past 25

years many of these stakeholders and decisionmakers

have invested nancial, human and political resources

to push forward a human security agenda. There have

been some achievements as a result of these eorts

and debates in both practical and analytical terms.

Recent years have seen the human security approach

take on a more practical role for programme design

or policy recommendations.



A recent survey by the

UN Human Security Unit found, particularly among

stakeholders of the UN system and nongovernmental

organizations, an appreciation for the human security

approach, specically in the following areas:



• As an analytical and planning tool that helps im-

prove the conception, design and execution of

policies and programmes.

• As a tool that helps identify interlinkages across

insecurities and promotes multisectoral solutions

to address interconnected issues.

• As a tool that fosters multistakeholder partnerships

and improves the coherence of responses across

sectors.

• As an approach that emphasizes and guides prac-

tical strategies to reach those most vulnerable,

enhances local capacity and community-driven

solutions to stem the cycle of crisis and promotes a

preventive lens essential to reducing vulnerability

and building resilience.

• As a tool that ensures greater sustainability and

resilience by combining protection and empower-

ment and enhancing state–society relationships.

The human security approach has been interpret-

ed as a bottom-up approach, mainly because it puts

people at the centre of security concerns, where the

process of debate and deliberation in communities

and people facing vulnerability is just as important as

the end result of a process. The importance of a bot-

tom-up approach in practice is close to Amartya Sen’s

idea of agency (or the ability to act on behalf of what

is important). This exibility has been useful as a sup-

porting tool for the Sustainable Development Goals.



A review of the academic literature on human se-

curity shows that the rst and most obvious success

of the human security approach was the fundamen-

tal challenge it represented to traditional security

studies. It adapted methodologies to understand and

manage the day-to-day threats that people face in dif-

ferent contexts. “Human security analyses of what

are or should be priorities bring a focus on questions

of what it is to be human.”



By focusing on people

and not states, the approach allowed a broader un-

derstanding of the requirements to protect and pre-

vent against dierent and changing threats and risks.

However, there is no explicit connection with systems

thinking that provides a common ground for under-

standing the interdependencies and complexity of

current realities.



These broad characteristics have particularly ben-

etted critical studies on security.



Critical feminist

literature was an early adopter of the human securi-

ty approach and extended the work of the women,

peace and security agenda initiated by UN Securi-

ty Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000.



The

human security approach allowed critical feminist

authors to highlight dierent forms of insecurities,

expanding the search for empowerment and dignity.

Challenges and concerns over the years

The same ambition and broad perspective that some

people interpret as strengths of the human security

approach are interpreted by others as two of the main

weaknesses. As some observers described it, the con-

cept is so broad and elusive that “everyone is for it,

but few people have a clear idea of what it means.”



Others have argued that by having so many elements

under the approach’s umbrella, “we end up prioritiz-

ing everything.”



And that the consequence is “if

everything is being prioritized, then by denition,

36 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

nothing is.”



These types of criticisms came very

early on during the debate on human security.

A more general contention relates to the idea that

the human security approach has securitized devel-

opment and human rights, a point that has led to po-

litical disagreement about the scope of the concept.

This has been reected over the years in the dierent

interpretations by national governments and their re-

spective foreign aairs ministries.

Criticism of the human security approach can be

grouped into ve categories.



• Conceptual: The approach could be interpreted as

too wide ranging but without the accompanying

rigour to provide policy insight or to unpack com-

plex dynamics among peace, development and

human rights.



• Analytical: The lack of methodology and recog-

nition of the systemic nature of the approach are

only partially responsible for the “siloed” analysis

of the approach’s dierent elements. Measurement

also remains unresolved, as it would be dicult

enough to identify the variables and indicators that

could describe the elements of human security in a

meaningful way for the dierent contexts existing

in a given moment around the world.

• Political: The approach undermines the traditional

view of the state as the sole provider of security.

• Moral: Security can be used to promote hegemonic

interests of some states. Opposed to this concern is

the idea that the approach could fail to distinguish

between individual and universal security con-

cerns, which could undermine attention to issues

of common public good, collective interests and

solidarity.

• Operational: The broad nature of the approach

makes operationalization dicult because the vast

number of elements make prioritization dicult — a

challenge that aicts the humanitarian–devel-

opment–peace nexus. Moreover, the many bidi-

rectional interplays among dimensions of peace,

development and human rights create diculties

in identifying specic initial actions.

As the world faces another historic juncture, with a

truly global catastrophe (the Covid-19 pandemic) and

the looming climate crisis, we are well poised to revis-

it the concept of human security and the human se-

curity approach. It is in light of these truly collective

threats and downturn risks that aict us as a com-

mon humanity, albeit with dierent resources and

capability to cope and adapt to the challenges ahead.

An enrichened human security approach is one of the

fundamental ways in which we can reconceptualize

the solidarity needed to tackle these collective chal-

lenges as a truly global, international community.

 37

Annex 1.2. The Index of

PerceivedHuman Insecurity

The experimental Index of Perceived Human Securi-

ty is based on waves 6 (2010–2016) and 7 (2017–2020)

of the World Values Survey.



It therefore reects the

pre-Covid-19 period for the most part. The index is

computed for 74 countries and territories, covering

around 81 percent of the world’s people. Intertempo-

ral comparisons are possible for only 31 countries and

territories (with 27 percent of the world’s people). The

index combines 17 variables covering insecurities

from violent conict, socioeconomic insecurities and

insecurities at the personal and community levels

(table A1.2.1). These insecurities reect challenges to

freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom

from indignity.

• For violent conict insecurities the index uses

variables reecting worries about a war involving

the country of residence, a civil war or a terrorist

attack.

• For socioeconomic insecurities the index uses

variables representing explicit worries (losing job,

not being able to give children education) and

actual deprivations in health, food and economic

security.

• For personal and community insecurities the index

uses variables of exposure to crime, changes in

habits because of security concerns, perceptions

of safety in the neighbourhood and assessments

of specic risks, including robbery, alcohol and

drugs on the streets, abuse by law enforcement and

racism.

The socioeconomic insecurity variables predomi-

nantly capture challenges to freedom from want. The

deprivations (hunger, having no money, not being

able to aord medicines) and worries about the fu-

ture (about children’s education or having a job) also

indicate a threat to human dignity, in line with the

common aspirations dened the Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights and the 2030 Agenda for Sus-

tainable Development.

The variables on violent conict and personal

and community insecurities capture challenges to

freedom from fear. They also capture challenges to

human dignity and the “right to life, liberty and se-

curity of person,” as acknowledged in the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. The variables relating

Table A1.2.1 Dimensions and subdimensions of the Index of Perceived Human Insecurity

Weights Freedom from:

Dimensions Subdimensions Want Fear Indignity



Fear of violent conflict

 War

 Civil war

 Terrorist attack



Socioeconomic insecurity

 

 



 

 Worried about giving children a good education

 Worried about losing/finding job



Personal and community insecurity

 



 

 



 Overall insecurity in neighbourhood

a. Each indicator within the subdimension is equally weighted.

Source: Human Development Report Office.

38 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

to incidents of racism and abuse from enforcement

authorities reect some of the eects of horizontal in-

equalities on dignity.

The aggregation follows a standardized approach:

each indicator is transformed into a binary variable,

with 1 indicating insecurity and 0 indicating freedom

from insecurity. Then, the indicators are aggregat-

ed using a weighted arithmetic average through dif-

ferent subdimensions and dimensions of insecurity,

using equal weights (see table A1.2.1).

 39

Contrary to the general perception, many concrete

policies, both global and local, already can contribute

to enhancing the human security interests of those

aected by the new generation of threats in the An-

thropocene context. Probably the best examples,

with challenges and achievements, are the local and

global responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and cli-

mate change. The two challenges are enormous, and

the eorts are still fragmented. Yet the concept of

human security, if used strategically, has the power to

enhance policy outcomes by integrating and aligning

those fragmented policy eorts to protect the vital

core of all humans in ways that enhance human free-

doms and human fullment.



New challenges to human security emanate from

both the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis,

reected in the Anthropocene context. Specic is-

sues from dierent areas show that, while each has

its distinctive solutions, they are often interrelated.

Moreover, by putting people at the centre, there is an

opportunity to explore cross-sectoral collaboration

(table S1.1). Global implementation and local imple-

mentation have the potential to be connected — and

linked to the Sustainable Development Goals. Glob-

al implementation of human security approaches

includes providing global public goods, using global

governance norms and mechanisms and promoting

people’s own eorts to change their mindsets and

pursue more transformative lifestyles. Local imple-

mentation includes the two main human security

strategies of protection and empowerment, based on

the existing frame of human security.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic include

pursuing universal health systems, reviewing

international health regulations, introducing a new

international pandemic facility and creating new

mechanisms for vaccine development and distri-

bution, notably the Access to Covid-19 Tools Accel-

erator and COVAX. The global health governance

architecture, though still in the formative stage, start-

ed sharing vaccines. The World Health Organization

took the lead, despite many challenges, and other UN

entities contributed their expertise. Public-private

partnerships, private foundations, businesses and

civil society organizations have all worked in tandem.

And strategic partners have committed to interna-

tional cooperation, even when each state had its own

domestic challenges.

This type of response could inspire action to tack-

le the climate crisis and other processes of dangerous

planetary change, with global, macro-level tools and

local, micro-level tools. The human security frame

can assist in designing, mapping and implementing

policy tools for climate action. Consider how many

people are highly vulnerable to both Covid-19 and cli-

mate change–induced extreme weather events. This

overlap suggests the possibility of supporting those

facing multiple crises through a human security lens.

The human security approach is comprehensive.

Even if a policy is meant to be human-centred, it is

not part of a full human security approach unless it

is packaged and implemented to full people’s mul-

tifaceted needs to ensure their freedom from want,

fear and indignity. As the responses to the Covid-19

pandemic have shown, a health focus cannot satisfy

people’s human security unless it is combined with

socioeconomic measures and measures that uphold

human rights.

NOTE

1 Ogata and Sen 2003.

SPOTLIGHT 1.1

Exploring how the human security approach can illuminate

the overlaps between the response to Covid-19 pandemic

and climate change

Based on Hoshino (2021)

40 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Table S1.1 Promoting empowerment, protection and solidarity in a world of interconnected threats: Example

Health threats: Pandemics, including reference

to COVID-19 (Sustainable Development Goal 3) Links

Anthropocene context: climate change

(all Sustainable Development Goals

directly or indirectly affected)

Global

implementation

Global

institutional

mechanisms

and public

goods

A new International

Pandemic Financing

Facility

Incorporating health issues

in monitoring climate

impacts and formulating

action

Including climate-related

health threats in pandemic

preparedness efforts

New compact for climate

action

Network of national

pandemic coordinators

who are accountable

to heads of state and

government

Integrated systems to

monitor hazards and

response

Risk-sharing mechanisms

to both address

adaptation needs and

promote mitigation

Clinical reagents,

tests, vaccines and

medicines, COVID-19 Tools

Accelerator, prenegotiated

platform for tools and

supplies

New standards to

consistently measure

the effects of climate

change across human

development dimensions

and across local areas

Global social

norms

Open data and scientific

collaboration

Cross-disciplinary

collaborations on climate–

health nexus

Local–global

links

National

and local

implementation

Promoting

agency

Universal healthcare

systems

Equipping healthcare

systems to better address

health risks due to climate

change

Community participation

in monitoring hazards

disaster response,

mitigation and adaptation

Participation and

accountability in health

and response measures

Inclusion of indigenous

peoples and knowledge

Nature-based solutions

Social norms Social distancing and

masking

Social norms based on the

idea of common security

and responsible behavior

People’s values can

contribute to mitigation

efforts through direct

action and demands for

change from companies

and governments

Upholding

human rights

Right to health

Right to life, right to

self-determination, right

to development, right to

health, right to food, right

to water and sanitation,

right to adequate housing,

cultural rights

Protection Solidarity

Empowerment 

Dissemination of local

best practices

Institutionalization,

regional application and

localization of global

measures

 41

CHAPTER

The Anthropocene

context is reshaping

human security

44 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

CHAPTER 2

The Anthropocene context is reshaping human

security

We live in a moment of dangerous and unprecedent-

ed planetary changes. In 2020 the human-made mass

overtook the total living biomass on Earth, and at

current rates of growth, it is expected to double over

the next two decades.



Current atmospheric concen-

trations of carbon dioxide are higher than at any time

in at least 2 million years, and increased pollution in

our air, water and land causes some 9 million prema-

ture deaths a year.



This new context can be charac-

terized as the Anthropocene — the age of humans.



With societies closely interconnected, through the

ow of people, goods and information, the human se-

curity of one group is closely linked to that of others

(a notion that has been characterized as “common se-

curity”).



The inequalities and interdependencies be-

tween people and societies have made the relevance

of common security plain to see, but the analysis in

this chapter suggests that the Anthropocene reali-

ty adds another more forceful reason to rearm the

importance of solidarity for human security, together

with protection and empowerment.

The Anthropocene context demands far-reaching

changes in how we manage human embeddedness in

nature (box 2.1), moving away from actions that drive

planetary imbalances in the pursuit of narrow notions

of development and security. The uncharted territory

of the Anthropocene makes greater demands on the

capacity of societies to broaden and reassess what

it means to pursue development and security amid

great uncertainty. Solidarity strategies in the context

of an enriched frame of human security gain special

signicance for navigating this reality, supporting

deliberations to act responsibly and collaboratively

so that we are all more secure amid truly existential

challenges.

“

The Anthropocene reality adds another more

forceful reason to rearm the importance

of solidarity for human security, together

with protection and empowerment

This chapter describes some of the dangerous plan-

etary changes already under way and their implica-

tions in several areas that are posing threats to human

security. It is not meant to be comprehensive in cov-

ering all dimensions of the Anthropocene — but to use

Box 2.1 Human security for a more-than-human world

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, have we

reached an inflection point in thinking critically about

our interconnected sense of planetary precarious-

ness? Has the pandemic elicited enough reflection

on the wider set of overlapping human–environ-

mental crises to have an impact on how we define

and frame security for our overarching human and

nonhuman worlds?

In seeking to build a consensus on visions of se-

curity for the future, it is important to consider how

global human–environmental security is about

shared interests and can be enhanced by acting

collectively, responsibly and cooperatively. In this

endeavour transcending anthropocentric concep-

tualizations of security could be helpful but would

necessitate carefully documenting the planet’s inter-

secting human and environmental precariousness

and detailing why and how we must address them

holistically.

Human security strategies in practice have

typically involved compartmentalized engagements

with artificially separate human and environmental

concerns. The concept of human security would

benefit from recognizing the planet’s intertwined

human–environmental precariousness. A reframing

of security in the context of the Anthropocene reaf-

firms the systemic view of humans as part of the

natural world.

Consider climate change. Confronting it as an

exclusive concern for environmental security will

ultimately be ineffective if it ignores other human se-

curity elements such as food security, health security

and community security, as highlighted in the 2020

Human Development Report.

Siloed security strate-

gies for the environment have “become increasingly

divorced” from their “heterodox and critical roots in

human security” and thus overlook how security

threats arise “out of the interconnections between

different aspects and forces in particular situations.”

This is why “the value added from human security

analysis comes [from its] functioning as a boundary

concept to transcend those divisions, flexibly.”

In this

sense the very elasticity of the concept of human

security is its strength in responding to nonhuman

security challenges in context-sensitive ways.

Source: Morrissey 2021.

Notes

1.UNDP 2020c. 2.Elliott 2015, p. 11. 3.Gasper and Gómez 2015, p. 100.

 45

a few illustrations to unearth what the broad process

of planetary changes means for human security. It

highlights agency and the importance of adding soli-

darity to protection and empowerment for human se-

curity in the Anthropocene.

The self-reinforcing interaction

between dangerous planetary

changes and social imbalances

Dangerous planetary changes are part of a self-rein-

forcing cycle, resulting from the interaction of plane-

tary imbalances



and social imbalances (inequalities

in opportunities, wealth and power across groups of

people that can have social destabilizing impacts; g-

ure 2.1). This interaction shows how the Anthropocene

context compounds threats to human security, which is

indicated by the arrow owing from planetary to social

imbalances. However, social imbalances feed through

social, economic and political processes that exacer-

bate planetary imbalances (thus the arrow in the other

direction). Countries with lower human development

will face the worst eects, due in part to their limited

ability to adapt. Within countries the negative impacts

will be felt the most by those already otherwise vulner-

able. Those experiencing the worst impacts are also

those with less power and opportunity to shape policy

and decisionmaking. And the lack of agency diminish-

es the prospects of breaking this vicious cycle through

deliberation and collective action.



“

Those experiencing the worst impacts are also

those with less power and opportunity to shape

policy and decisionmaking. And the lack of agency

diminishes the prospects of breaking this vicious

cycle through deliberation and collective action

Dangerous planetary change

Climate change, already considerable, is accelerat-

ing. Without decisive reductions in emissions over

the next two decades, temperatures may surpass the

threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial

levels — and may do so earlier than previously esti-

mated.



Even under relatively optimistic scenarios,

the threshold of 2 degrees Celsius could be reached

by mid-century.



Human inuence has unequivocally

impacted the planet, with greenhouse gas emissions

causing global surface temperature and sea levels

to rise, Arctic ice area to diminish, extreme weather

events to multiply and intensify and annual global

Figure 2.1 The Anthropocene context is reshaping human security through the interaction of dangerous

planetary changes and social imbalances

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Dangerous planetary

change:

- Climate change

- Biodiversity loss/extinction

- Zoonotic diseases

- Pollution and

environmental

degradation

Human security crises:

- Health challenges: food

security, physical integrity

- Violent conflicts

- Technology/economic

security

- Inequalities

Anthropocene context:

compounded effects on

human security

Destabilizing dynamics

Planetary

imbalances

Social

imbalances

46 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

precipitation to increase.



In the most ambitious sce-

narios for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (cou-

pled with targeted air pollutant reduction and

anthropogenic removal of carbon dioxide), air quality

could improve in the medium term, and ocean acidi-

cation would be reversed. But even in this case, ris-

ing sea levels and ice and glacier loss are likely to be

beyond the point of reversal and set to continue their

path for decades or millennia to come.



This reality

reframes the context for expanding human develop-

ment



and advancing human security, as ambitious

emissions reduction and carbon dioxide removal

strategies will need to be urgently considered.

Biodiversity loss and threats of extinction are alarm-

ing. The population of species of mammals, sh, birds,

reptiles and amphibians fell by an average of 68 per-

cent between 1970 and 2016.



Up to 1 million species

are estimated to be facing extinction.



For instance,

wild mammals today account for only 4 percent of the

global mammal biomass, while livestock and pets ac-

count for 62 percent and humans the remaining 34 per-

cent.



This process is driven by human action. A direct

driver of substantial biodiversity loss has been food

production, which involves converting animal habi-

tats into agricultural land.



An estimated 420 million

hectares of forest have been lost through conversion

to other land uses since 1990.



More than a third of

the world’s land surface and nearly 75 percent of fresh-

water resources are now devoted to crop or livestock

production,



increasing pressures on scarce water re-

sources (2.3 billion people live in water-stressed coun-

tries



). These imbalances in the planetary system

have become the source of threats to human security

through multiple channels: from disrupting food and

water systems to the emergence of zoonotic diseases.

“

Greater resilience to natural hazards

that t with longer-term historical patterns

has allowed for the reduction of human

vulnerability to shocks. But the natural

hazards, as well as exposure and vulnerability

patterns, are changing in the Anthropocene.

Climate- and weather-related disasters have

increased rapidly in the last few decades

Biodiversity loss is projected to continue, given that

121–219 species will become threatened under cur-

rent rates of forest loss over the next 30 years in the

high-risk zones of Borneo, the central Amazon and

the Congo Basin.



The intensity of land use and ris-

ing temperatures can also lead to major reductions

in pollinating species, with knock-on eects on food

security and resilience, mostly in the tropics.



The

diversity of life on Earth also represents a source of

adaptive capacity to navigate future risks. As biodi-

versity losses increase, this adaptive capacity is un-

dermined, with consequences for human security.

Pollution and environmental degradation have

reached dangerous levels. Anthropogenic air pollution

is related to the combustion of various types of fuel.

Only 4 of 45 megacities with measurements satised

World Health Organization guidelines for air quality.



Burning fossil fuels emits pollutants, such as sulphur di-

oxides and nitrogen oxides, which can cause acid rain,

damage soil and plants and put aquatic life in danger by

increasing acid levels of rivers and lakes.



Today the bi-

omass of plastic is double the total biomass of animals

on the planet.



Water pollution has worsened over the

past two decades: it is estimated that up to 400 mil-

lion tons of solvents, heavy metals and other industrial

waste enter the world’s water each year.



The eects of natural hazards appear to be at an

inection point. Greater resilience to natural haz-

ards that t with longer-term historical patterns has

allowed for the reduction of human vulnerability to

shocks.



But the natural hazards, as well as expo-

sure and vulnerability patterns, are changing in the

Anthropocene. Climate- and weather-related disas-

ters have increased rapidly in the last few decades.

The 2010s had 360 distinct disasters a year, up from

around 100 in the 1980s.



Recorded damage and the

number of aected people (through deaths, injuries

and homelessness) suggest an inection point in re-

cent decades — after reductions in most of the 20th

century — with evidence of more severe events.



These changes are also reected in the high number

of people displaced by natural hazards: 31 million in

2020.



Some estimates indicate that 1 billion people

worldwide could face forced displacement by 2050.



Flooding events are expected to increase, threatening

the more than 1 billion people who live in low eleva-

tion coastal zones.



They are vulnerable not only to

average sea level rise but also to uctuations caused

by storms and high tides. The number of people vul-

nerable to permanent sea level rise is estimated to

jump from 110 million today to almost 200 million by

 47

2100.



These changes threaten the very existence of

some Small Island Development States,



where the

livelihoods and basic infrastructure of many commu-

nities are vulnerable to sea level rise, ocean acidica-

tion and extreme weather events.



Social imbalances reflect the unequal distribution

of benefits and costs of planetary change

Social imbalances (reecting inequalities in human

development) result from a combination of existing

distribution of power and the unequal eects of dan-

gerous planetary change across countries and groups

of people within countries. The distribution of power,

which determines the ability to take advantage of ex-

isting planetary resources, denes who benets from

behaviour that drives planetary pressures, and the

unequal eects of the resulting planetary changes de-

termine the distribution of the costs.



A human secu-

rity lens helps capture both.



Low Human Development Index (HDI) countries

will face the strongest negative eects of danger-

ous planetary change across multiple dimensions,

both because of direct impact and because of limit-

ed adaptation capacity. And within countries many of

those living in already marginal and vulnerable con-

texts will tend to fare worse.



Higher HDI countries, in turn, are likely to expe-

rience climate change very dierently. There will be

changes in weather patterns, with some substantial

negative eects for parts of the population. But the

actual risk to people will, on average, be much lower

than in developing countries. The typical developed

country might experience reductions in some dan-

gerous hazards, as in the number of days with ex-

treme temperatures.



The capacity to adapt to the

eects of climate change is much greater in wealth-

ier countries than in poorer countries. This depends

on income and on enhanced capabilities, linked to

access to technological advances, education and in-

frastructure. In all these areas global inequalities are

already enormous. And some of the gaps in these en-

hanced capabilities are widening.



“

While the distribution of costs and

benets is asymmetric across countries, no

country is immune to the human security

implications of the Anthropocene context

The contribution to planetary pressures by very

high HDI countries is already large and still growing.

It is much larger than the contribution of lower HDI

countries



(gure 2.2, left panel). The distribution of

planetary pressures — the emissions of carbon diox-

ide and the consumption of material resources — is

Figure 2.2 The destabilizing dynamic of climate change: More developed countries tend to capture more

benefits from planetary pressures and less of their costs

Source: 

Index of Planetary Pressures value, 2019

(based on carbon dioxide emissions and

material footprint per capita)

–50

100

0.250

0.200

0.150

0.100

0.050

Human Development Index group

Low Medium High Very high

Number of additional extreme temperature

days, above average (1986-2005)

Human Development Index group

Low Medium High Very high

48 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

unequally distributed in favour of higher HDI coun-

tries. As an indicator of the impact of dangerous plan-

etary change, consider the additional days of extreme

temperatures (gure 2.2, right panel). When it comes

to bearing the consequences, countries with fewer

resources to adapt, with lower HDI values, bear the

brunt of the costs.

“

When planetary imbalances interact

with intersecting horizontal inequalities,

they can reinforce historical patterns of

disempowerment directly linked to recognitional,

procedural and distributional inequities

Climate change has increased annual econom-

ic growth in richer countries with colder temperate

climates while reducing economic growth in poorer

countries with warmer climates. The estimated net

eect is a 25 percent larger gap between the top and

bottom deciles of the country-based income dis-

tribution than in a world without climate change.



These asymmetries are central when considering the

human security benets of acting now to curb climate

change, which can be huge in countries in the Arab

States, South Asia and Sub- Saharan Africa (gure 2.3).

While the distribution of costs and benets is

asymmetric across countries, no country is immune

to the human security implications of the Anthropo-

cene context. The eects are widespread, multiple

and interlinked. A disaggregated view can uncov-

er how some areas of developed countries face high

mortality risks due to climate change and how some

territories in developing countries face low mortali-

ty risks (gure 2.4). Moreover, territories with limit-

ed exposure to some risks, such as mortality (Florida

in the United States and the west coast of India), can

face high vulnerability to other threats, such as ood-

ing and rising sea levels.

Within countries, group-based inequalities are im-

portant in dening the impacts of the Anthropocene

context on people (see chapter 5). When planetary

imbalances interact with intersecting horizontal in-

equalities, they can reinforce historical patterns of

disempowerment directly linked to recognitional,

procedural and distributional inequities.



For recog-

nitional equity women and indigenous peoples face

barriers to land ownership linked to identities and

traditional social norms. For procedural equity the

unequal distribution of impacts from planetary im-

balances exacerbates exclusion and discrimination,

as with polluting industries locating in areas where

Black people or indigenous peoples live. For distri-

butional equity dierent groups face unequal ac-

cess to resources and unequal impacts of planetary

Figure 2.3 Increasing asymmetries—net lives saved by mitigation

Note: Comparisons are between Representative Concentration Pathways 4.5 and 8.5. Aggregates are weighted by population.

Source: 

100

Arab States Sub-Saharan

Africa

South

Asia

East Asia

and Pacific

Latin America and

the Caribbean

Europe and

Central Asia

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2099

Regional simulations of deaths averted by mitigation

(lives potentially saved, per 100,000 inhabitants)

 49

imbalances, as with the large percentage of women

facing water shortages, low human development and

high gender inequality (gure 2.5).

The next section drills down in more detail on how

the Anthropocene context is compounding threats

to human security on several dimensions. While cli-

mate change is a focal point, the discussion suggests

not only the intrinsic importance of this particular

challenge but also the broader implications of the An-

thropocene context for human security. In addition,

climate change interacts with biodiversity loss, nat-

ural hazards and pollution, all with compounding ef-

fects on human security.

Compounding threats

to human security

The impacts of the Anthropocene context on peo-

ple’s lives are yet to be fully understood, but there

is emerging evidence on their likely eects through

multiple dimensions that aect human development

and human security.

From a risk perspective (based on the combina-

tion of hazard, exposure and vulnerability), the An-

thropocene context presents a new reality.



First,

the baseline of hazards is changing, given the scale

of climate change, biodiversity loss and environmen-

tal degradation just described. Second, the exposure

patterns are shifting. The Covid-19 pandemic — likely

a zoonotic disease, one of several to emerge or re-

emerge this century alone — shows the broad implica-

tions of the possibility of facing ever more systemic

negative surprises. Third, because of the change in

hazards and exposure patterns and the limited

knowledge of potential new events and their prob-

abilities, societies are ill-prepared for this complex

new reality.

Threats to human security in the Anthropocene

context are multidimensional, because they aect

people through multiple channels, many of them

yet to be fully understood; interconnected, because

they interact as part of self-regulating planetary sys-

tems, including interactions between ecosystems

and social systems; universal, because they have

global — though unequally manifested (see the next

characteristic) — reach; and unequally distributed,

because their eects are geographically asymmetri-

cal and the impacts on people are mediated by ex-

isting social, economic and political structures. The

following sections discuss the eects of Anthropo-

cene-related threats on some dimensions of human

security, including those associated with disrup-

tions to food systems, heightened health threats,

ampliers of the drivers of tensions and violent

conict, and threats to economic production and

productivity.

Figure 2.4 The distribution of mortality risks caused by climate change is expected to be unequal between and

within countries

Note: Data are for 2080–2099 and refer to Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5.

Source: 

100

Mortality Risk Index

50 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

“

After two decades of progress, the number

of people aected by hunger has increased

from a low of 607million in 2014. The

estimate for 2020 ranges from 720million

to 811million, reecting the considerable

eect of the Covid-19 pandemic

Threats disrupting food systems

After two decades of progress, the number of people

aected by hunger (undernourishment) has increased

from a low of 607 million in 2014. The estimate for

2020 ranges from 720 million to 811 million, reect-

ing the considerable eect of the Covid-19 pandemic

(gure 2.6). So, the world is getting further away from

the goal of Zero Hunger by 2030.



This trend is also

evident with a broader denition of food insecurity:

in 2020, 2.4 billion people were moderately or severe-

ly food insecure, up 44 percent (or 723 million people)

from 2014. In 2020 alone more than 300 million people

became aected by food insecurity. In 2019, 7.9 mil-

lion people died because of dierent forms of dietary

risks.



Changes in environmental factors alone, even

when they have implications for food supply, do not

determine food access and use. A complex set of com-

pounded environmental and social factors (in the An-

thropocene context) underpins these changes,



with

eects that can intensify in the future. The main argu-

ment here is that the Anthropocene context presents

new threats to human security through a range of in-

terlinked factors that aect food entitlements (ranging

from loss of purchasing power, through a combination

of higher food prices and lower incomes, through the

erosion of social and political support for vulnerable

communities in the face of multiple demands for at-

tention and to the sheer uncertainty and novelty of

some environmental conditions that underpin food

production, distribution, access and use).

Changes in temperature and precipitation have al-

tered land quality and crop yields. Intense and fre-

quent extreme events pose a threat not only to the

production and distribution of food but also to the

Figure 2.5 A large fraction of the population facing water shortage lives in subnational territories with low Human

Development Index values and high gender inequality

Note: Bubble size represents the population facing water shortage in each subnational area.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on City University of New York/Human Development Report Office project.

Gender Development Index group

0.200 0.400 0.800 1.0000.600

Human Development Index value

(High gender gap)

(Low gender gap)

 51

livelihoods of a large number of people engaged in

agriculture — in particular, the approximately 3 billion

people living on 500 million small farms in low- and

middle-income countries.



Small Island Develop-

ing States experience a higher frequency of disasters

than the rest of the world and tend to be more wa-

ter-scarce than other regions — climate change is ex-

acerbating both of these challenges.



Climate change is already aecting crop production,

with an average annual reduction of 1 percent in con-

sumable food calories from the top 10 global crops.



And estimated availability of calories has fallen in

nearly half of food-insecure countries.



Climate var-

iability has reduced income and increased food inse-

curity in Ghana and Ethiopia, which have a large share

of employment in the agricultural sector.



In Bangla-

desh and India crop yields have fallen due to temper-

ature changes.



Smallholder farmers in drier regions

are particularly aected by climate variability, because

they depend primarily on rainfed agriculture.



Below

normal rainfall is worsening the pre-existing drought

conditions, and delayed heavy rainfall is ooding

some areas.



Therefore, variability in temperature and

precipitation, as well as more frequent natural haz-

ards, exacerbates threats to human security.

“

Crop diversity is declining; thecontraction

of agrobiodiversity increases people’s

vulnerability to extreme temperatures

and weather events, diseases and

pathogens, and crop failures

Crop diversity is declining, with considerable ef-

fects on food security and resilience to disasters.

Although our species has evolved to consume more

than 7,000 species, today just 3 — wheat, rice and

maize — provide more than half of our plant-derived

calories.



Genetic diversity within species is also de-

clining.



Taken together, this contraction of agrobio-

diversity increases people’s vulnerability to extreme

temperatures and weather events, diseases and path-

ogens, and crop failures (box 2.2).



Climate change also drives notable changes in

oceans, increasing surface temperature, acidication

and sea level rise. Countries that depend heavily on

sheries for protein intake and employment are ex-

posed to these threats.



New and heightened health threats

The Anthropocene context has multiple eects on

health.



Biodiversity loss and land use changes can in-

crease disease transmission.



For example, the Ebola

outbreak in West Africa resulted from the transmission

of viruses from wild animals to humans that spread in a

context of deforestation and great population density.



Forest loss in Bangladesh has drastically reduced native

habitats of fruit bats, which has increased the chances

of virus spillover between bats and humans.



And Am-

azon rainforest deforestation has increased malaria

transmission in Brazil: a 10 percent increase in deforest-

ation led to a 3.3 percent increase in malaria incidence.



Figure 2.6 Hunger and food insecurity are on the rise

Source: 

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Hunger (undernourished

people, millions)

Hunger (undernourished people)

Moderately or severely

food-insecure people (millions)

Moderately or severely

food insecure people

52 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Long-term exposure of humans to air pollution

enhances the risk of cardiovascular and respiratory

diseases, reproductive and central nervous system

dysfunction, and cancer — increasing mortality and

reducing life expectancy.



Nearly 4.2 million deaths

occur every year due to ambient air pollution and

3.8 million due to smoke from dirty cookstoves and

fuels.



The global loss of life expectancy due to air

pollution is 2.9 years compared with a loss of 0.3 year

caused by violence.



This can be greatly reduced by

decreasing the net use of fossil fuels.



Globally an estimated 80 percent of industrial and

municipal wastewater is released into the environ-

ment without any treatment, with detrimental eects

on human health and ecosystems.



Heavy metals are

produced by industries and disposed into water bod-

ies without proper processing and treatment, expos-

ing humans and animals to pollution. For example,

commonly consumed sh in Bangladesh had various

levels of heavy metals, suggesting a link between the

consumption of these contaminated sh and cancer.



And around the Ankobra River in the Western Re-

gion of Ghana, sh contamination has exceeded the

suggested safe amount.



In addition, cholera and ty-

phoid can spread through contaminated water.

Plastic pollution has contributed to soil contamina-

tion, which can reduce the safety of food for humans

and many other organisms that depend on soil.



Hu-

mans are also exposed to microplastics via ingestion,

inhalation and dermal absorption, which can cause

several health complications. Microplastics may also

contain vectors for microorganisms and toxic chem-

icals that cause ill health.



High exposure to mi-

croplastics pollution can aect the central nervous

system and the reproductive system.



Climate change alone — beyond the eect of pol-

lution or zoonotic diseases — is expected to have

substantial eects on mortality. By 2100 the num-

ber of estimated deaths associated with climate

change (in a scenario with very high greenhouse

gas emissions)



could be comparable to those as-

sociated with some of the leading causes of death

today (gure 2.7).



Globally, under the assump-

tions of population growth of Shared Socioeconom-

ic Pathway 3 and with moderate mitigation, around

40 million people cumulatively might die because

of climate change in the 2020–2100 period. These

estimates consider current adaptation capacities,



which are notoriously insucient to avert signi-

cant deaths in the moderate mitigation scenario.

Box 2.2 Biodiversity loss, food security and disaster risk reduction

The sharp decline of pollinators due to pesticides and habitat loss, documented in numerous recent studies,

affects food security and nutrition around the world. Of the leading global food crops directly consumed by

humans and traded on the global market, 85 percent rely on animal pollination. Without pollinators, production

of some of the leading global crops would decrease by as much as 90 percent.

The decline of pollinators affects

not only absolute food supply but also the availability of nutrients. Pollinated crops account for 35 percent of

global food production, more than 90 percent of available vitamin C and more than 70 percent of available

vitamin A.

Forests contribute to global food security, as wild foods harvested from forests provide a wide range of nutri-

ents and micronutrients.

Wild animals, or bush meat, provide more than 6 million tons of food to communities

in the Congo and Amazon basins alone.

Yet tropical forest loss is large: since 2002 the world has lost more than

60 million hectares of tropical forest.

Biodiversity loss also has consequences for disaster risk. Increased diversity among species in an ecosystem

generates diverse physical and biological traits and supports ecological resilience and the protective function of

ecosystems. For instance, seagrass ensures the generation of oxygen and improves water quality by capturing

sand, dirt and silt particles. Its roots trap and stabilize sediment, reducing erosion and buffering coastlines

against storms.

Source: 

Notes

1.Soroye, Newbold and Kerr 2020. 2.Potts and others 2016. There were 13 crops in this category: atemoya, Brazil nut, cantaloupe, cocoa, kiwi,



3.FAO 2019. 4.Sunderland and others 2013. 5.Nasi, Taber and Van Vliet 2011. 6.Weisse and Dow Goldman 2020.

 53

Under a very high greenhouse gas emissions sce-

nario the projected net cumulative deaths during

the same period because of climate change could

surpass 190 million.



The climate change burden of disease is expected

to be greatly unequal. Most territories — with an esti-

mated 80 percent of the world’s population — are ex-

pected to see major increases in death rates.



In some

localities in the Arab States and Sub- Saharan Africa,

death rates due to climate change might surpass to-

day’s leading causes of death (cancer and heart dis-

ease). Meanwhile, the other territories that make up

the remaining 20 percent of the world’s population

are expected to record lower net death rates because

of a reduction in extremely cold temperatures.



“

By 2100 the number of estimated deaths

associated with climate change could be

comparable to those associated with some

of the leading causes of death today

Threats exacerbating tensions and violent conflict

The Anthropocene context might be a threat ampli-

er and multiplier behind a new generation of con-

icts.



Human-driven pressures on the planet are

producing a warmer climate, a more volatile natu-

ral environment prone to climate shocks and dam-

aged ecosystems with reduced resilience and fewer

services to humans, some of which were document-

ed above. Volatility in weather patterns, shocks to

food supply and distribution, and land and resource

scarcity — typically interacting with horizontal ine-

qualities and contestation of political power — have all

been linked to heightened conict risks.



While a changing natural environment may in-

crease tensions, it is the interlinkage with structural

development challenges, socioeconomic-political

conditions and horizontal inequalities with atten-

dant power imbalances that tends to trigger conict.



Recent meta-analyses and reviews nd that climate

Figure 2.7 In a very high emissions scenario some regions of the world might face climate change–

induced mortality rates similar to those of the main causes of deaths today

Note: RCP is Representative Concentration Pathway. Includes only areas with increased mortality due to climate change, home to more than

80 percent of the global population.

Source: Human Development Report Office based on Carleton and others (2020) and data from the World Health Organization.

0 600200 400

Deaths per 100,000 people

Arab States

Sub-Saharan Africa

Developed

South Asia

East Asia and Pacific

Europe & Central Asia

Latin America

and the Caribbean

Moderate emissions, RCP 4.5

Very high emissions, RCP 8.5

Malignant neoplasms (cancer)

Cardiovascular diseases

Infectious and parasitic diseases

Neurological conditions

Main causes of death today

54 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

change, particularly through warming temperatures

as well as precipitation changes, is coupled with

heightened conict risks.



But violent conict out-

breaks are channelled through socioeconomic-polit-

ical conditions, and they are manifested in horizontal

inequalities, deprivation and exclusion of particular

groups, and power imbalances between parties to

the conict.



Violent conict itself may also contrib-

ute to dangerous planetary change, directly through

attacks on the natural environment or indirectly

through diversions of political attention and resourc-

es.



Focusing on the interlinkages helps detect blind

spots in the ongoing policy debate that might add to

the factors explaining the development–human secu-

rity gap described in chapter 1.

“

While a changing natural environment

may increase tensions, it is the interlinkage

with structural development challenges,

socioeconomic-political conditions and

horizontal inequalities with attendant power

imbalances that tends to trigger conict

Climate-related hazards, such as large-scale ood-

ing, can increase political unrest



and instigate vio-

lent conict when interacting with political exclusion

of and deprivation among certain groups.



The cli-

mate change–conict interrelationship may be par-

ticularly relevant in developing countries with large

agricultural sectors that depend heavily on rainfall

and environmental conditions, coupled with low eco-

nomic diversication. In these settings droughts,



changes in precipitation



and dry spells during crop

growing seasons



increase conict risks as liveli-

hoods are threatened and food prices surge,



and

food insecurity increases as asset prices drop, leading

to a loss of entitlements to food and other resources.

Coupled with horizontal inequalities and perceptions

of injustice, stressors such as reduced incomes or in-

creased competition can fuel uprisings — and may es-

calate to violent conict.

Conicts compound with food insecurity, deterio-

rated livelihoods and other eects of climate change,

driving the forcible displacement of people.



Ac-

cording to the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees, about 9 of 10 refugees come from the

countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate

change. These countries also host about 70 percent

of all people internally displaced by conict and vi-

olence.



In 2020, 40.5 million people were added to

the global population of internally displaced people

(almost 10 million because of conict and violence), a

number expected to continue to increase (gure 2.8).



Forcibly displaced people — no matter the cause: con-

icts, violence, disasters or a combination — face mul-

tiple human security threats in their place of origin

and in host locations (see chapter 5).

Academic and policy debates on the climate– security

nexus have focused mostly on fragile contexts and

low-income and developing countries. Yet the An-

thropocene context is universal, and climate-related

conict and violence can occur across countries at all

incomes. For example, there is an association between

high temperatures and short-run increases in crime in

high-income contexts, suggesting that a higher tem-

perature can elevate discomfort and boost hostility and

violence. A recent study of climate change and inter-

personal violence in 57 countries found that each Celsi-

us degree increase in annual temperatures is associated

with a nearly 6 percent average increase in homicides.



A warming climate also has strong geopolitical impli-

cations, as power balances may shift and new rivalries

may develop over, for example, rare earth minerals that

are crucial for low-carbon technologies, aecting coun-

tries globally.



This illustrates the broader set of threats

to human security in the Anthropocene context.

Threats to economic production and productivity

The Anthropocene context is aecting human security

by challenging both the expansion of human develop-

ment and the ability to reduce pressures on the plan-

et. It is already eroding some foundations of economic

productivity, directly aecting more than just the fac-

tors of production (labour, natural capital and physical

capital). The threats to economic productivity have im-

plications for dimensions of human security linked to

income, employment and economic prospects.

The Anthropocene context has — through climate

change, natural hazards and pollution — reduced not

only people’s ability to learn and live healthy lives

(the direct impact on health was discussed above),

intrinsically important from a human development

perspective, but also the foundations for econom-

ic production and, in particular, improvements

 55

in economic productivity. Short-run temperature

changes can impair cognitive performance.



High

temperatures inhibit learning, with disproportion-

ate impacts on minority students.



Exposure to high

temperatures around the time of birth can have long-

term consequences for educational attainment and

earnings.



And exposure to pollution in childhood

has been linked to poorer education performance

and long-term reductions in human capital.



“

Academic and policy debates on the climate–

security nexus have focused mostly on fragile

contexts and low-income and developing

countries. Yet the Anthropocene context is

universal, and climate-related conict and

violence can occur across countries at all incomes

Climate change is increasing the frequency of ex-

treme weather events. Given that disasters can aect

education and health outcomes, this can erode labour

productivity.



School enrolment often drops follow-

ing a disaster, and child labour increases.



After the

1988 earthquake in Nepal, children born in districts

severely aected by the disaster were 14 percent less

likely to complete middle school and 10 percent less

likely to complete high school.



Only children from

high caste groups were able to mitigate this negative

shock in the long run, widening the gap in human

capital between low and high caste groups.



Climate change also has an impact on worker pro-

ductivity and labour supply through health impacts.



The Arab States, South Asia and Sub- Saharan Afri-

ca are worst aected by heat stress–induced reduc-

tions in worker productivity (gure 2.9, left panel). In

Australia absenteeism and reductions in work per-

formance caused by heat stress generated $655 per

person in annual cost, amounting to 0.33–0.47 per-

cent of GDP.



In Guangzhou, China, an increase in

daily maximum wetbulb globe temperature (a meas-

ure of heat stress) was associated with a higher risk of

Figure 2.8 The Anthropocene context affects forced internal displacements

Source: IDMC 2021.

40.5m

Geophysical

Total new

displacements in 2020

7.5m

Armed

conflict

1.2m

Other

208,000

Violence

(political)

137,000

Violence

(criminal)

9.8m

655,000

30.7m

694,000

Violence

(communal)

988,000

Other

storms

14m

Floods

14.6m

Storms

137,000

Earthquakes

102,000

Landslides

46,000

Extreme

temperatures

Weather

Disasters

Conflict and

violence

32,000

Droughts

30m

518,000

Volcanic

eruptions

13.6m

Cyclones,

hurricanes,

typhoons

1.2m

Wildfires

56 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

work-related injuries.



Under a very high emissions

scenario declining labour productivity is predicted

to reduce global gross domestic product (GDP) by

1.5 percent towards the end of the century relative to

the reference scenario with no climate change.



The

impact of higher temperatures is expected to reduce

purchasing power in Europe and the United States,

but the strongest impacts would be felt in low and

medium HDI countries (gure 2.9, right panel).



“

The Anthropocene context is aecting

human security by challenging both the

expansion of human development and the

ability to reduce pressures on the planet

In some settings climate change is contributing

to reallocations of labour supply. In India warmer

temperatures have contributed to lower agricultur-

al productivity and a shift in labour to nonfarm sec-

tors.



Individuals whose livelihoods and incomes

are endangered by climate change may also turn

to migration. In rural Mexico wage laborers in poor

rural households were most vulnerable to extreme

heat. Extreme heat has reduced the probability, in the

short run, that a person works locally and increased

the probability of migration to urban areas or abroad.



Natural systems — in addition to providing food,

water, fuel and other material goods — provide wider

ecosystem services such as watershed protection,

pest regulation, climate control and hazard mitiga-

tion. And in many parts of the world, natural systems

are of social, cultural and spiritual value to people.



But natural capital (understood as the contribution of

nature to people, recognizing that there many other

reasons for why nature should be a matter of con-

cern) is being rapidly depleted.



In 123 countries an

increase in wealth between 1990 and 2014 was ac-

companied by a decline in natural capital.



The loss

of natural capital is evident in deforestation,



land

degradation



and the global depletion of sh stocks.



Some forms of natural capital help protect people

from disasters, and their loss therefore heightens

vulnerability to natural hazards. For example, man-

groves provide protection from coastal ooding, but

mangrove forests have declined globally.



By one es-

timate the loss of mangroves would result in 15 mil-

lion more people facing oods around the world,



with Small Island Developing States among those

Figure 2.9 Climate change is expected to affect’s people ability to work

Note: Aggregates are based on median values. RCP is Representative Concentration Pathway.

Source: 

0 1 2 3 4

Developed

Europe and

Central Asia

Latin America and

the Caribbean

East Asia

and Pacific

South Asia

Sub-Saharan

Africa

Arab States

Very high emissions (RCP8.5)

Moderate emissions (RCP4.5)

0 1 2 3 4

Very high

High

Medium

Low

Human Development

Index group

Region

Climate change labor disutility by 2100

(percent of GDP)

Climate change labor disutility by 2100

(percent of GDP)

 57

most vulnerable to mangrove loss.



Desertication

arising from climate change and other human ac-

tivity is set to diminish dryland ecosystem services

and reduce biodiversity.



Between 1982 and 2015

climate change contributed to the desertication of

about 5.43 million km



of land, aecting an estimated

213 million people, 93 percent of them in developing

economies.



Climate change is also aecting economic produc-

tivity through dierent demands for physical capital,

particularly in the energy sector. Energy production

and consumption are the source of three-quarters of

global greenhouse gas emissions, including from the

generation of electricity to regulate temperatures.



The net eect of climate change on energy de-

mand is undetermined, reecting the opposing forc-

es of reduced heating needs and increased cooling

needs.



But even if climate change reduces aver-

age global energy demand, some countries will face

substantial challenges. Higher temperatures will in-

crease demand for electricity, especially in warmer

places, such as the tropics and the southern regions of

China, Europe and the United States.



But in colder

regions, such as the Scandinavian countries, temper-

ate weather will reduce demand for heating.



There-

fore, the burden on increased energy demand falls

mainly on developing countries, which tend to de-

pend on fossil fuel for energy.



The limited adaptation capacity in poorer countries

will make their energy transition harder as they seek

to increase their productive capacity (to expand their

human development) because they will have to invest

more to get the same output. In a scenario with very

high emissions through 2100, the annual increase in

electricity consumption (relative to current consump-

tion) due to climate change is expected to be 1.8 per-

cent in the European Union and 2.7 percent in the

United States — but more than 2,000 percent in Nige-

ria.



Because of this asymmetry, navigating the chal-

lenges of expanding human development and easing

planetary pressures will be harder for the typical de-

veloping country.

“

The limited adaptation capacity in poorer

countries will make their energy transition harder

as they seek to increase their productive capacity

(to expand their human development) because

they will have to invest more to get the same output

Against this background, technology is evolving

rapidly, with the potential to increase economic pro-

ductivity, opening room for expanding human de-

velopment with lower planetary pressures. Energy

production might be decoupled from carbon dioxide

emissions through a mix of renewable sources (in-

cluding solar photovoltaics), new storage systems

(including lithium-ion batteries), complemented by

smart grids and technologies that capture and store

carbon dioxide.



Other advances can reduce materi-

al consumption — by improving eciency, enhancing

recycling and sharing resources.



In particular, the

digital transformation promises a more ecient use

of decentralized resources, through new algorithms,



blockchains,



platforms and sharing apps.



But as

chapter 3 discusses, some of these technologies can

have unintended consequences that might harm

human security.

Human security in the

Anthropocene context

Dangerous planetary changes that interact with glob-

al and local social imbalances result in wide inequal-

ities in people’s ability to survive and adapt to the

compounding eects of the Anthropocene context.

The planetary and social imbalances of the Anthro-

pocene overlap and interact with the main threats

described in part II, including health challenges, con-

icts, digital technologies and horizontal inequalities.

The Anthropocene context demands transforma-

tions in human security and development — to recog-

nize human embeddedness in nature and navigate

uncertainty and how to respond to these challenges

through the eyes of humankind.

Today’s approaches are far from adequate, as high-

lighted the recent Dasgupta Review and the 2020

Human Development Report.



Most security ap-

proaches have failed to consider the implications of

the embeddedness of social systems as part of Earth

systems in a context where human-induced planetary

pressures are driving dangerous planetary change.

This is the case of some narrow views of food securi-

ty, for instance. While livestock production is impor-

tant for food security in many developing countries,



mass meat production intended primarily for export

has contributed to deforestation and had adverse

58 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

health impacts, including increasing the probability

of zoonotic diseases.



Scientic work on Anthropocene risks (with a focus

on raising awareness of the scale of the problems) is

not fully informing the preparedness and crisis man-

agement work of multilateral, national and local in-

stitutions.



The eects of global changes are likely to

be increasingly heterogeneous both across countries

and within countries, as documented above, and this

knowledge beyond averages would need to be sys-

tematically considered when navigating the new con-

text of the Anthropocene.

The human security concept gains heightened rel-

evance in the Anthropocene context, as argued in

chapter 1, but also needs to be fully cognizant of this

new context. The compounding eects of Anthropo-

cene-related threats pose clear demands not only for

protection and empowerment strategies but also for

solidarity — recognizing that the security of people

across dierent parts of the world is connected, as is

the resilience of ecosystems and people.



“

In the Anthropocene context agency empowers

people to drive the transformations needed

to improve human security for everyone

As chapter 1 argues, agency is the critical node

bringing together human security strategies aimed

at protection, empowerment and solidarity in the

Anthropocene context. Across the globe there is

overwhelming support for the 2030 Agenda for Sus-

tainable Development, with most people agree-

ing that it is important to protect the planet, even if

this would mean sacricing income.



But this wide

agreement has not been enough to fully shift policy-

making: today, most of the consequential actions are

not in the hands of those willing and able to build se-

curer systems. Recognizing the centrality of agency

can help bridge this gap.

The centrality of agency in human security

strategies in the Anthropocene context

As argued throughout this Report, enhancing agen-

cy has benets beyond its direct eects in improving

the human security of groups excluded from or dis-

empowered in decisionmaking. In the Anthropocene

context agency empowers people to drive the trans-

formations needed to improve human security for

everyone.

Consider the transformative potential of enhanc-

ing the agency of indigenous peoples. Indigenous

groups are already greatly contributing to reduc-

ing planetary pressures.



Indigenous practices over

many generations have led to comparable or greater

biodiversity richness in indigenous lands today, even

compared with protected areas, as shown in Austral-

ia, Brazil and Canada.



Indigenous land tenure and

management have been critical to securing forest

carbon stores in the Amazon forests.



Indigenous

practices are being recognized to address the impacts

of severe wildres, as through prescribed burns.



The wealth of knowledge and experience within in-

digenous communities on coping with environmental

change is vital for shaping nature-based approaches

to human security, so our common security depends

on their empowerment. Indigenous practices focus

not only on stewardship of environment but also on

livelihoods, security and resilience of communities

amid change. These communities are thus well posi-

tioned to shape responses to human security threats.



But that requires protecting their rights and expand-

ing their agency.

An important starting point in this respect is pro-

tecting indigenous rights, including land tenure and

freedom from violence. Indigenous peoples’ initi-

atives to safeguard their ways of living have often

brought them into conict with powerful actors and

interests. Approximately 40 percent of environmen-

tal activists killed in 2019 were from indigenous

groups, and more than a third of fatal attacks be-

tween 2015 and 2019 targeted indigenous peoples.



Indigenous groups have often been excluded from

environmental movements. Biodiversity conserva-

tion campaigns focused on creating protected wil-

derness areas often involved displacement or forced

relocation of indigenous peoples from their territo-

ries.



Indigenous peoples have also been among

the hardest hit by development policies involving

large-scale modication of natural environments,

such as extractive industries. Moreover, indigenous

groups are exposed to the negative impacts of climate

change, due to their location in vulnerable areas and

their exclusion from decisionmaking.



In this con-

text indigenous activism goes beyond eorts against

 59

degradation of nature and biodiversity loss to also ad-

vance human rights and justice.



“

The wealth of knowledge and experience

within indigenous communities on coping with

environmental change is vital for shaping nature-

based approaches to human security, so our

common security depends on their empowerment

Policies drawing on indigenous knowledge will be

most eective when they are open and accountable to

indigenous groups and take into account their long-

term marginalization. Supporting the direct contribu-

tions of indigenous communities, by promoting their

empowerment and their struggles for justice, is key to

advancing nature-based human security.

There is also a broad space for local communi-

ties. Involving local actors in policy responses to new

human security threats is crucial, not only because of

environmental justice considerations and the impli-

cations for their political capabilities



but also be-

cause local communities wield enormous strengths

and assets that are key to the success of strategies to

face Anthropocene-related threats. Local commu-

nities possess rst-hand knowledge of changes in

weather patterns, demographic characteristics, social

norms (including women’s roles in the community)

and skills, practices and resources that may reduce

vulnerability and increase adaptability to dierent

forms of risks.



Top-down plans that ignore these

local assets might not have such knowledge. Indeed,

case studies in Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sen-

egal have all demonstrated that local communities

are critical in monitoring local changes, contribut-

ing to early warning systems that help inform crop-

ping, farming practices and evacuation decisions and

minimizing economic losses and the loss of lives and

livelihoods.



Enhanced agency for the stewardship of nature

There are opportunities to promote human security

through actions that protect, sustainably manage and

restore natural or modied ecosystems, taking ad-

vantage of nature’s contributions to people.



Indeed,

human societies have shaped and sustained most of

terrestrial nature for much of the past 12,000 years.



Today’s biodiversity crisis stems primarily from the

fairly recent appropriation and intensifying use of land

once held and used sustainably by many societies.



These actions can scale up nature-based solutions

since their results and ability to respond to the mag-

nitude of today’s interlinked threats depend on their

systemic implementation. The broad framework of

nature’s contribution to people brings explicit mecha-

nisms to integrate diverse values in the decisionmak-

ing process, including both intrinsic and instrumental

valuation of nature services.



This can be a formi-

dable way of achieving both protection and empow-

erment, with initiatives that rely on the agency of

local communities, including historically disempow-

ered indigenous groups. Some of the following action

areas — with multiple co-benets — can help people

deal with the risks from natural hazards, enhance

water and food security and mitigate the eects of

climate change more broadly.

• Managing risks from natural hazards. Expanding

green areas can be eective in managing extreme

temperature risks in urban spaces, particularly the

risks of heatwaves.



Managing ecosystems is a tool

of disaster risk reduction: through the conservation

of vegetation to reduce the risk of landslides. And

dierent ecosystems — dunes, oodplains, forests

and mangroves, oyster and coral reefs, salt marsh-

es, wetlands — are natural defenders of shorelines

against storms, winds and erosion. They can also

contribute to food security, economic development

and carbon storage.

• Employing biodiversity for resilience. Diversity in

agricultural landscapes and crops is important for

the adaptive capacity of global food systems.



For

example, pollinator-mediated crops are crucial for

global nutrition and agriculture more broadly, and

strategies to stem pollinator decline will enhance

food security.



Moreover, diversity in species vari-

ety can make ecosystems more resistant to destabi-

lizing risks. For instance, plant species with varying

types of roots (in thickness, depth and orientation)

planted on erosion-prone slopes can protect against

soil slippage and landslides.



• Improving water availability and quality. The manage-

ment of natural wetlands, soil moisture and ground-

water recharge are some sustainable nature-based

approaches for water availability.



In cities catch-

ment management and green infrastructure can

60 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

help ease pressure on water supply. For water quality

nature-based solutions oer alternatives to existing

“end of pipe” water treatment approaches. For

instance, constructed wetlands mimic natural sys-

tems for ltering runo rainwater and can remove

up to 88 percent of suspended solids, 92 percent of

organic matter, 46–90 percent of phosphorus and

16–84 percent of nitrogen from water,



as well as

pathogens.



These initiatives should be part of

blended approaches (combining green and grey in-

frastructure) to adequately respond to water security

threats in the 21st century.



“

Adaptation to ongoing dangerous

planetary change needs to be enhanced

with a global view; otherwise, there is the

risk that inequalities will continue to widen,

creating human crises at the local level and

humanitarian crises at the international level

• Enhancing food security. Forestry and agricultural

activity, which support the global food supply, are

vulnerable to climate change and biodiversity loss.

Nature-based agricultural practices that support

food security include regenerative agriculture

(increasing soil fertility and productive capacity

over time), agroforestry (growing crops on land

interspersed with trees) and silvopasture (integrat-

ing trees, forage pasture and grazing livestock on

the same land).



These initiatives strengthen the

resilience of agricultural ecosystems, support bio-

diversity and benet farmer livelihoods.

• Contributing to climate change mitigation. It is possi-

ble to contribute to climate change mitigation while

also beneting communities and ecosystems.



systemic approach can deliver global outcomes:

a group of 20 cost-eective actions across forests,

wetlands, grasslands and agricultural lands could

provide 37 percent of the global mitigation needs

of this decade to keep temperature rise below the

2 degrees Celsius threshold.



Indigenous peoples

and local communities have made important con-

tributions to climate mitigation by protecting forest

areas. Forest conservation eorts, particularly

in biodiversity hotspots, could be implemented

alongside, but faster than, the transition from fossil

to renewable fuel.



Similar questions of human rights and

accountability are raised in relation to the growing

number of people forcibly displaced by conicts and

the use of autonomous systems and articial intelli-

gence in warfare.

“

Questions of human rights and accountability

are raised in relation to the growing number

of people forcibly displaced by conicts

and the use of autonomous systems and

articial intelligence in warfare

The current multilateral system, built in part to

save future generations from the scourge of war, sees

its institutions evolving to face new conict threats.



The triple-nexus humanitarian– development– peace

approach indicates not only the importance of phys-

ical safety but also a minimum threshold of eco-

nomic, social, political and cultural freedoms in

promoting a peaceful and just future for all. Insti-

tutional innovations in the climate– security space



and in expanding the set of voices at the peacebuild-

ing table — including the Youth Peace and Security

Agenda,



the landmark UN Security Council Reso-

lution 1325 on gender-responsive peacebuilding



and

recent UN Security Council discussions on new and

emerging technologies — show how the concept of se-

curity is broadening in the multilateral space.

82 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Multilateral peacebuilding balances humanitarian-

ism with long-term development eorts. Its eective-

ness can be enhanced by international commitments

to advance human security and human rights — to

protecting civilians in conict, empowering histori-

cally marginalized groups and communities or easing

planetary pressures. Calls for networked multilat-

eralism stress the responsibility of all social actors

to uphold human rights.



Commitments to interna-

tionally agreed conventions on human rights and to

peace also advance the integrated and indivisible

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In fact,

committing to peace is not only a moral obligation

— it also makes economic sense. Investing $1 in

conict prevention today can save up to $16 in the fu-

ture.



Conversely, the economic cost of conict and

violence was estimated to be 10.5 percent of glob-

al GDP in 2019.



Worryingly, global trends seem to

point towards slow progress on disarmament and

multilateralism.



Agency connects empowerment

and protection for peaceful lives

The emphasis on empowerment in the context of

human security also implies empowering people to

act for peace. Empowering people to act for peace is

key in the current setting, with a conict landscape

that increasingly comprises protracted conicts with

a wide array of actors and in which consequences

spill across national boundaries.



The last section

of the chapter argues that centring conict analy-

sis and peacebuilding on people unearths common-

ly overlooked dimensions of conict and peace and

may provide a way of empowering people to become

change-agents for peace.

Identifying, supporting and amplifying the eorts

of the principal agents of change at the local, nation-

al, regional and global levels are critical, as is nding

platforms for constructive dialogue. Doing so also

requires changing pervasive social norms and power

hierarchies that limit the agency and voice of histor-

ically marginalized groups. For example, including

women in peace processes can improve the likeli-

hood of sustainable peace agreements.



UN Security

Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and secu-

rity calls on all actors to incorporate gender perspec-

tives and enhance women’s role in peacebuilding.



Empowerment-focused eorts to address conict

risks need to protect those at risk of victimization

while holding to account those perpetuating violence

and violating human rights. So, systemic approach-

es are important not only to reduce conict tensions

and risks at a macro scale but also to prevent violent

behaviours at the individual level.



Being exposed to

violence at a young age can desensitize children and

increase their likelihood of accepting and perpetuat-

ing violent behaviour.



Lack of economic opportu-

nities can reduce the opportunity costs of engaging

in violence,



whereas inequalities and exclusion can

create grievances that can be instrumentalized by po-

litical actors to foster conict.



The dynamics of violent conflict are

evolving under the new generation

of human security threats

Human security strategies based on the pursuit of

protection, empowerment and solidarity can com-

plement current approaches of addressing violent

conict. This is particularly pertinent in the current

context — whether for the turmoil in Afghanistan, the

future of reconciliation with indigenous peoples and

First Nations in Canada or the transition measures for

supporting people and places in managing large-scale

transformations to ease planetary pressures.

“

Conventional security policies would be

enhanced by systematically considering how

overlapping human security threats create

tensions and compound conict risks

Conict is becoming more complex, internation-

alized, multidimensional and fragmented, involving

more types of actors and persisting longer. A devel-

opment-with-insecurity trend is emerging (see g-

ure 4.1). Conventional security policies would be

enhanced by systematically considering how over-

lapping human security threats create tensions and

compound conict risks. Similarly, development ap-

proaches that fail to account for planetary pressures

and inequalities risk further aggravating human secu-

rity threats. The following discussion illustrates how

the new generation of human security threats inter-

act with evolving conict dynamics. By no means ex-

haustive, this overview shows how the intersections

 83

warrant careful attention, as they may open new are-

nas for addressing conict risks.

Conflict risks are exacerbated in the Anthropocene

context; climate change is a threat multiplier

As chapter 2 shows, a changing climate is one fea-

ture of the Anthropocene context. Land and ocean

ecosystems, as well as the services they provide to

humans, are changing because of human-induced

climate change, and biodiversity loss is rampant,

further eroding ecosystem resilience



and harming

human health, livelihoods and wellbeing.



While

there is still an ongoing discussion on the direct cli-

mate–conict link, a large body of research identies

several pathways between the two,



highlighting how

the Anthropocene context interplays with conict dy-

namics. This calls for a broader conceptualization of

human-ecological (in)security that captures the sys-

temic and volatile nature of the Anthropocene.



Con-

ict can also exacerbate environmental degradation,

leading researchers to point to possible “vicious vul-

nerability and climate traps.”



Conicts are ultimate-

ly related to social imbalances: horizontal inequality,

power hierarchies and political interests that seem to

contribute more to environmental conicts than the

direct eects of deteriorations in the environment or

access to natural resources do.



Climate change disproportionately aects coun-

tries already experiencing armed conict. At the end

of 2020, 10 of 21 ongoing UN peace operations were

in countries most exposed to climate change.



While

this is due to geographic location, armed conict in-

creases the diculties in managing and adapting to

climate change and may even exacerbate environ-

mental degradation. Conict weakens government

institutions and diverts attention from sustainable

development to military concerns. Global military

spending is increasing,



alongside the military car-

bon footprint.



Conict operations may also directly

hurt the natural environment. For example, attacks

on physical infrastructure can lead to oil spills, res

and higher carbon dioxide emissions.



Indeed, by

one estimate, the Gulf War contributed to more than

2 percent of global fossil fuel emissions in 1991.



And

more recent research shows how agricultural lands

were captured and destroyed by all sides in the Syrian

war.



Conict is also a predictor of declines in wild-

life populations, which hurts biodiversity.



“

Climate change disproportionately aects

countries already experiencing armed conict

A transition to a low-carbon economy is critical to

curbing climate change, yet conict may result in bar-

riers to much needed energy transitions and lock in

outdated polluting technologies.



The phasing out of

outdated technologies and shifting from fossil fuel to

renewable technologies also comes with transition

risks, which, if not carefully managed, can slow the

shift and even increase conict.



Some regions and

groups are better equipped to benet from new oppor-

tunities in low-carbon economies, while others stand

to lose out if no measures are taken when fossil fuel–

intensive production and related employment oppor-

tunities are phased out.



If the distributional eects of

the transition are perceived as unfair and regions and

groups are left without the support needed to adapt

to a new economic reality, social unrest may follow.



In fragile settings the side eects of renewable ener-

gy projects and local climate adaptation projects may

heighten conict risks.



At the global level the transi-

tion may reshape geopolitics, changing the relative po-

sitions of states and regions and leaving political and

economic uncertainty.



In addition, the growing de-

mand for minerals in the wake of a low-carbon transi-

tion may exacerbate or spur new conicts.



Digital technologies define new arenas for conflict

Chapter 3 highlights the threats to human securi-

ty from digital technological innovation, which may

also create new arenas where conicts play out. The

same technologies can provide new opportunities to

ensure accountability and foster peace — through, for

example, better forecasting of conict risks



— but

military use of emerging technologies may also pose

serious human security risks. For example, auton-

omous weapons systems and articial intelligence

may reduce human involvement in warfare,



raising

questions about responsibility and accountability for

the use of force. Existing regulatory and governance

frameworks are ill-equipped to address the human

rights risks linked to such emerging technologies.



84 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Some digital technologies can facilitate illicit eco-

nomic transactions and tax evasion, as they allow for

anonymity and untraceable transactions.



Online

sharing and storing of personal data expose individ-

uals to risks ranging from identity fraud and theft to

hate crimes, attacks and cyberbullying. Half of all in-

ternet users may be victims of a cybercrime.



Online

hate speech disproportionately targets women and

minority groups,



and online harassment can silence

social activists and undermine public deliberation.



Although major social media platforms have policies

for banning hateful conduct, regulatory frameworks

are still lacking for the most part, implying much dis-

cretion by rms that already concentrate substantial

economic power in arbitrating what is acceptable be-

haviour online and possibly making the internet yet

another unsafe space for many people.

The algorithms that social media platforms use

to promote content may create content clusters and

spread misinformation that can drive polarization.



While some research points towards the potential of

these arenas to spur radicalization and recruitment to

extremist groups,



the link between online hate and

real-world violence and crime is yet to be fully estab-

lished.



For the victims of cyberviolence, however,

sharply distinguishing between online and oine vi-

olence may not be useful, as online attacks incite fear

and restrict people’s freedoms, adversely impacting

human security.

Large and growing inequalities mount tensions;

conflict arenas differ across groups

Horizontal inequality has long been thought of as a

key driver of conict,



but the conict–inequality

link seems to be multidirectional, with horizontal in-

equality both shaping and being shaped by violence

and conict.



These interlinkages are important

when group-level inequalities are tied to the system-

atic political, social and economic exclusion or dis-

crimination of particular groups. Fault lines across

groups can be mobilized by political actors or other

interests for conict and violence.



This should not

be seen as an argument to curb civil liberties, given

that the large majority of groups and social move-

ments protesting discrimination, exclusion and ine-

qualities use peaceful methods to make their voices

heard (box 4.2). Horizontal inequalities alone do not

automatically trigger violent conict; other channels

are needed to translate horizontal inequality into vi-

olent action.

People’s perception of inequality and injustice

seems to be crucial in furthering conict risks.



Groups perceiving inequalities as unfair are more

likely to be mobilized to act and more prone to be

sensitive to political leadership and narratives that

stir up animosity aimed at triggering violence.



Hori-

zontal inequality–driven conict tensions compound

the interaction with the potential harms of digital

technology. As seen above, online content clusters

and widespread misinformation can further exacer-

bate feelings of animosity and alienation.

Conict aects groups and places dierently and

interplays with existing social and gender norms, at-

titudes and values. Men are more likely to be victims

of violent crime and homicides and to be killed in

battle. Yet men also make up 90 percent of homicide

perpetrators worldwide and commit violent and sex-

ual oences at much higher rates than women.



warfare systematic sexual violence towards women

remains an abhorrent human rights violation.



How-

ever, one of the most egregious yet widely tolerat-

ed violations of human security is violence against

women and children within their households and in

the community. About one in three women world-

wide has been subject to physical and/or sexual vio-

lence, most often by an intimate partner.



Thus, the

most dangerous place for many women across the

globe may be their own home.

Conflicts are a growing public health concern

Armed conict and violence not only pose direct

threats to health but also interact with other human

security threats to harm physical and mental well-

being. Conict may have long-term negative eects

on important health determinants, such as household

livelihoods and education. People living in conict

areas face compounding health risks. They are dis-

proportionately aected by trauma and injuries as

well as mental health problems, which may lead to

long-term disabilities and chronic illness when on-

going violence reduces access to quality healthcare

services.



Conict destroys healthcare infrastructure

 85

and services, exacerbating people’s vulnerability to

trauma and diseases not directly related to ghting.

Noncommunicable diseases may remain untreat-

ed, and conict can increase stress and other risk

factors.



These adverse health outcomes disproportional-

ity aect already at-risk populations. For example,

conict is associated with increased gender-based

and sexual violence directed towards women, higher

rates of sexually transmitted diseases and worsening

maternal health outcomes.



Food insecurity is high-

er in conict-aected areas, which may cause mal-

nutrition and adverse health outcomes, especially

among children.



Conict and violence trigger dis-

placement, further exposing people to health threats,

which can be exacerbated when people live in close

proximity, leading to contexts that are prone to out-

breaks of life-threatening diseases such as cholera

and malaria and that could become transmission

belts for Covid-19.

Box 4.2 Social protests have intensified over the past three years

Over the past 10 years protests have been mul-

tiplying across the world, escalating in size and

frequency. Largely peaceful, the growing scale and

scope of protests are symptoms of human insecurity,

revealing deep cleavages in societies and the failure

of authorities to address citizen concerns.

Between 2009 and 2019 antigovernment protests

increased by 11.5 percent a year on average, peaking

in 2017 and 2019. In 2019 almost a quarter of the resi-

dents of both Hong Kong, China (SAR) and Santiago,

Chile — 2 million and 1.2 million people, respectively —

took to the streets, and the social movement Fridays

for Future registered more than 4 million environmen-

tal protests. These protests parallel declining trust

in governments and democracy.

Protest is a form

of political expression,

many times a final resort to

seek social and political change when traditional

mechanisms have not been responsive. While a

protest may be triggered by a single event or policy

change — such as the killing of George Floyd in the

United States, the increases in metro fares in Chile or

a proposed carbon tax in France — they often reflect

mounting grievances, exclusion and discrimination.

The number of protest events has increased in all

Human Development Index (HDI) categories over the

past three years, with the largest increase in the very

high HDI category (see figure). Rather than cooling

tensions, the Covid-19 pandemic has spurred more

protests across the world as people have taken to

the streets to voice concerns about governments

responses, or lack thereof, to the public health cri-

sis.

The vast majority of protests are peaceful, and

only a small fraction turn violent or are met with

intervention from authorities. How authorities meet

demonstrations can affect whether they turn vio-

lent, and repression of nonviolent protests has been

found to trigger further violence.

When protests are

met with violence from authorities, human security

is threatened, and human rights are violated.

The number of protest events has increased in all

Human Development Index categories over the past

three years

Peaceful protests

Protests with intervention from authorities

Violent protests

Number of protests (thousands)

2018

2019

2020

2018

2019

2020

2018

2019

2020

2018

2019

2020

Low Medium High Very high

Human Development Index category

Source: Human Development Report Office, based on Armed Con-

flict Location & Event Data Project.

Source: Bell and Murdie 2018; Brannen, Haig and Schmidt 2020; EIU

2021; Ferreira and Schoch 2020; Fridays for Future 2021; Kishi 2021;

Lipsky 1968; Pinckney 2016.

Notes

1.EIU 2021. 2.Lipsky 1968. 3.Kishi 2021. 4.Pinckney 2016. 5.In 2020

the United Nations Human Rights Committee adopted General





86 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

“

While a protest may be triggered by a single

event or policy change — such as the killing of

George Floyd in the United States, the increases

in metro fares in Chile or a proposed carbon

tax in France — they often reect mounting

grievances, exclusion and discrimination

Public health crises such as the ongoing Covid-19

pandemic may call for extraordinary policy meas-

ures and restrictions to protect people’s health.



the measures are perceived as ineective or unfair or

fail to recognize adverse distributional eects, social

and political tensions may increase. And while the

pandemic dampened conict events, in 2020 political

violence rose in more countries than it fell.



Afghan-

istan, Mexico, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and

Yemen experienced the most political violence that

year, whereas Cameroon, the Democratic Repub-

lic of the Congo, Iraq, Mali and Nigeria saw conict

events increase by more than 50 percent.



Putting people at the heart of conflict

analysis, conflict prevention and

sustaining peace shows the power

of the human security approach

After decades of gradual de-escalation, conict is

again on the rise (gure 4.2). In 2020 there were 56

active state-based conicts in 37 countries, the most

involving the government of a state since the end

of World War II.



Much of this increase may be as-

cribed to the Islamic State engaging in direct conicts

with governments in numerous countries. However,

state-based wars are giving way to conict between

nonstate actors. In 2020, 72 active nonstate conicts

claimed the lives of 23,000 people. Together, both

gures point towards violent conicts that are less

state-centric and increasingly protracted.



The conicts of today tend to be less deadly than

the wars prior to 1990. Now, most battle- related

deaths are concentrated in a few countries. Further-

more, crime is now a greater source of violent deaths

than armed conicts, and most occur outside tradi-

tional conict zones.



The Americas account for

40 percent of homicides, and homicide rates have re-

mained high and stable in the region while declining

in the rest of the world.



Beyond homicides, people

in Latin America are disproportionately exposed to

other violent crimes.



Still, measuring and monitoring conict are laden

with political and technical challenges. Traditional

conict metrics, such as number of ongoing conicts

or battle-related deaths, do not fully capture the reach

of armed conicts today, nor do they give a complete

picture of the scale of the human security implica-

tions of violent conicts. With protracted conicts

Figure 4.2 The number of violent conflicts is rising again

Source: Aas Rustad 2021a.

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

540,000

100

120

140

160

180

1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Number of battle deaths

Number of conflicts

State-based conflicts Nonstate conflicts One-sided violence incidents

State-based battle deaths Nonstate battle deaths One-sided battle deaths

 87

and organized crime simultaneously concentrating

in subnational hotspots and spreading across bor-

ders, data and measurement innovations are needed

to improve understanding of who is aected by con-

ict. Although there are fewer battle-related deaths

than in the past, violent conicts are now more pro-

tracted, lingering on for years. Violent conict creates

immense hardship and suering, including physical

injuries, mental health problems and trauma, sexual

violence, and exploitation, as well as generalized fear

and a breakdown of trust.

This Report introduces one innovation in measur-

ing the number of people aected by conict that re-

veals stark trends (box 4.3).



The number of people

living in proximity to conict events has more than

doubled since 1990, and the share of conict-aect-

ed people has been growing rapidly as well. Today

about 1.2 billion people live in conict-aected areas,

560 million of them in countries not classied as frag-

ile contexts.



In 2020 people in at least 25 countries

not facing fragile contexts were living in proximity to

conict events. Between 2014 and 2020 the number

of people living in conict areas increased by 378 mil-

lion, and 40 percent of them were outside fragile

contexts. Since conventional conict analysis and

peacebuilding tend to focus on fragility, conict-af-

fected people outside of traditional conict zones

may be overlooked.

Box 4.3 Measuring conflict-affected populations

To scale the dimension of people exposed to conflict,

Østby, Aas Rustad and Arasmith (2021) developed a

methodology for calculating the number of people living

in proximity to conflict. In 2020, 4.5 billion people lived

in countries that saw some kind of conflict. Yet not all

of those people were equally affected, as conflict events

tend to concentrate in hotspots (box figure 1).

About 555 million people lived within 50 kilometres of a

conflict event in 1990, compared with almost 1.2 billion—15

percent of the world’s population — in 2020.

The trend is

even more dramatic for children because conflicts are

more common in countries with younger populations.

Some 200 million children lived in conflict areas in 1990,

compared with 452 million — 19 percent of all children — in

2020. About 73 percent (864 million) of conflict-affected

people live in areas with low levels of conflict (1–25 people

killed a year). But even living in low intensity conflict areas

can have a big impact on people’s lives.

(continued)

Box figure 1 Number of people within 50 kilometres of fighting

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020

People (millions)

People living in low intensity conflict

(1–25 people killed in a year, left axis)

People living in very high intensity conflict

(more than 1,000 people killed in a year, left axis)

People living in medium intensity conflict

(26–100 people killed in a year, left axis)

People living in high intensity conflict

(101–1,000 people killed in a year, left axis)

Conflict-affected population as a share of world population (right axis)

Conflict-affected population as a

share of world population (percent)

Note: The number of people living in conflict affected areas, where fighting takes place within a 50 kilometre radius.

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset v.20.1; UN World Population Estimates; Østby, Aas Rustad and Tollefsen 2020.

88 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Living in a conict-aected area and being exposed

to violence, directly or indirectly, have negative ef-

fects on important human development outcomes.



A reduced sense of safety and adverse mental health

are common in communities with recurring violent

events.



For example, a surge in local homicides in

Bogotá, Colombia, increased mental health disor-

ders and posttraumatic stress disorder among ado-

lescents, including those without direct exposure to

violence.



“

Today about 1.2billion people live in

conict-aected areas, 560million of them in

countries not classied as fragile contexts

Violence and fear of violence push people to leave

their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. The num-

ber of forcibly displaced people has been growing —

peaking at 82.4 million in 2020 (gure 4.3).



Chapter

5 illustrates the multiple human security threats that

forcibly displaced people face. While the conicts

in Afghanistan, Somalia and Syrian Arab Republic

are thought to be responsible for more than half the

world’s refugee population, overlapping human se-

curity threats, conict and violence drive displace-

ment outside war zones. Unprecedented violence,

widespread criminality and impunity threaten cit-

izen security in Central America and drive people

from their homes in the Northern Triangle countries.



Box 4.3 Measuring conflict-affected populations (continued)

South Asia has the highest number of people affected

by conflict; however, in Sub-Saharan Africa and the

Middle East around 30 percent of the total population

live in conflict (box figure 2). In the mid-2000s the conflict-

affected population in Sub- Saharan Africa rose sharply

as a result of large increases in nonstate conflicts. The

Arab countries show an increase after 2011, coinciding

with the post–Arab Spring period, particularly in Iraq,

Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. Around 2016 there was

an increase in Latin America, due mainly to violence re-

lated to nonstate conflict between drug cartels in Brazil

and Mexico.

Source: Østby, Aas Rustad and Arasmith 2021; Østby, Aas Rustad and

Tollefsen 2020; Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Da-

taset v.20.1; UN World Population Estimates.

Note

1.A conflict event is defined as “An incident where armed force was used

by an organised actor against another organized actor, or against civil-

ians, resulting in at least one direct death at a specific location and a



Box figure 2 Africa and in the Middle East have the

largest share of people living in conflict

0 10 20 30 40

Europe and

Central Asia

Developed

countries

East Asia and

the Pacific

Arab States

Latin America and

the Caribbean

Sub-Saharan

Africa

South Asia

Conflict-affected population (percent)

Source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset v.20.1;

UN World Population Estimates; Østby, Aas Rustad and Tollefsen 2020.

Figure 4.3 The number of forcibly displaced

people is at a record high

Note: The global number of forcibly displaced people is recorded by

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in its Refugee

Data Finder. It includes data from the United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East on Palestine refugees

under its mandate and data on internally displaced people from the



Source: 

100

2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 2020

Forcibly displaced people (millions)

 89

Internal displacement is also a growing concern, es-

pecially in relation to climate change and environ-

mental degradation.



“

Fear of violence may reduce people’s mobility,

dictate how they move in public space and reduce

their participation in community activities

Yet, fear of violence may also reduce people’s mo-

bility, dictate how they move in public space and re-

duce their participation in community activities.



This seems to hold true even in areas where meas-

ured conict, violence and crime are low,



show-

ing how insecurity, both measured and perceived,

can shape behaviour, hamper wellbeing and curtail

agency. As chapter 1 mentions, human insecurity is

present across all HDI categories. Furthermore, the

feeling of insecurity has been growing over time,

with the largest increases in very high HDI coun-

tries. Crime, violence and terrorism is the second

most cited risk to personal safety in the latest World

Risk Poll,



and more than 60 percent of people

worldwide are worried about sustaining serious harm

from violent crime.



Going beyond the traditional conict metrics to cen-

tre the analysis on people, rather than on the contesta-

tions, illustrates the power of using a human security

approach. It shows how violent conict increasingly

aects people outside traditional conict zones, who

may be overlooked when the focus is where ghting

takes place. It also identies how conict is not only a

threat to physical safety but may also raise barriers to

trust, solidarity, agency and empowerment — key prin-

ciples needed to face the new generation of human

security threats. People-centred conict analysis puts

people at the heart of conict prevention and shifts

attention towards empowering people to become

change-agents for peace. Systematic work to source

locally dened indicators of conict and peace may

amplify the voices of those living in conict (box 4.4).

Other approaches include measuring the eective-

ness of peace operations on the lives of people, as well

as on institutions.



Ultimately, conict, violence and

peace are felt, experienced and constructed by people.

Box 4.4 Everyday Peace Indicators

Research by the Everyday Peace Indicators (EPI) project

shows how villages and neighbourhoods around the

world perceive peace and peace-related concepts,

such as coexistence, security and justice. The findings:

everyday people raise concerns vastly different from

top-down measures of conflict and peace, hinting at the

blindspots of conventional security policies that make

sustaining peace in the long term so difficult.

Traditional indicators such as conflict deaths and other

conflict events are important to understand macro-level

trends, but they may not adequately represent the

priorities of those living in, or affected by, conflicts. For

example, based on data from 1,500 people in 18 rural

villages in eastern Afghanistan, EPI researchers found

that roadblocks (commonly raised by insurgent groups

to extort travellers) were indicators of insecurity and

conflict.

But the ability to access public services or the

visibility of women and girls in public spaces, such as

the market, indicated reduced conflict. In Colombia the

re-emergence of the local market and trade in San Jose

de Uruma in northeastern Antioquia, previously hit hard

by internal armed conflict, marked a transition towards

peace, whereas the EPI researchers argue that piling

up of trash on the streets may indicate a deteriorating

situation.

Source: Firchow 2018; Firchow and Urwin 2020; Vera-Adrianzén and

others 2020.

Note

1.Firchow and Urwing 2020. 2.Vera-Adrianzen and others 2020.

90 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022



Inequalities and the

assault on human dignity

CHAPTER

92 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

CHAPTER 5

Inequalities and the assault on human dignity

Inequalities have a direct bearing on dignity — and

thereby on human security. This chapter is concerned

with horizontal inequalities — those experienced be-

tween groups of people based on some shared char-

acteristic, including aspects of how they choose to

self-identify. The chapter considers inequalities in

terms of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation

and age, among others. It describes how discrimina-

tion, violence and violations of human rights parallel

horizontal inequalities. It points to the importance of

understanding intersectionality: because each per-

son’s identity is plural, some face discrimination on

multiple fronts. For instance, Black women face dif-

ferent forms of sexism from White women and dif-

ferent forms of racism from Black men. Horizontal

inequalities often persist despite measures to outlaw

or regulate their underlying drivers (through antidis-

crimination laws, for example). Even when groups

are formally protected against discrimination, social,

political and cultural practices of exclusion can still

erode people’s dignity. Many groups have little to no

formal protection at all, as is the case for large num-

bers of people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexu-

al, transgender, intersex or another sexual minority

(LGBTI+ people) around the world.

Securing lives of dignity for people who suer hori-

zontal inequalities demands systemic action. This

chapter argues that this action must be bring the cen-

trality of agency to the fore. An approach based on

agency arms that people from excluded groups are

not passive victims (of forces beyond their control)

or beneciaries of support from others — important

as assistance may be in many circumstances; rather,

that they are active movers and participants in so-

cial change. The focus on agency makes plain that

addressing horizontal inequalities is more than im-

proving the wellbeing of groups excluded and dis-

criminated against, important though that is. And a

focus on agency shows how eliminating horizontal

inequalities not only is a matter of justice for those

discriminated against or excluded but also enrich-

es communities and society more broadly, because

agency is central for broader processes of social

change.



An agency-focused approach also recogniz-

es that people hold multiple identities at once.



That

people are simultaneously members of dierent

collectives provides for solidarity to be built across

groups over shared values and goals. A foundation

of agency enhances space for solidarity as people are

better able to reason about, strategize and participate

in actions that transform society.

Horizontal inequalities

undermine human dignity

What does dignity mean? As discussed in chapter 1,

dignity lies at the heart of human rights. A commit-

ment to human rights is based in part on the recog-

nition that everyone has inherent worth, solely by

virtue of being human and irrespective of their gen-

der, race or other identity. To quote again from arti-

cle 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity

and rights. They are endowed with reason and con-

science and should act towards one another in a spirit

of brotherhood.”



The inherent dignity of all people

is also the basis for the universality of human rights.

There are complementary perspectives on dignity.

For instance, according to Martha Nussbaum, dignity

is related to respect, agency and equality. So, dignity

consists of being treated with respect. It also implies

having control over what people are able to do. And it

implies respecting the principle that all human beings

are all equal.



“

Injustice, oppression and discrimination

are based on hierarchies of human

value, which directly aect dignity

Human rights set necessary conditions for what we

owe to each other — treating each other with respect,

tolerance and understanding. Realizing these con-

ditions places broad demands on society that can be

fullled not only by legislating and enforcing the pro-

tection of particular rights but also by examining the

multiple ways that preclude advancing those rights.



It is in the context of such examination that horizontal

inequalities can become relevant, harming the pur-

suit of human rights and, in part as a result, hurting

dignity. Injustice, oppression and discrimination are

based on hierarchies of human value, which directly

aect dignity. Justice and nondiscrimination — as well

as the principle of equality for everyone — are the core

values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights



and the global commitment to recognize inherent

human dignity.

 93

In addition to legal protection of human rights,

expanding people’s capabilities also supports digni-

ty. However, dignity can be diminished when some

groups progress and others fall behind in what counts,

or is perceived to count, for social worth.



When new

generations are more educated but lack access to high

quality jobs or the ability to aord the living standards

of past generations, people’s dignity can be aected

by a sense of unfairness or a sense of failure.



“

It is important when considering human

security to account for all voices and

enable their agency both in the description

of issues and in policy responses

The frame of human security has not always fully

accounted for the dierent concerns of varied social

groups. For instance, feminist critiques have pointed

out that policies that claim to serve all people often

render the specic concerns of women invisible.



Security discourses can also fall into gendered, ra-

cialized and colonialist patterns by associating cer-

tain groups of people with victimhood and weakness



and by adopting protection strategies that may ulti-

mately disempower those being protected. Many in-

stitutions connected with enhancing security can be

underpinned by patriarchal, colonial and traditional

social norms. When that happens, they endow some

groups with greater power while others are placed in

a subordinate and submissive position. For instance,

in patriarchal societies men typically are granted the

role of protectors of their families and, by extension,

of leaders protecting a population.



It is therefore important when considering human

security to account for all voices and enable their

agency both in the description of issues and in poli-

cy responses. The fundamental needs of individu-

als for human security dier based on each person’s

plural identities (sex, gender, race, sexual orienta-

tion, age, ethnicity, ability and residence).



People’s

plural identities are a source of strength and enrich

personal and social life but can also expose some

people to overlapping forms of discrimination and vi-

olations of human rights.



In analysing experiences

of human insecurity and designing policies to tackle

them, recognizing intersectionality helps overcome

the dangers of masking overlapping identities



by ac-

knowledging that ultimately we are all human.



This chapter describes some forms of discrimination

and rights violations that are manifested in, and often

foster, horizontal inequalities. These inequalities bear

on the human security threats discussed throughout

this Report (gure 5.1). At a time of increasing severity

and frequency of hazards linked to the Anthropocene

context that threaten human security, the gaps in capa-

bilities more relevant to responding to them are wid-

ening.



Some groups that are falling through the oors

of basic capabilities are also experiencing greater chal-

lenges to dignity. The chapter highlights inequalities

in control over resources



(land, food and water



)

that aect health, time allocation and possibilities

for education and work — widening gaps in capabili-

ties.



It identies the impacts of economic insecurity

and greater risk to crises and shocks across dierent

groups. Finally, it brings into view the ways the dier-

ent experiences of insecurity and overlapping hierar-

chies of power can undermine human dignity.

Threats to human security

along the lifecycle

The functional capacity of people (echoing the no-

tion of capability, the ability to be and do what peo-

ple value and have reason to value



) evolves from

childhood through adult life to older age. But there

can be wide disparities in people’s functioning due to

disadvantages and risk factors throughout lifecycle

(gure 5.2). This section discusses some of the chal-

lenges faced by groups at higher risk of suering from

inequalities in functional capacity: children, young

people and older people.

Human security and wellbeing achievements at

earlier stages of a person’s life aect outcomes at

later stages. For example, poverty, violence and men-

tal health disorders earlier in life reduce healthy life

expectancy, resulting in poorer health capabilities

later in life.



For children trauma, stress and ad-

verse childhood experiences impair both physical

and mental development, with long-lasting impacts.



Household and family violence, conict and commu-

nity violence, insecurity, discrimination, income in-

security, child marriage and gender-based violence

are just some of the human security threats aecting

children’s health and development.

Conict threatens every aspect of children’s lives

and security. In 2019, 69 percent of the world’s

94 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

children were living in conict-aected countries, and

more than 18 percent were living in conict zones.



Between 2005 and 2020 there were more than

266,000 veried grave violations against children in

conict,



with the real number likely much higher.



Children engaged in armed conicts face various and

compounding threats, including death, injury and dis-

ability, as well as deprivations in nutrition, poor living

conditions, gender-based violence, obligations to take

part in torture and killings, and dangerous labour.



Conict also deprives children of education.



Digital technologies are revolutionizing both the

potential benets and potential threats of technol-

ogy for children, but the eects are unequal. Digital

technologies create opportunities for access to educa-

tion, breaking cycles of poverty and social needs for

children and young people. But digital divides exist

between low- and high-income countries, reaching

81 percentage points for children and young people

(gure 5.3).

Inequalities in access to digital technologies have

widened inequalities in education during the Covid-

19 pandemic, as the reliance on digital technologies

for education has grown.



This corresponds with

trends showing that dierences in school attendance

between the pre-pandemic period (with in-person

instruction) and the pandemic period (with online

teacher-assisted lessons) were more pronounced in

countries with higher multidimensional poverty.



The pandemic further exposed the gender digital

divide, showing that women and girls are at a dis-

advantage in digital skills, with bigger gaps in more

advanced skills, hindering their ability to take advan-

tage of technology.



Protection and empowerment strategies will dif-

fer for every age group. Children, especially those

in early childhood, depend on external inputs for

survival and development of basic capabilities. This

need demands action on the part of caregivers and

institutions to allow children to develop free from

Figure 5.1 Different groups of people experience new threats to human security differently

Source: Human Development Report Office.

Anthropocene

context

- Discrimination and human rights violations

- Citizenship rights denial for trans people

- Increased likelihood of homelessness

for young people who identify as lesbian,

gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex or

another sexual minority (LGBTI+)

- Unequal access to justice for Black people

- Technology lag for

older people

- Gender digital divide

- Skills gap for young

Black people

- Unequal access to health

- Increased risk of HIV

for LGBTQI+ people

- Ageism and mental health

- Indigenous peoples affected by planetary imbalances

- Women experience increased food insecurity

- Environmental migration and displacement

- Underfinanced humanitarian

aid for refugees

- Negative impact on young

people’s education

- Increased intimate partner violence

- Driver of migration

and displacement

- Increased risk of violence

against women and girls

- Hinders education

opportunities for young people

- Older people left behind

Digital

technology

threats

Health

threats

Inequalities

Violent

conflict

Covid-19

 95

human insecurity. This does not mean that children

are not agents in their own lives and societies. Chil-

dren and adolescents are active participants in socie-

ty through cultural, social and political engagement,

and in many cases they are also participants in eco-

nomic activity and care work.



Recognizing their

agency in these areas is key to protection and empow-

erment strategies for children.

Figure 5.2 The change in functional capacity over the lifecycle has different implications for human

security challenges and thus requires different policies

Source: 

Functional capacity

Childhood Youth Adult life Older age

Highest functional

capacity

Maintaining independence

and preventing disability

Possible range

of function

Rehabilitation and

ensuring quality of life

Age

Disability threshold

Growth and development

Figure 5.3 There is great inequality between high-income and low-income countries in young people’s

internet access at home

Source: UNICEF and ITU 2020.

100

Low income Lower middle

income

Upper middle

income

High income World

Children and young people (ages 0–25) Young people (ages 15–24)

School-age children (ages 3–17)

Internet access (percent)

96 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

“

Children and adolescents are active

participants in society; recognizing their

agency in these areas is key to protection and

empowerment strategies for young people

Youth marks the shift to adult life, with a high-

er functional capacity in the transition from school

settings to workplaces. Having less experience and

fewer skills than older adults, young people can en-

counter entry barriers to the labour market and may

have high unemployment rates, pushed even higher

by the Covid-19 pandemic, which harmed groups that

tend to suer from the impacts of horizontal inequal-

ities. For instance, in the United States in May 2020,

although the unemployment rate declined among

White young people, the rate among non-White young

people rose.



Sectors where young people tend to be

overrepresented (retail and hospitality) have been the

hardest hit, with most jobs done by young people in

these sectors unable to be performed from home.



Young people are particularly aected by violent

conicts and organized crime. They also have gen-

dered vulnerabilities to violence against women and

girls, sexual assault, human tracking and forced la-

bour. Crime, violence and drug use have increased

with Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns, directly linked

to limited access to employment and the loss of so-

cial and community networks.



These factors can

force young people to pull out of civic spaces, reduc-

ing their visibility.



Young people are often exclud-

ed or given only a token role in civic spaces,



where

their voices are not heard to shape their own future.



In decisionmaking linked to the Covid-19 pandemic,

younger generations have not systematically gained a

seat at the table with policymakers and leaders.



De-

spite these challenges, young people have demon-

strated that they are critical agents of social change,

as they seek creative ways to prevent violence and

consolidate peace around the globe.



With longer life expectancies and lower fertility

rates, the global population is ageing. By 2050 an es-

timated 1 in 6 people will be older than 65



— 80 per-

cent of them in developing countries (table 5.1).



Ageing gradually reduces mental and physical capac-

ities and increases disease risks. While ageing is in-

evitable, the process can be widely dierent in speed,

nature and characteristics. Genetics play a part in this

variation, but much comes from a person’s physical

and social environment and their sex, ethnicity and

socioeconomic status.



At the same time, inequal-

ities within population groups carry over into older

age,



producing wide ranges in functional capaci-

ties.



Having higher dependency ratios is usually as-

sociated with greater economic pressure on the active

population and demands for higher scal spending to

support the older population.



Health outcomes for older people appear to be

strongly linked to disadvantages at earlier stages of

life that could have a cumulative eect.



Unhealthy

habits and behaviours that lead to poor health out-

comes in later life, such as smoking, high alcohol

consumption, low physical activity and diets low in

fruits and vegetables, have been linked to socioec-

onomic status.



In some countries where data are

available, evidence shows that lower socioeconomic

status is generally associated with increased smoking

Table 5.1 Number of people age 65 or older, by geographic region, 2019 and 2050

Region

Number of people age 65 or older (millions)

Percent change,

2019–20502019 2050

World 702.9 1,548.9 120

Northern Africa and Western Asia 29.4 95.8 226

Sub- Saharan Africa 31.9 101.4 218

Oceania, excluding Australia and New Zealand 0.5 1.5 190

Central and Southern Asia 119.0 328.1 176

Latin America and the Caribbean 56.4 144.6 156

Eastern and South-Eastern Asia 260.6 572.5 120

Australia and New Zealand 4.8 8.8 84

Europe and Northern American 200.4 296.2 48

Source: UNDESA 2019.

 97

prevalence by age, race, ethnicity and region, regard-

less of sex.



Dierences in food expenditure also

show the prevalence of less healthful foods in lower

socioeconomic groups.



Communities with lower so-

cioeconomic status face limited access to aordable

exercise facilities,



possibly contributing to higher

prevalence of obesity and diabetes in lower income

populations. These risks have greater chances of be-

coming vulnerabilities as age advances, likely leading

to health deprivations for older poor people.

“

Young people have demonstrated that

they are critical agents of social change, as

they seek creative ways to prevent violence

and consolidate peace around the globe

People facing higher deprivations live shorter lives

and spend a bigger proportion of their life in poor

health.



Healthy life expectancy is associated with

better mental health. In Denmark men with mental

disorders lost 10.2 more healthy life-years than men

without mental disorders, and women with mental

disorders lost 7.34 more life-years than women with-

out mental disorders.



People older than 65 need support because of natu-

ral declines in some functional capacities and higher

risks for some diseases. In Organisation for Econom-

ic Co-operation and Development countries their in-

comes are on average lower than those of the total

population,



and their risk of falling into poverty or

remaining in poverty is signicant.



Older women

are at a higher risk than men for poverty due to gen-

der inequalities that persist from earlier in their lives.

Their pensions tend to be lower because of lower

wages, gaps in employment due to childbearing and

childrearing labour, and longer life expectancies —

and their already lower savings are stretched out over

longer periods of time.



As the socioeconomic analysis intersects with other

capabilities such as health, physical and psychosocial

dependency and support networks, an increasingly

complex picture forms around the experience of age-

ing on wellbeing and agency. A study on multidimen-

sional poverty and quality of ageing in Peru showed

that being male, being younger, being more educat-

ed, being employed, not smoking, lacking physical

disabilities, having proper nutrition, showing high-

er empowerment and self-esteem and being free of

mental disabilities were all positively related to suc-

cessful ageing for people older than 65 living in multi-

dimensional poverty.



The internalization of age stereotypes begins early

in life and is present at all life stages. Stereotypes rep-

resent subconscious ideas about older people that are

then embodied through attitudes towards ageing and,

as discussed in chapter 1, represent a direct threat to

human security. Experiences of ageism have negative

eects on frailty outcomes for older people through

negative age stereotypes. More positive attitudes to-

wards and self-perception of ageing have been linked

to better physical outcomes and less frailty in old age.



Knowledge of the ageing process reduces both anxie-

ty about ageing and ageist attitudes themselves.



This

points to an important rst step in addressing ageism:

information and education on the ageing process.

A recent example of this has been seen during the

Covid-19 pandemic. Guidelines for rationing looked

to maximize the lives and life-years saved, which

often resulted in making older age and comorbidi-

ties the main determinants hindering access to limit-

ed care services.



There are also relevant inequality

components to rationing, which is more likely, more

severe and more often required in low-income set-

tings, with systems that are less equipped and have

fewer resources.



Violence and economic

discriminations harm the human

security of women and girls

Gender inequality is one of the most widespread

horizonal inequalities. Women’s livelihoods are se-

verely impaired by poverty, with around 435 million

women and girls living on less than $1.90 a day in

2021 — including 47 million pushed into poverty dur-

ing the Covid-19 pandemic.



In low-income coun-

tries 92.1 percent of employed women are in informal

employment compared with 87.5 percent of men.

In lower middle-income countries 84.5 percent of

women are in informal employment compared with

83.4 percent of men.



Women have lower earnings,

lower savings, worse working conditions and less ac-

cess to nancial accounts, reducing their capacity to

absorb economic shocks.



Unequal conditions leave

women with less protection and resilience against

unemployment, health emergencies, paid sick leave

98 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

and other basic rights. Women in many countries

have low access to bank accounts, with barriers such

as lack of knowledge of nancial services, cultural or

religious factors and lack of provisions or aversion to

credit.



In societies where traditional patriarchal so-

cial norms are pervasive, women are more econom-

ically dependent on men and are constrained from

making decisions for themselves and their families,

hurting both their wellbeing and agency.

But gender inequality not only is a glaring injustice

against women; it also harms society. For instance,

women’s food insecurity cascades into the poorer

nutrition and health outcomes of entire families and

communities,



and their economic insecurity can

heavily restrict their agency. The sex gap in access to

food increased from 2018 to 2019, with women liv-

ing in rural settings the most aected— paradoxical

since women and girls represent most food producers

and food providers.



Still, in more than 90 countries

female farmers lack equal rights to own land and to

access other productive resources such as livestock,



impacting nutrition and health outcomes of entire

families and communities.



Globally, the prevalence

of food insecurity is higher for women than for men,

with the largest gaps in Africa and Latin America and

the Caribbean.



Natural hazards kill more women than men on av-

erage and leave women at higher risk for displace-

ment because of their dependence on forests, land,

rivers and rainfall.



The Covid-19 pandemic has had

a disproportionate toll on women in critical areas of

human development. Women have had higher risk

exposure to the virus by being overrepresented in the

frontlines of the response. They are overrepresented

in the hardest hit sectors cwomen account for 39 per-

cent of global employment but 54 percent of total job

losses during the pandemic.



Teenage pregnancies

and violence against women and girls increased sub-

stantially during the pandemic.



Women’s sense of

not being in control and living in fear are due to tra-

ditional social norms and patriarchal structures



that

result in the existing sex inequalities that harm their

wellbeing and agency.



Violence against women and girls, one of the

most brutal forms of harming women’s wellbeing

and agency,



encompasses any action or behaviour

that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexu-

al or mental harm or suering for women and girls.



Violence against women and girls is the most obvious

manifestation of deep power imbalances.



Fear of

violence is a common experience for women every-

where. In the triangle of violence, direct violence re-

fers to violence that is visible and explicit, including

manifestations of physical, sexual and psychological

violence (gure 5.4).



Indirect violence, or structural

and cultural violence, is subtle and can be invisible.

Structural violence is built into social systems and

power relations; manifests in inequalities in oppor-

tunities, access to services and representation in de-

cisionmaking; and is perpetuated through economic

violence or child marriage, both of which limit wom-

en’s opportunities. Cultural violence is a result of

traditional social norms about gender and feminin-

ity, manifest in dierent forms of psychological and

emotional violence such as stereotyping, prejudices,

sexist language and micromachismos.



All forms of

violence are interconnected.



Cultural violence le-

gitimizes both direct and structural violence.



Subtle

forms of violence, called microaggressions, build up

to severe forms of violence, such as rape and femi-

cide (box 5.1).



“

As the socioeconomic analysis intersects with

other capabilities such as health, physical and

psychosocial dependency and support networks,

an increasingly complex picture forms around the

experience of ageing on wellbeing and agency

Economic violence, pervasive around the world, in-

volves making or attempting to make a person nan-

cially dependent by maintaining total control over

nancial resources, preventing the person from hav-

ing a nancial account, withholding access to money

or forbidding attendance at school or work.



It can

deepen poverty and hinder educational attainment or

work opportunities.



Psychological violence involves

causing fear by intimidation, whereas emotional vio-

lence refers to undermining a person’s sense of self-

worth. Psychological and emotional violence can

start with microaggressions. Targets of violence have

named psychological abuse and living under fear as

more harmful than direct physical violence.



Intimate partner violence is widespread around

the world, with 27 percent of ever-married/partnered

women ages 15–49 years having experienced it. The

highest prevalence is in Southern Asia (35 percent)

 99

and Sub- Saharan Africa (33 percent).



In some set-

tings social and cultural norms treat violence as a

justiable response to women’s perceived misbehav-

iour; these beliefs contribute to intimate partner vio-

lence being treated as a private matter rather than as

a serious threat to women’s rights and security.



least 200 million girls and women alive today in 30

countries have undergone female genital mutilation.



“

Violence against women and girls is the most

obvious manifestation of deep power imbalances

Violence is typically underreported because of

three factors:



• Stigma: Women who have experienced violence

can be perceived as dependent, unassertive, help-

less, depressed and defenceless by themselves,

their families, authorities and society in general.



• Denial: In dierent environments women and

girls might not be aware that routine situations

are abusive, so they consider it normal and do not

name it as violence.

• Mistrust: The failure of authorities to recognize

and address violent actions is one of the main risks

women consider before reporting.

Inequalities in power across

race and ethnicity hurt

everyone’s human security

Race is typically associated with physical character-

istics that become socially signicant (such as skin

colour), while ethnicity is associated with cultural ex-

pression and identication (through language, shared

traditions or beliefs). Both have been interpreted

dierently over time and are still viewed dierent-

ly in dierent contexts, but this chapter emphasizes

people’s lived experience and how they self-identify,

recognizing that this process is often extremely con-

strained where social categories of race and ethnicity

Figure 5.4 Different forms of violence against women and girls: Linking the iceberg model to the

violence triangle

Source: 

Direct

Structural Cultural

Subtle

Invisible

Explicit

Visible

Femicide

Rape Sexual abuse

Physical aggressions

Trafficking

Yelling Isolating Insulting

Humiliating Devaluating Ignoring

Disregarding Blaming Emotional

blackmailing

Controlling Jealousy Sexist jokes

Sexist language Invisibilizing

Female genital mutilation

Child marriage

Threatening

Media stereotyping

Mansplaining Gaslighting

Manterrupting Bropriating

Other micromachismos

100 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

are associated with specic physical or cultural fea-

tures.



Analysing race and ethnicity dynamics oers

an opportunity to use a dierent lens to understand

what security means, uncovering assumptions, co-

lonial legacies where relevant and, more broadly,

power relations.



Horizontal inequalities between

racial and ethnic groups often persist over time,

with eects across many dimensions: political, eco-

nomic, cultural and social.



When racial and ethnic

identities become connected to political power and

mobilization, more powerful groups can thwart the

advancement, dignity and rights of others. In this

vein the distribution of power in many contexts, up-

held through colonialism and other historical pro-

cesses of subjugation, has favoured the wellbeing of

White people at the expense of Black and indigenous

peoples.



When political power is distributed along

ethnic lines, ethnic dierences can be manipulated or

leveraged by political and other leaders as points of

contestation between groups, generating social ten-

sions, mistrust and violations of rights and dignity.



In the most extreme cases invoking these inequalities

between ethnic groups can foster violent conict.



Formal standings and ocial positions against

racism can hide the way racial inequality has been

shaped and reproduced through development.



is important to recognize how longstanding concep-

tions of development and security have themselves

upheld racial inequalities.



Racial identities are gen-

erated in part through a process of “othering,” where-

by groups dene and internalize their own identities

through their social relations to others. Othering is

closely intertwined with existing power relations. An

example is the construction of “the west” as a social

category associated with progress and security, de-

ned in relation to “other” regions that are associated

with lack of progress and, concomitantly, as places of

human insecurity.



“

Analysing race and ethnicity dynamics

oers an opportunity to use a dierent lens to

understand what security means, uncovering

assumptions, colonial legacies where relevant

and, more broadly, power relations

This section considers racial inequalities as experi-

enced by Black people and indigenous peoples. Both

groups are excluded from opportunities and face in-

security shaped by racist and colonial legacies, lack-

ing rights, recognition and representation.



Box 5.1 Femicide: The killing of women and girls because of their gender

Perpetrators of violence use different forms of abuse to exercise and maintain control and domination. The

killing of women is the extreme manifestation of this pattern.

The UN Vienna Declaration

recognizes femicide as the killing of women and girls because of their gender,

which can take different forms: the murder of women because of intimate partner violence; the torture and

misogynist slaying of women; killing of women and girls in the name of “honour;” targeted killing of women

and girls in the context of armed conflict; dowry-related killing of women; killing women and girls because of

their sexual orientation and gender identity; killing of aboriginal and indigenous women and girls because of

their gender; female infanticide and gender-based sex selection foeticide; genital mutilation–related deaths;

accusations of witchcraft; and other femicides connected with gangs, organized crime, drug dealers, human

trafficking and the proliferation of small arms.

Femicide differs from male homicide in specific ways. For example, most cases of femicide are committed by

partners or ex-partners and involve ongoing abuse, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where

women have less power or fewer resources than their partner. In 2020, 47,000 women and girls were intentionally

killed by an intimate partner or family member, and on average a woman or girl is killed every 11 minutes by an

intimate partner or a family member.

Some actions by countries to address femicide are legal changes, early interventions, multiagency efforts,

and special units and training in the criminal justice system. Latin American countries specifically criminalize

femicide. Yet there are no signs of a decline in gender-related killing of women and girls.

Notes

1.ECOSOC 2013. 2.UNODC 2021. 3.UNODC 2018.

 101

than 370 million indigenous peoples rely on commu-

nal land and resources,



but much of this land is held

only through customary tenure, leaving communities

vulnerable to land grabs and expropriation. About

48 percent of the Quilombolas in Brazil live in se-

verely food-insecure households, with the North and

Northeast regions of the country facing the most crit-

ical situation.



About 25 percent of Māori children

in New Zealand live in poverty, and 29 percent live

in food-insecure households.



Indigenous peoples

have based their survival on traditional occupations,

such as farming, hunting or shing. This, combined

with discrimination, has tended to limit them to wage

work in the informal economy (domestic work, street

vending, agriculture and construction), traditionally

in low productivity industries where they do not earn

enough to lift themselves out of poverty and food in-

security.



Informal work increases their vulnerabil-

ity to exploitation and abuse, with lack of respect for

their work rights and lack of social protection.

Indigenous peoples also face discrimination

through the repression of cultural identities. When

dominant or colonial languages were made ocial,

indigenous languages were discouraged or made ille-

gal,



and traditional religions and cultural practices

were often outlawed.



Across America children were

forcibly taken and sent to special schools to assimilate

the new language and traditions, facing sexual and

physical abuse or corporal punishment for using their

native tongue.



For indigenous peoples in Canada to

have full citizenship, they had to assimilate to euro-

Canadian gender, sexual and familial norms.



With lower representation and opportunities to

participate in their communities, indigenous peoples

are less likely to advocate for themselves, height-

ening horizontal inequalities. Indigenous peoples

around the world are aware of the discrimination

and lack of representation; they know their rights,

and they are very active in advocating for them. But

they face violence from business interests and can

be dismissed by governments because of lack of rep-

resentation. The number of killings of environmental

activists has more than tripled since the early 2000s.

In 2019 a record 212 people were killed defending

their land and environment; 40 percent of them be-

longed to indigenous communities, and more than a

third of fatal attacks between 2015 and 2019 targeted

indigenous peoples.



“

Racial discrimination through inequitable

systems that can take the form of structural racism

aects education, healthcare, employment, income,

benets, social protection and criminal justice

Racial discrimination through inequitable systems

that can take the form of structural racism aects ed-

ucation, healthcare, employment, income, benets,

social protection and criminal justice. Expressions of

racism that shape Black people’s experiences of inse-

curity include the prejudices (negative attitudes), ste-

reotypes (categorical beliefs) and unequal treatment

associated with their race. Structural racism has di-

rect consequences for human security. For example,

Black people receive lower quality health care and

live in racially segregated areas or in geographic prox-

imity to low-quality hospitals.



Black people face

exclusion and discrimination in education and em-

ployment. For instance, they are stereotyped as less

warm and less capable than their peers.



There is

evidence that Black populations have borne a dispro-

portionate toll during the Covid-19 pandemic.



many cases Black people are more likely to be arrest-

ed and incarcerated and face more punitive sanctions

in the criminal justice system.



People on the move can be forced to

follow paths of human insecurity

Journeys of human mobility can take many forms and

be connected to dierent and intersecting human se-

curity threats along the way. When migrating through

irregular channels, people’s dignity and therefore

human security are especially vulnerable to threats

ranging from tracking, abuse, violence and death

in transit to lack of access to basic services and for-

mal employment, exploitation, discrimination and

restrictions of basic rights at destination points (g-

ure 5.5). Although most people migrate voluntarily

through labour or family migration,



many others

are displaced or forced to move



due in part to the

impacts of the Anthropocene context (see chapter 2),

sociopolitical and economic instability or conict and

violence.

As dangerous planetary change continues, com-

munities around the world — but especially in

developing countries — are increasingly aected by in-

tensifying extreme weather events and other climate

102 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Figure 5.5 Migration and displacement on a path of insecurity

(continued)

Threats to human security triggering migration and displacement

Threats to human security in transit

Violence, conflict and instability

War, conflict, gang violence, organized crime and human rights abuses are

forcing people to flee in order to preserve their life and security.

6.6 million people have been forced to flee the Syrian Arab Republic

since conflict broke out a decade ago.

More than 5 million Venezuelans have left the country amid severe

sociopolitical instability.

Disaster

Weather-related disasters, aggravated by pressure on planetary systems,

geophysical disasters and other sudden-onset and slow-onset hazards, displace

millions of people every year.

In 2020 alone 30.7 million people were internally displaced due to disaster.

Close to 40 percent of that happened in the East Asia and the Pacific

region due to typhoons, floods, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

Poverty, lack of opportunities and scarcity

Dire development crises of diverse backgrounds create food insecurity, poverty,

scarcity and lack of resources and opportunities for millions of people worldwide.

Some turn to migration as a mitigation strategy or a solution in search for a

better life.

Economic or labour migration dominates some of the most important

migration corridors in Southern Asia, such as Bangladesh–India,

Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and Nepal–India.

Hazardous journeys

Migrants and displaced persons attempt dangerous journeys to escape insecurity,

but they can encounter more insecurity and even death along the way.

Deaths at some of the most dangerous migration routes:

• Mediterranean Sea: 22,977 deaths and missing migrants since 2014,

18,617 of them in the Central Mediterranean route.

• American continent: 5,822 deaths and missing migrants since 2014,

3,580 of them in the United States–Mexico border route.

Smuggling, trafficking and exploitation

The absence of sufficient institutional avenues for a way out of insecurity leads

people to migrate in irregular situations, bypassing formal institutions. This

exposes them to a range of threats to their human security.

Smuggling networks have become a profitable and complex industry

(estimated at $6.75 billion a year only for the East, North and West Africa

to Europe route and the South America to North America route). Migrants

risk violence, abuse, exploitation and more in the hands of smugglers.

Compounding risk

in Central America’s

Northern Triangle

Long-standing violence

and organized crime

41 percent of migrants from

the Northern Triangle cite

insecurity or violence as one

of the two main reasons for

migration.

Searching for better

opportunities

Three of the poorest

countries on the continent.

Fleeing poverty and

the possibility of better

opportunities is one of the

main drivers for migration.

Disasters and climate

change aggravating an

already dire situation

Drought in 2018 put 3.2

million people at risk of food

insecurity in El Salvador

Hurricane season 2020:

Displaced 310,000 people

in Guatemala and 175,000

people in Honduras and

severely affected agriculture

and fishing in the region.

“Coyotes y polleros”

75 percent of migrants

paid smugglers to help

them make part of or

the entire journey to the

United States, paying

often between $4,000 and

$8,000.

Northern Triangle

migrants targeted, killed,

extorted, kidnapped

Some estimates: More than

11,000 migrants kidnapped

in Mexico in 2010; 2,180

Central Americans

disappeared in Mexico at

the end of 2015. More than

70,000 have disappeared

since 2006.

Migration and displacement

On a path of insecurity

 103

phenomena that threaten their lives, livelihoods and

human security. For example, severe droughts and

oods endanger water access and food security and

force seasonal or permanent migration. It is predicted

that by 2050 around half of the world population, and

as much agricultural production, will be at risk due to

increased drought and ood variability,



a potential

push-factor for migration.



Rising sea levels are also

expected to inuence the migration of millions, par-

ticularly aecting Small Island Developing States and

countries with large coastal settlements.



Individu-

als, families and communities may thus choose mi-

gration as a way to mitigate their environmental risk

and protect their human security.

Figure 5.5 Migration and displacement on a path of insecurity 

Source: Center for American Progress 2020; Community Psychology n.d.; Eurostat 2021b; Freedom for Immigrants 2021; García Bochenek 2019;

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 2018; Human Rights Watch 2018, 2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; IADB 2018; IDMC 2020,

2021; International Crisis Group 2016; IOM 2016, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b, 2021; IPUMS USA 2021; Laczko, Singleton and Black 2017; Long and Bell

2021; Migration Data Portal 2021a, 2021b; Repeckaite 2020; UNHCR 2018, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c; UNHCR and UNICEF 2019; UNODC 2020; US

Customs and Border Patrol 2021; US Department of Homeland Security 2019.

Threats to human security as an immigrant or a displaced person

Although not the same, migrant smuggling can turn into human trafficking.

• Libya: 76 percent of 1,400 Libyan migrants surveyed in Italy

experienced at least one indicator of human trafficking (International

Organization for Migration), and 84 percent suffered inhumane

treatment, including brutal violence and torture (Oxfam)

Detention, deportation and family separation

Some migrants and displaced persons trying to cross borders into a different

country are detained.

Across the world cases of inhumane conditions in detention centres,

families forcibly separated, prolonged detentions of one or more years,

sexual abuse, tortures and other forms of violence have been reported.

Reports around the world show that deportation processes can be violent

and abusive, and deportees often face increased insecurity going back to

no support system, no refuge and even to revenge for having fled.

Dangers and challenges

Undocumented migrants face great insecurity by living outside the protection

and coverage of most formal institutions and services. Documented migrants

still face insecurity and inequality due to limitations of their migratory status,

discrimination and other barriers of formal institutions.

10 percent of human trafficking victims are targeted because of their

immigration status. This is also used by traffickers as leverage to keep

exploiting victims.

Undocumented migrants participate mainly in the informal economy,

which exposes them to unfair wages and working conditions, exploitation,

lack of social protection and high job insecurity. Shocks such as the

Covid-19 pandemic disproportionately affect informal workers.

In the European Union the unemployment rate of non-EU born immigrants

is 13.9 percent, more than double the 6.1 percent of native workers.

Insecurity at refugee camps and temporary settlements

4 million out of 7.4 million school-age refugee children under the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees mandate were out of school

in 201 7.

The enrollment gap between refugee children and children globally

stands at 31 percent for primary education and 61 percent for secondary

education.

Rising deportations and

US Border Patrol encounters

More than 11,700 deported

to the Northern Triangle

from the United States

between 2017 and 2019.

More than 62,000 monthly

apprehensions or expulsions

on average in 2021.

Unaccompanied children

The number of

unaccompanied children

from the Northern Triangle

apprehended at the United

States–Mexico border

doubled to more than 21,500

between 2012 and 2017.

66,000 unaccompanied

children from the Northern

Triangle registered in

Mexico since 2015.

Higher unemployment,

less qualified jobs

Latinos have historically

had an unemployment rate

1.6–1.9 times higher than

that of non-Hispanic Whites

More than 50 percent of

Northern Triangle migrants

work low-wage jobs in

construction, food services

and cleaning compared

with 20 percent of all

migrants.

Access to basic services

and social protection

Around 20 percent of

Latinos in the United States

lack health insurance,

compared with 7.3 percent

of non-Hispanics.

Around 60 percent of

Northern Triangle migrants

pay taxes in the United

States, but only 23 percent

report receiving benefits

from social protection

programmes.

* Nonexhaustive list of risks and hazards

104 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

The number of people forcibly displaced due to

conict or disaster has trended up over the past dec-

ade, reaching more than 80 million worldwide (see

chapter 4). More than 86 percent of refugees are host-

ed in developing countries, and 27 percent of all ref-

ugees are hosted in the Least Developed Countries.



Managing incoming people presents a complex chal-

lenge for host countries, which struggle to safeguard

the dignity and human security of those on the move

and to protect and empower refugees and migrants.

And the Covid-19 pandemic has brought added op-

erational and nancial challenges to the disaster

displacement response, further exacerbating the

impacts of displacement on human security and the

wellbeing of those aected.



In general, international migration is intimately

connected with several dimensions of human secu-

rity. Nearly two-thirds of the close to 272 million in-

ternational migrants worldwide in 2019 were labour

migrants.



While seeking better opportunities, la-

bour migrants face insecurities ranging from discrim-

ination to barriers in access to basic services such as

health, education and housing, even though they can

ll skill and labour gaps and contribute to host socie-

ties and economies.

Discrimination impairs the mental and physical

health of migrants.



Migrants are also discriminat-

ed against and subjected to violence because of mis-

information and discriminatory beliefs that they hurt

the economic prospects of host-country citizens by

stealing jobs or draining social services.



Ending discrimination against different

expressions, behaviours or bodies

enhances human security for all

LGBTI+



people face specic human security chal-

lenges, stemming from repressive (and often violent)

responses to their having identities, expressions, be-

haviours or bodies that are perceived to transgress

traditional dominant gender norms and roles.



The human security discourse has not acknowl-

edged the dierent gender identities and sexual ori-

entations or incorporated LGBTI+ experiences of

human insecurity.



In terms of freedom of want,

LGBTI+ people face discrimination in home own-

ership, credit and nancial resources, education

and employment. They also face impediments in

exercising the right to full citizenship and in access to

basic services — as well as increased health risks and a

greater likelihood of being homeless. They face par-

ticular risk of harm in societies that do not tolerate

diversity.



“

The human security discourse has not

acknowledged the dierent gender identities

and sexual orientations or incorporated

LGBTI+ experiences of human insecurity

To be recognized as a person before the law is a

human right and key to accessing education, work,

housing and health services, to political participa-

tion and to protection from violence, torture and dis-

crimination.



LGBTI+ people do not have the right

of recognition of their identity and full citizenship

in 87 percent of the world’s 193 countries.



In many

countries trans women reported experiencing vio-

lence when they attempted to get their government-

issued identity cards, passports or electoral cards.



LGBTI+ people, especially young LGBTI+ peo-

ple, have a greater likelihood of being homeless due

to familial rejection; economic and legal issues; dis-

crimination in home ownership, credit and nancial

resources; mental illness; addiction; or eviction.



Some 15–30 percent of young people experiencing

homelessness may identify as LGBTI+.



In many

countries LGBTI+ people have low visibility, with

fewer than 15 percent disclosing their sexual orien-

tation, gender identity or gender expression to their

families in 2016 and around 5 percent in schools,

workplaces or communities.



When employers dis-

criminate or refuse to hire transgender people for not

having certain documents, this pushes LGBTI+ peo-

ple to less productive positions than they are qualied

for — such as jobs in the informal sector.



Gay cisgender men have higher risk of contract-

ing HIV. In South Africa HIV prevalence among

LGBTI+ people ranges from 10 percent in Cape Town

to 50 percent in Johannesburg.



Lesbian and bi-

sexual women have the lowest STD prevention rates

in Thailand, where 84 percent of bisexual women

and 90 percent of lesbians have never been tested for

HIV.



The stress and trauma LGBTI+ people expe-

rience can result in poor mental and physical health

outcomes. A study by the US Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention reports that LGBTI+ young

 105

people are four times as likely as cisgender students

to seriously consider suicide.



Due to stigma LGBTI+ people may be denied ac-

cess to health, education or technology services.

Health care providers often do not understand their

unique needs.



Bullying and exclusion at schools

can reduce their ability to study or lead them to skip

school.



In Thailand 41 percent of LGBTI+ people

and 61 percent of transgender women reported dis-

crimination as students in 2018.



Technology-wise

they are overlooked by automated gender recogni-

tion of articial intelligence, and the digital divide

is higher for older LGBTI+ people.



LGBTI+ people

are also more prone to online violence and discrimi-

nation, with 64 percent of LGBTI+ social media users

experiencing harassment and hate speech.



Regarding freedom from fear, anxiety and indig-

nity, LGBTI+ people endure torture, inhumane and

degrading treatment, criminalization, targeted phys-

ical and sexual attacks, forced medical interventions,

conversion therapies and killings. In many countries

men perceived to be gay have been targets of arbi-

trary detentions, including other forms of violence

such as electric shocks, beatings, insults and humil-

iations.



Violence can start early in life in dierent

spaces (home, school, work, public spaces, online),

and the threat of violence and abuse lasts through-

out their lives, with greater risk for sexual violence.



LGBTI+ people are stigmatized and pathologized

through their lives, being perceived as ill, disordered,

malformed or abnormal.



The vast majority of

LGBTI+ people in several countries have been subject

to violence, with higher incidence for gay men, and

many have experienced sexual violence.



Through-

out LGBTI+ people’s lives discrimination reduces

their access to education, employment and social

protection and can lead to death (box 5.2).

“

Agency is key for the simultaneous achievement

of empowerment and protection, placing the

person at the heart of the security actions

One of the main challenges in assessing the cov-

erage of human rights, discrimination and violence

is the lack of global and national statistics and data

on gender identity. And sexual orientation puts pol-

icymakers in uncharted territory as they craft pro-

grammes and policies that aect LGBTI+ people

and their families. The lack of disaggregated data

also risks grouping the dierent identities under the

LGBTI+ umbrella, despite dierent needs and expe-

riences of insecurity.

Box 5.2 Understanding transfemicide

Trans and gender-diverse people face discrimination and marginalization every day that can lead to violence

and death. The murder of transgender people is sometimes reported but often in a transphobic way. In most

countries there is no formal data collection to describe the nature, frequency or extent of transgender homicides.

Since 1980 activists around the globe have shed light on transphobic violence. The Brazilian lesbian, gay, bisexual

and transgender organization Grupo Gay da Bahia and the US Transgender Day of Remembrance website were

pioneers.

In 2009 the Trans Murder Monitoring Observatory started to systematically monitor, collect and analyse re-

ports of the killing of trans and gender-diverse people worldwide.

Its latest data show an alarming increase from

149 in 2008 to 375 in 2021 — or 151 percent. About 70 percent of the recorded murders happened in Central and

South America. About 96 percent of the recorded murders were trans women or transfeminine people, for whom

the risk for sexual violence increased because 58 percent of murdered trans women and transfeminine people

were sex workers.

Other identities intersect as well: in the United States 89 percent of the trans people murdered

were Black, and in Europe 43 percent of the trans people murdered were migrants.

Notes

1.Balzer, LaGata and Berredo 2016; Trans Murder Monitoring Observatory 2020. 2.Trans Murder Monitoring Observatory 2021. 3.These figures

are incomplete because data are not systematically collected in most countries and because families, authorities and media often misgender

trans people. It is not possible to estimate the number of unreported cases. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic has disproportionately im-



work, on top of the stigma and criminalization that leaves trans sex workers exposed to violence. And it has revealed the lack of legislation and



106 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Eliminating horizontal inequalities

to advance human security:

The salience of agency and

the imperative of solidarity

The previous sections describe how some groups of

people experience violations of their human rights

through exclusion, discrimination and violence. Pro-

tection and empowerment strategies are directly

relevant to enhancing the human security of these

groups. Agency is key for the simultaneous achieve-

ment of empowerment and protection, placing the

person at the heart of the security actions (as dis-

cussed in chapter 1).

When discriminated groups are able to shape de-

cisionmaking, potential tensions between protection

and empowerment strategies diminish. Putting agen-

cy at the centre of human security actions arms that

people are not just victims lacking power over their

circumstances.



Nor are they exclusively passive

recipients of protection. Instead, they can be active

participants in eorts to improve their own wellbe-

ing and agency. Rearming people’s status as agents

rather than as victims is particularly important to

eliminate horizontal inequalities, given that human

security actions may otherwise unfold in disempow-

ering, paternalistic or even hegemonic approaches.



Moreover, the signicance of agency is broader

than enabling discriminated groups to enhance their

own human security. Agency empowers people to

drive social transformations that improve lives and

the wellbeing of others. When embedded in protec-

tion and empowerment strategies, agency enhances

people’s ability to deliberate and act on broader so-

cial imperatives. Enhancing agency thus not only re-

duces horizontal inequalities between groups but also

improves human security for everyone.

Agency can be the basis for solidarity. When agen-

cy is emphasized, there is also more space for ac-

tions that integrate diverse experiences according to

plural, and sometimes overlapping, identities.



focus on agency helps incorporate intersectionality in

human security. It recognizes the dierent identities,

their intersections and their practical and strategic

needs



and allows policymakers to tackle integra-

tion, respect and meaningful inclusion. Take Brazil

and South Africa, two countries where Black women

have higher unemployment rates than White men

and the national average (gure 5.6). Analysing and

measuring human security with an intersectional

Figure 5.6 Black women have higher unemployment rates in Brazil and South Africa, first quarter of 2021

Source: 

Brazil

South Africa

Black women Black men White women White men National (all)

Unemployment rate (percent)

20.1

12.9 12.9

13.7

9.1

38.3

8.9

7.1

35.4

32.6

 107

perspective can open new possibilities for solidarity

across groups.

Addressing inequalities under a human security

lens requires systemic action, not isolated policies,

embodying a commitment to the broad realization of

human rights. In the context of longstanding horizon-

tal inequalities, this entails going beyond legislating

against discrimination. Antidiscrimination measures

are undoubtedly important because they mitigate un-

justied dierences in how certain groups are treat-

ed. However, people can continue to face exclusion

and indignity even when they are formally protected

from discrimination. Societal prejudices, econom-

ic insecurity and impediments to political participa-

tion, education and health can all work to perpetuate

inequalities. In this context achieving broad realiza-

tion of human rights demands action going well be-

yond legal protection.

“

Analysing and measuring human security

with an intersectional perspective can open

new possibilities for solidarity across groups

Advancing human security depends on elimi-

nating horizontal inequalities; as they are reduced,

human security is enhanced. For this cycle to unfold,

it is crucial to emphasize the salience of agency and

solidarity. Solidarity strategies have an instrumental

role in the form of common security: the security of

one group contributes to the security of other groups,

Figure 5.7 Building blocks to advance human security by reducing horizontal inequalities

Source: Human Development Report Office based on UN Treaty Bodies and leading documents.

- International Labour Conventionon the Rights of

Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Racial Discrimination

- United Nations Declaration on the Rights

of Indigenous Peoples

Global

governance

tools

Lifecycle

Race and

enthnicity

- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

- International Convention for the Protection of All Persons

from Enforced Disappearance

- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Gender

Migration and

displacement

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights

- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

- 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

- The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action

- Compact on Women, Peace and Security

and Humanitarian Action

- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women

- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights

of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

- Global Compact on Refugees

- New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants

- Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration

- Convention on the Rights of the Child

- Lisbon Declaration on Youth Policies and Programmes

- International Labour Conference Resolution

Concerning Youth Employment

- There is currently no global declaration, treaty or

convention on the rights of older people. 2021–2030 was

declared the UN Decade of Healthy Ageing.

108 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

as the violation of some groups’ rights today leaves

the space for the violation of other groups’ rights

tomorrow.



The Universal Declaration of Human Rights re-

mains one of the most important commitments to

protecting the dignity of all people. Numerous doc-

uments addressing specic issues or groups have

since been introduced, seeking to establish shared

principles and, at times, coordinated policy direc-

tions in light of global challenges aecting people’s

lives and dignity. They represent key resources to

advance human security (gure 5.7). They can serve

as building blocks, as well as guides and sources for

complementary action, which must also evolve to re-

spond to the evolving human security threats of our

times.

“

No person is dened solely by being part of any

social group, and each person has plural identities.

But there are systematic dierences across groups

of people that harm human security — not only

of those discriminated against but of everyone

Possible evolution would include, for instance,

reforming justice systems and strengthening the

health care response on violence against women and

girls. This would provide formal protection mech-

anisms for women and girls. However, protection

policies are not enough for long-term human securi-

ty, since they can ignore underlying causes, such as

a culture that normalizes violence against women

and stigmatizes women who have experienced vio-

lence. They also may limit the recognition of agency.

Therefore, protection should be complemented by ef-

fective instruments to raise awareness and support

for laws against violence against women and girls,

to promote women’s rights and to educate society at

large for an end to the discrimination and revictimi-

zation of women.

For LGBTI+ people there has been a progressive

reduction of criminalization of dierent forms of

gender identity and expression and of consensual

same-sex sexual conduct around the world. For ex-

ample, the number of countries criminalizing con-

sensual same-sex sexual conduct dropped from 85

to 67 between 2007 and 2020.



These measures

are a step towards human security. But they do not

address threats to dignity if LGBTI+ people contin-

ue to face discrimination in social life. Thus, these

measures should be complemented by nondiscrimi-

nation frameworks — based on legal and social norms

— so that LGBTI+ people have the agency not only to

lead the life they value but also to drive broader so-

cial change that eliminates the horizontal inequalities

that are a permanent threat to human security.

* * *

This chapter highlights only some of the many hori-

zontal inequalities that characterize our world today.

No person is dened solely by being part of any so-

cial group, and each person has plural identities. But

there are systematic dierences across groups of

people that, as the chapter illustrates for a few cases,

harm human security — not only of those discriminat-

ed against but of everyone. It is right to emphasize

the importance of addressing this discrimination by

enhancing the wellbeing of those who suer the con-

sequences of persisting horizontal inequalities — it

is a matter of justice. But it is equally crucial to rec-

ognize that people have agency, and in enhancing

agency not only would there be more of a chance

for the wellbeing of those excluded or discriminated

against to be enhanced, but everyone’s human securi-

ty would advance. Eliminating horizontal inequalities

thus acquires even greater relevance and rearms

the importance of adding solidarity to protection and

empowerment strategies.

 109

The concept of human security, as introduced in the

1994 Human Development Report,



was conceptual-

ized as universal and centred on people. Universalism

is a concern for people everywhere, as it encompass-

es the common threats experienced by human beings

(unemployment, crime, pollution) while recognizing

the dierent threats facing women in the person-

al security area related to violence against women.

Centred on people — a concern for how people live

and exercise, their choices and how they access most

markets and opportunities. In this sense it recogniz-

es the important dierences in access to markets and

opportunities — in relation to economic insecurity —

for women and girls throughout their lifecycle.

Before the concept of human security was coined,

feminist scholars had challenged the state-centric

denitions of security.



Theories of feminist secu-

rity questioned the foundations of the concept that

reveals an inherent gender bias and androcentric

framework,



defying the traditionally gendered hier-

archies embedded in the concept of security that de-

value women’s lives and their economic and social

contributions to society.



The gender perspective in human security has been

debated by dierent generations of international re-

lations feminists,



often centring on two aspects that

have been omitted: gender inequalities and the ways

dierent women experience insecurity.

International relations feminists



started question-

ing the gender biases in the core concepts of state,

power and security, built in masculine terms. They

believed that security could be achieved by elimi-

nating gender inequality and distinguishing between

men as the powerful and women as the weak.



Re-

search started with the analysis of masculine dis-

course around national security in the military.

Cynthia Enloe analysed the construction of mascu-

linity in national armies, the treatment of women sol-

diers and the presence of women prostitutes around

military bases.



By identifying the strong connec-

tions between the exercise of power over women and

their bodies and the understanding of security, she

concluded that women were strongly marginalized in

the name of practicing security.

The concept of security placed the state as a pri-

mary actor, built on the privilege of masculine traits,

with women absent from the public sphere. Catharine

McKinnon called attention to the lack of gender con-

siderations and determinants of the state, acknowl-

edging that the concept of state was male, as “the

law sees and treats women the way men see and treat

women.”



The state and justice system exercised

male power over women by institutionalizing the

male point of view in law. So, security from feminist

standpoints highlights the multiple and overlapping

hierarchical relationships of power that undermine

women’s dignity and capabilities.



Feminist scholars proposed a more comprehen-

sive denition of security “not just as the absence of

threats or violence, but as the enjoyment of econom-

ic and social justice,”



recognizing that security de-

pends on the dierent economic, political, social and

personal circumstances.



Researchers also explored the relationship between

security and gendered bodies,



which contributed to

a better understanding of how the concept was ex-

cluding and ignoring women’s experiences with in-

security, arguing that the body could explain several

aspects of historical oppression on women, where

sexuality is the eect of historical power relations.



And beyond gender, other inherent characteristics

such as race or ethnicity should be considered and ac-

counted for when conceptualizing human security —

as humans with dierent overlapping characteristics

will experience insecurity in dierent ways.



Later, the eld of international relations opened

space for gender as an analytical category to make

women’s experiences with insecurity visible.



The

way to rectify the exclusion of women was by ana-

lysing their everyday lives. Adding women was not

their main request, as this would just reinforce the

male experience and viewpoint as the main category.

Gender should be considered a systematically analyt-

ical category about constructions of masculinity that

SPOTLIGHT 5.1

A feminist perspective on the concept of human security

110 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

privilege men and devalue femininity.



Gender hi-

erarchies shaping behaviour and practices in society

should be visible, so that dierent solutions and alter-

natives can be developed to overcome insecurities.



Feminist theorists had also highlighted that the

lack of reection around women’s subordination in

dierent spaces (state, family, workplace) is seen

as an accidental failure of democracy instead of ac-

knowledging gender as an element of how patriar-

chal institutions were built. For human security this

means reecting on whose security is being empha-

sized and how. Boys’ and men’s security is prioritized

over girls’ and women’s because of sexism. All forms

of insecurity are gendered. And their manifestations,

patterns and degree of intensity might dier for each

gender but also depend on the context.



According to Beth Woroniuk, the key gendered

dimensions missing in human security discussions

since the concept emerged were violence against

women, gender inequality in control over resourc-

es, gender inequality in power and decisionmaking,

women’s human rights and women as actors not

victims.



Also at the beginning of the millennium,

the Women’s International Network for Gender and

Security started to redene security, prioritizing the

consistency of human security with the principles

of nonviolence, universal human dignity and sus-

tainable living. The network dened four critical

feminist dimensions for human security: a healthy

planet and sustainable living environment, meet-

ing basic human needs for wellbeing, respecting

and fullling human rights and eliminating violence

and armed conict in preference for nonviolent

change and conict resolution. Other researchers

have asked for human security to focus on women

issues of physical, structural and ecological violence

rather than military security.



To include gendered

dimensions in human security means letting go of

androcentric biases, bringing to the fore the experi-

ences of women and girls shaped by unequal power

relationships.

Another aspect, in line with the second-wave fem-

inism claiming that “the personal is political,”



is to

start with the individual or community rather than

the state or the international system. Feminist schol-

ars drew on local experiences of women to interpret

and explain their insecurities and disadvantaged

positions.

Feminist scholars



have also argued that women

cannot simply be added as a category to study inter-

national relations and human security, because both

are set on masculine constructions of world politics,

resting on a patriarchal system. The main task of the

most recent generation of international relations

feminists has been to deconstruct the traditional un-

derstanding of human security by introducing new

ways to interpret gender. Continuing the work by pre-

vious generations, third-generation feminists view

human security through the lens of human relation-

ships and human needs as opposed to a masculine

view centred on institutions.



Black feminism



— led by Kimberlé Crenshaw,



who developed the theory of intersectionality, and

Patricia Hill Collins,



who developed the matrix of

domination — proposed a critical approach to human

security. The insecurities experienced by women

are shaped not just by their gender but also by other

identities, such as race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, dis-

ability, physical appearance and religion. These cat-

egories are used as frameworks of domination and

power that exclude and marginalize those who are

dierent.



For Hill Collins gender has the same im-

portance as race and class in paying attention to the

power relations that are root causes of sexism, racism

and classism to understand how insecurity is experi-

enced in people’s daily lives.



Several scholars have identied violence against

women as one of the most pervasive threats to wom-

en’s and girls’ security. Worldwide, women live in

constant risk of experiencing violence at the per-

sonal, community, economic and political levels, a

violence rooted in the foundations of a system that

facilitates patriarchal structural violence.



This risk

limits women’s and girls’ mobility and agency over

their own lives.

In the same line of structural violence, gender jus-

tice is one of the key aspects of improving human se-

curity, as women and girls are typically invisible and

marginalized within judicial processes. Gender jus-

tice refers to “legal processes that are equitable, not

privileged by and for men, and which distinguish

gender-specic injustices that women experience.”



When a group of people with a common identity face

discrimination coming from institutions or traditions,

it is embedded in the social structure. This structural

violence can lead to suering and death just as often

 111

as direct violence, and though the damage is slower

and more subtle, it is more dicult to repair.



Feminist studies of human security have put on

the table relevant themes for women such as the im-

pacts of armed conict on women, gender relations

and gender roles; ways international humanitarian

actions and peacekeeping operations widen or dimin-

ish unequal gender relations; and women’s absence

from decisionmaking positions that are central to

peacebuilding.



Women experience gendered eects

in the context of conicts and are also neglected in

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration be-

cause they are not recognized as combatants or are

viewed simplistically as camp followers or wives of

commanders because of stigma and prejudices about

their gender.



The frame of human security stresses the im-

portance of people being able to take care of them-

selves: all people should have the opportunity to meet

their most essential needs and to earn their own liv-

ing. Empowerment and independence will not be

achieved by framing women and girls as vulnerable

victims of the dierent threats they face but by asking

women and girls how they are secured or unsecured.

Hearing women’s voices will tell a dierent story of

security, where they enforce the respect of their eco-

nomic, political and human rights and are empow-

ered to achieve their own development.

NOTES

1. UNDP 1994.

2. Donoso 2016; Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

3. Blanchard 2003.

4. Tickner 1999b. See also Ling (2000).

5. The generations of international relations feminists do not match the waves

of feminism (Tickner 1992).

6. Enloe 1989, 1993; Grant 1991; Peterson 1992; Runyan and Peterson 1991; Ste-

ans 1998; Sylvester 1994; Tickner 1992, 1995.

7. Tickner 1995.

8. Enloe 1989, 1993.

9. MacKinnon 1989, p. 162.

10. Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018; Harding 2016; Tickner 2015.

11. Steans 1998, p. 67.

12. Nuruzzaman 2006.

13. Steans 1998; Sylvester 1994; Tickner 1992.

14. Based on the work of Michel Foucault (1980), several feminist thinkers used

his theory of power in relation to the body (Steans 1998).

15. Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

16. Chin 1998; Hooper 2001; Peterson 2003; Prügl 1999; Tickner 2005.

17. Peterson 2004.

18. Wisotzki 2003.

19. McKay 2004.

20. Woroniuk 1999.

21. McKay 2004; Tickner 1999a.

22. Hanisch 1969.

23. Baines 2005; Peterson 2004; Reardon 2001, 2015; Shepherd 2008, 2010;

Tickner 2005, 2015.

24. Reardon 2015.

25. Anzaldúa 1987; Lorde 1980.

26. Crenshaw 1989, 1991, 2017.

27. Collins 1990.

28. Donoso 2016; Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

29. Collins 2002.

30. Bunch 2003; Bunch and Carrillo 1998.

31. McKay 2004, p. 157. See also McKay (2000).

32. Winter and Leighton 2001.

33. Baines 2005; McKay 2004.

34. Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018; McKay and Mazurana 2004.

112 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

United Nations Children’s Fund

The new generation of human security threats in the

Anthropocene context, including the compound-

ing eects of inequalities, digital technology threats,

health threats and violent conict have a unique and

far-reaching bearing on children and their futures.

The realization of human security inevitably depends

on addressing those widespread and cross-cutting

challenges to their survival, livelihood and dignity,

with profound eects on future generations.

This is exemplied by the Covid-19 pandemic,

whose lingering impact has resulted in increasing

poverty and inequality, which threaten to undermine

the rights of children. An estimated 100 million more

children are projected to be living in multidimension-

al poverty today, representing an increase of 10 per-

cent since 2019.



Along with growing poverty, more

children are out of school, hungry, abused, made to

work and forced into early marriage. The global cri-

sis has taken a harsh toll on children and adolescents,

fuelled by deprivation and loss and heightened by

racism, discrimination and gender inequality.

Anthropocene risks

The Children’s Climate Risk Index



revealed that vir-

tually every child on the planet is exposed to at least

one environmental threat, be it heatwaves, cyclones,

ooding, drought, air pollution or lead poisoning, and

approximately 1 billion children live in countries clas-

sied as extremely high risk from the consequences

of climate change. Children can be particularly vul-

nerable to climate and environmental shocks if there

are inadequate essential services, such as water, san-

itation, healthcare and education. As it stands, en-

vironmental degradation has contributed to one in

three children having elevated levels of lead in their

SPOTLIGHT 5.2

Children and human security

Figure S5.2.1 A new generation of human security threats for children

Source: Human Development Report Office based on UN Treaty Bodies and leading documents.

Digital

technology

threats

Health

threats

Inequalities

Violent

conflict

Other

threats

Approximately 1 billion children live in

countries classified as extremely high risk

from the consequences of climate change

One in three children under age 5 is

malnourished and unable to grow,

develop and learn to their full potential.

Current Covid-19 and economic crisis:

Almost 9 million more children may

end up in child labour, 10 million more

girls in early marriages.

Children need to be protected

in cyberspace, with adequate

regulation and strategies

to promote online safety

against abuse, bullying,

sexual exploitation and other

threats, including privacy

breaches, while protecting the

education and health benefits

of digital technologies.

Nearly one in five children in

the world lives in a conflict

zone, where they are at risk

of being killed, maimed,

abducted, subject to sexual

violence or recruited into

armed groups.

 113

blood. About half a billion children are threatened by

ooding, and by 2040 one in four children will live

amid extreme water stress.

In order to reduce these Anthropocene risks, eorts

are needed to improve the resilience of the essen-

tial services that children depend on to survive and

thrive. This includes improving access to water, sani-

tation and hygiene services, as well as introducing cli-

mate-smart health services. Children will also benet

from schools and education systems that can respond

exibly and adeptly to disasters and from social safe-

ty nets that are climate-responsive. In all these eorts

children and young people must be engaged as agents

of change in environmental and climate action, as it

is their futures that hang in the balance.

Inequalities

Evidence from previous crises (including economic

shocks and especially the current Covid-19 pandem-

ic) shows that the wide-ranging social and econom-

ic impact is likely to be disproportionally higher on

children, with groups most likely to be left behind

suering the severest consequences in terms of pov-

erty and hunger linked to reduced family incomes,

job losses and rising inequality.



The global reach

of the pandemic means that children in both devel-

oped and developing countries are aected. Poorer

and marginalized children globally are also more

vulnerable to loss of education and less able to par-

ticipate in distance learning and access health-care

services. This is particularly true for the 1 in 10 chil-

dren with disabilities worldwide, who may experi-

ence deprivation and be less likely to be counted,

consulted and considered in decisionmaking that

aects them.



The cost of inaction is high. Children stand to lose

the equivalent of $17 trillion, or roughly 14 percent of

global gross domestic product (GDP), from their fu-

ture earnings due to loss of schooling and learning.



Almost 9 million more children may end up in child

labour, 10 million more girls in early marriages, and

many more children will experience violence and

suer negative impacts on their mental health. This

is not only a loss to children but also to communi-

ties, countries and the world, with productivity and

growth prospects likely to be reduced for decades.



Digital technology risks

Digital innovation and technology development are

accelerating, particularly as the Covid-19 pandem-

ic has caused a shift to distance and remote deliv-

ery systems. Digital innovations and solutions have

become fundamental to improving children’s lives

across the spectrum, from health to nutrition, edu-

cation, protection, access to water, sanitation and

hygiene, and inclusion. Children themselves can use

technologies, including the internet, for communica-

tion, play, schoolwork, accessing information, train-

ing, skilling and preparation for the world of work as

well as personal expression.

Widespread school closures during the Covid-19

pandemic have spurred a reimagination in educa-

tion, including through new digital delivery platforms

designed to provide children with the education and

skills they need for the 21st century. The persistence

of the digital divide, however, means that low- and

no-tech solutions that are better suited to reaching

students without internet access must remain viable

alternatives. Finally, with opportunities come risks

and threats. Children need to be protected in cyber-

space, with adequate regulation and strategies to

promote online safety against abuse, bullying, sex-

ual exploitation and other threats, including privacy

breaches, while protecting the education and health

benets of digital technologies.

Health and nutrition challenges

While tremendous progress has been achieved in

maternal and child health and nutrition over the

past two decades, inequalities in access to health

care mean that many groups of children are left be-

hind. Young children, and newborns in particular,

continue to die from preventable causes stemming

from inadequate maternal and newborn health care

and nutrition or from treatable infectious diseas-

es. Moreover, failing to invest adequately in early

childhood development serves to deny young chil-

dren the stimulation their developing brains need

to thrive. Progress in immunization for preventable

diseases has also stagnated, and there is great ine-

quality in the availability and distribution of Covid-

19 vaccines.

114 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Due to inadequate diets, only half of children ages

6–23 months receive the recommended number of

meals per day that they need to thrive and grow well.

This contributes to there being one in three children

under age 5 who are malnourished and unable to

grow well, develop and learn to their full potential.



To survive and thrive, every child, including adoles-

cents, should have access to nutritious diets to avoid

the double burden of obesity and undernutrition, as

well as quality primary healthcare to promote both

their physical and mental health. Yet globally, more

than one in seven adolescents ages 10–19 is estimated

to live with a diagnosed mental disorder.



Urgent in-

vestment in mental health services is needed, as is an

end to the stigma associated with mental illness, to

promote greater understanding and support of men-

tal health.

Violent conflict

Nearly one in ve children in the world lives in a

conict zone, where they are at risk of being killed,

maimed, abducted, subject to sexual violence or re-

cruited into armed groups.



Armed actors conduct

deliberate campaigns of violence against children,

including putting their schools, hospitals, water fa-

cilities and other essential services under attack.

In 2020 alone the United Nations veried nearly

24,000 grave violations against children in conict

— or about 72 violations per day.



Women and girls

face increased risk of gender-based violence during

humanitarian crises. Added to this are an estimated

33 million children who were forcefully displaced in

2020, accounting for 1 in 70 children globally.



help children process and heal from conict they

have experienced, mental and psychosocial support

for children and adolescents must be integral to any

humanitarian response.

Children deserve to grow up in an environment

that is conducive to peace and security. To promote

sustainable peace within societies, factors driving

conict and grievances must be addressed through

the equitable and inclusive delivery and manage-

ment of essential services, including education,

health, nutrition, water and sanitation, social pro-

tection and child protection. Institutions must also

be responsive and accountable to communities and

allow for inclusive participation in decisionmaking

at all levels, including hearing the voices of children

and young people.

None of these threats can be successfully ad-

dressed without the active involvement of children.

Guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child,

as well as other UN human rights instruments, all

children deserve to be included, without discrimi-

nation, in matters that aect their human security

and to have opportunities and agency in accordance

with their rights. For this to be a reality, children and

young people must be heard on decisions that aect

their lives and, within an environment of trust, sup-

port and capacity development, be engaged as allies

and problem-solvers on the issues that concern them

the most. This will be the most eective way to pre-

pare children for being active citizens and veritable

agents of change and human development.

NOTES

1. UNICEF 2021e.

2. https://www.unicef.org/reports/climate-crisis-child-rights-crisis, accessed

20 December 2021.

3. Furceri, Ostry and Loungani 2020.

4. UNICEF 2021g.

5. World Bank, UNESCO and UNICEF 2021.

6. World Bank 2020a.

7. UNICEF 2019.

8. UNICEF 2021f.

9. UNICEF 2021h.

10. UNICEF 2021i.

11. UNICEF 2021d.

 115



Healthcare systems

outmatched by new

human security

challenges

CHAPTER

118 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

CHAPTER 6

Healthcare systems outmatched by new human

security challenges

Health is fundamental to human security, which

is concerned with protecting the “vital core of all

human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms

and human fullment,”



and people’s ability to exer-

cise their freedoms depends on their health. In other

words health directly constitutes people’s wellbeing

and enables people to exercise agency (that is, the

ability to pursue what they value in life).



In contrast,

ill health not only diminishes wellbeing; it also limits

people’s agency. Threats to health present some of

the most critical challenges to human security.

The past few decades have seen major improve-

ments in global health. Child mortality was more than

halved between 1990 and 2019,



and life expectancy

has greatly improved. Maternal mortality rates have

declined signicantly, though they remain unaccept-

ably high in some parts of the world.



There have been

large reductions in mortality from HIV/AIDS,



ma-

laria



and diarrhoeal diseases.



Disparities between

developing and developed countries in basic health

outcomes have greatly narrowed over time. But a new

generation of health challenges has come into play in

the form of more frequent new and re-emerging zo-

onotic diseases (linked to the Anthropocene context)

and the predominance of noncommunicable diseas-

es, resulting in a mismatch between new health chal-

lenges and the healthcare systems that have propelled

achievements in basic health outcomes.

The Covid-19 pandemic has been one of the most

acute threats to people’s health in recent decades,

but this type of pandemic is expected to increase in

frequency in the near future.



Covid-19 started as

a health shock and has gone hand in hand with an

enormous setback for human development. In 2021

Covid-19 adjusted Human Development Index (HDI)

values remain far below their precrisis levels (see

box 1.1 in chapter 1), resulting in a clear setback to

human security.



The pandemic has shown that with-

out considering threats to human security, gains in

human development remain vulnerable to reversal.

Health threats are unevenly experienced and their

impacts unequally distributed, mediated by people’s

exposure and their ability to cope with and recov-

er from them once they occur. The ability to weather

poor health and to live a healthy life is connected close-

ly to the conditions for people to grow up, learn, work

and age—that is, to social determinants of health.



In countries at all incomes, poor socioeconomic

outcomes are associated with poor health outcomes.



A substantial and growing body of evidence shows that

the impacts of Covid-19 on people have been driven by

inequalities in the social determinants of health.



Because health outcomes are shaped strongly by

decisions outside the health sector, eorts to protect

against threats to health cannot be limited to health-

care systems alone but must also be connected to sys-

temic measures.



“

The gap between health threats and the ability

of healthcare systems to address them poses

a critical challenge for human security. At the

same time, healthcare systems are among the

most promising spaces for advancing the new

generation of human security strategies, combining

protection, empowerment and solidarity

For instance, the global burden of disease has been

shifting, with noncommunicable diseases accounting

for an increasing share of the causes of ill health and

mortality. Health systems that delivered impressive

gains in meeting the challenges of communicable dis-

eases, maternal health and child health are evolving

to address the new challenges of chronic illnesses and

noncommunicable diseases. Still, while the need for

aordable and comprehensive healthcare is intensify-

ing, healthcare remains inaccessible to many people

around the world. Nearly half the world’s people lack

complete coverage of essential health services.



Pro-

gress towards the World Health Organization’s (WHO)

goal of 1 billion more people benetting from universal

health coverage by 2023 was slowing even before the

Covid-19 pandemic.



Out-of-pocket health spending is

catastrophic for poor people and is an increasingly sub-

stantial burden for middle-class households as well.

The gap between health threats and the ability

of healthcare systems to address them poses a criti-

cal challenge for human security. At the same time,

healthcare systems are among the most promising

spaces for advancing the new generation of human

security strategies, combining protection, empow-

erment and solidarity. The aspiration is for health-

care systems that directly protect people against a

wide range of threats to human security (including

disasters, chronic illnesses and infectious diseases),

empower people by supporting the broad expan-

sion of human capabilities and support solidarity by

 119

providing a space to share risks and resources. In-

stead of having individuals bear the risks of illness,

impoverishment or diminished capabilities, collec-

tive resources can insure against risks that individuals

would otherwise be unable to weather on their own.

The current context presents a unique opportunity to

re-evaluate and reform healthcare systems under the

human security lens. Rearming the human securi-

ty lens is especially important in the Anthropocene

context because the nature of health shocks will con-

tinue to evolve, likely not only in the form of future

pandemics but also as people confront the hazards

associated with climate change and other processes

of dangerous planetary change.

In this vein there has been a resurgence of global in-

terest in the universalization of healthcare and other

social policies. Countries as diverse as Brazil, the

Republic of Korea, Spain and Togo have implement-

ed generous cash transfer programmes.



Moreover,

a new ethics appears to be gaining ground. A recent

study in the United Kingdom and the United States

found substantially higher support for such universal

policies than in the past, due in part to respondent’s

experience during the Covid-19 pandemic.



This is also a fresh opportunity to discuss new ef-

forts to institute an international legal instrument for

pandemic preparedness and response. The Covid-19

pandemic has vividly demonstrated the urgent need

to strengthen multilateral action to address shared

threats to health. Proactive eorts towards stronger,

shared measures to tackle human insecurity can now

make an enormous dierence in our ability to with-

stand future challenges.

As economies bounce back from

the Covid-19 pandemic, people’s

health remains under threat

Reported deaths due to the Covid-19 pandemic sur-

passed 5 million at the end of 2021.



Excess mortality

is estimated to be at least double that number global-

ly.



Interruptions in health and nutrition services and

declines in household income due to the pandem-

ic are set to have devastating consequences on child

nutrition and, in turn, possibly on child mortality and

long-term health.



The pandemic has gone from a

health crisis to a full-edged human development cri-

sis. In 2020 the world Covid-19 adjusted HDI value

declined, reecting impacts from large disruptions in

education systems to labour market dislocations.



The year 2021 was expected to be a year of recovery,

as more information about the characteristics of the

virus that causes Covid-19 was uncovered and multi-

ple vaccines became available (even if used unequally

across and within countries). In practice, we are living

through another manifestation of economic develop-

ment with human insecurity. While most economies

bounced back and global income per capita reached

a historical peak, health outcomes reached a new low:

global life expectancy declined for the second year in

a row. Based on data on excess mortality in 2021, the

gap in global life expectancy at birth with respect to

the non-Covid-19 scenario is an estimated 1.5 years, or

a 7 year reversal for the world as a whole (gure 6.1).

“

While most economies bounced back

and global income per capita reached

a historical peak, health outcomes

reached a new low: global life expectancy

declined for the second year in a row

The economic recovery, while substantial, has

been uneven. Developing economies have had more

limited emergency scal responses than developed

countries. By mid-2021 countries had spent $16.9

trillion globally on Covid-19 pandemic–related s-

cal measures.



The heterogeneity across countries

in responses to the economic eects of the pandem-

ic is substantial—in their speed of response, reach

and, above all, size. Overall, in 2020 advanced econ-

omies spent 23.1 percent of GDP on discretionary s-

cal measures, compared with emerging economies’

9.9 percent of a smaller GDP.



Low-income countries

spent 4.1 percent of 2020 GDP. Monetary policy in ad-

vanced economies has also relied on unprecedented

and exceptional measures to support the scal eorts.

Most of the direct scal support measures have tar-

geted households (by expanding or creating new cash

and noncash transfers), businesses (by providing access

to nancial resources and the ability to meet payments

during the Covid-19 pandemic) and health systems (by

spending more in the health sector).



As the pandemic

worsened and the economic consequences of several

lockdowns started to hit, countries designed and imple-

mented alternative lifelines to protect households, sup-

port businesses and bolster the health sector.



120 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

As a result of asymmetries in the scal and mon-

etary measures put in place during the Covid-

19 pandemic, high-income economies have

experienced smaller economic contractions than

low- and middle-income countries.



Low- and

middle-income countries have also experienced

greater disruptions in essential health services dur-

ing the Covid-19 pandemic than high-income coun-

tries and greater challenges accessing life-saving

medicines and other essential supplies, such as med-

ical oxygen.



Emergency support measures are also

winding down earlier in emerging economies than in

high-income ones. A large part of scal support is ex-

piring in Brazil and China, and only in high-income

economies (France, Japan, Spain, the United States)

is it being replaced by additional measures or a sub-

stantial extension of existing programmes.



For the

remaining emerging economies the extension of s-

cal measures has been extremely limited.



Deploying vaccines has been central in making

economic recovery possible. Therefore, disparities

in vaccine access and use are not only a morally re-

pugnant situation but also a key driver of divergence

between countries’ economic recoveries.



Even

though there are some remarkable cases of devel-

oping countries expanding vaccination programmes

at levels comparable to those of wealthier countries,

the disparities across country groups are stark (g-

ure 6.2). By November 2021 around 67 percent of

the population in very high HDI countries was fully

vaccinated, compared with 46 percent in high HDI

countries, 30 percent in medium HDI countries and

only 7 percent in low HDI countries.



The averages

also hide large disparities within countries, including

low vaccine adoption by segments of the population,

even in very high HDI countries.

“

Deploying vaccines has been central in making

economic recovery possible. Therefore, disparities

in vaccine access and use are not only a morally

repugnant situation but also a key driver of

divergence between countries’ economic recoveries

Even though at least 10 manufacturers set produc-

tion targets of a billion doses each by 2021,



access to

Covid-19 vaccines has posed a considerable challenge

for several developing countries. Many developing

countries are still far from the way out of the crisis but

have not been able to access enough licenced vaccines

to cover their entire population. The constraints they

have faced include limited vaccine supply and insu-

cient cooperation and investment in global solutions

to combat Covid-19. In this sense, greater internation-

al cooperation is required to distribute vaccines at af-

fordable prices.



The main cooperative mechanism

to combat inequality in access to vaccines is the global

COVAX initiative, which aims to reach the most vul-

nerable 20 percent of every nation around the world.

Figure 6.1 The global economy is recovering, but people’s health is not

Note: Estimates and projections of life expectancy at birth are based on excess mortality data linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. For the projec-

tions different models represent scenarios of death distribution for younger populations. Model 1 provides the baseline for ages 15–64, and

Model 2 uses conservative assumptions for the distribution of deaths in that age group. Model a is the baseline for ages 0–14, Model b uses

pessimistic assumptions about the effect of Covid-19 on that age group and Model c uses optimistic assumptions about the effect of Covid-19



Source: Human Development Report Office based on data from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, the International Monetary

Fund, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the Human Mortality Database.

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Life expectancy at birth (years)

12,500

13,500

14,500

15,500

16,500

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

GNI per capita ($ PPP)

Pre-pandemic

projection

Model 1a

Model 1c

Model 2b

Model 1b

Model 2a

Model 2c

Pre-pandemic

 121

Figure 6.2 The disparities in Covid-19 vaccination across countries and territories are stark

Source: 

Very high

human development

88.8

Portugal

88.8

Portugal

87.3

Singapore

87.3

Singapore

86.5

Chile

86.5

Chile

83.8

Malta

83.8

Malta

82.5

Iceland

82.5

Iceland

81.5

Spain

81.5

Spain

81.3

Korea (Republic of)

81.3

Korea (Republic of)

80.6

Brunei Darussalam

80.6

Brunei Darussalam

80.5

Qatar

80.5

Qatar

79.4

Uruguay

79.4

Uruguay

78.7

Canada

78.7

Canada

78.5

Japan

78.5

Japan

77.9

Malaysia

77.9

Malaysia

77.5

Italy

77.5

Italy

77.4

Argentina

77.4

Argentina

77.3

Denmark

77.3

Denmark

77.1

Norway

77.1

Norway

76.8

Ireland

76.8

Ireland

76.5

Finland

76.5

Finland

76.1

France

76.1

France

75.9

Netherlands

75.9

Netherlands

75.2

Belgium

75.2

Belgium

75.1

Australia

75.1

Australia

73.8

Costa Rica

73.8

Costa Rica

73.7

United Kingdom

73.7

United Kingdom

73.5

New Zealand

73.5

New Zealand

71.6

Sweden

71.6

Sweden

71.1

Mauritius

71.1

Mauritius

70.3

Andorra

70.3

Andorra

70.1

Luxembourg

70.1

Luxembourg

69.1

Germany

69.1

Germany

68.9

Saudi Arabia

68.9

Saudi Arabia

Panama

Lithuania

67.8

Cyprus

67.8

Cyprus

67.6

Bahrain

67.6

Bahrain

67.3

Israel

67.3

Israel

66.7

United States

66.7

United States

66.3

Liechtenstein

66.3

Liechtenstein

66.3

Austria

66.3

Austria

Switzerland

65.5

Turkey

65.5

Turkey

Greece

64.8

Latvia

64.8

Latvia

62.1

Hungary

62.1

Hungary

61.6

Hong Kong, China (SAR)

61.6

Hong Kong, China (SAR)

61.1

Estonia

61.1

Estonia

59.3

Czechia

59.3

Czechia

59.2

Oman

59.2

Oman

57.6

Slovenia

57.6

Slovenia

53.9

Poland

53.9

Poland

52.3

Barbados

52.3

Barbados

47.7

Croatia

47.7

Croatia

46.4

Serbia

46.4

Serbia

46.2

Slovakia

46.2

Slovakia

44.4

Kazakhstan

44.4

Kazakhstan

41.7

Montenegro

41.7

Montenegro

40.2

Russian Federation

40.2

Russian Federation

36.8

Romania

36.8

Romania

36.2

Bahamas

36.2

Bahamas

33.5

Kuwait

33.5

Kuwait

29.2

Belarus

29.2

Belarus

26.7

Georgia

26.7

Georgia

22.2

Bulgaria

22.2

Bulgaria

Palau

82.3

Seychelles

82.3

Seychelles

China

75.1

Brazil

75.1

Brazil

73.6

Sri Lanka

73.6

Sri Lanka

72.6

Maldives

72.6

Maldives

71.5

Turkmenistan

71.5

Turkmenistan

70.9

Ecuador

70.9

Ecuador

69.8

Fiji

69.8

Fiji

67.8

Mongolia

67.8

Mongolia

66.7

Samoa

66.7

Samoa

65.2

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

65.2

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

63.1

Viet Nam

63.1

Viet Nam

62.9

Thailand

62.9

Thailand

Dominican Republic

61.5

Colombia

61.5

Colombia

Peru

57.8

Antigua and Barbuda

57.8

Antigua and Barbuda

57.5

Mexico

57.5

Mexico

55.6

Belize

55.6

Belize

51.1

Tonga

51.1

Tonga

48.9

Azerbaijan

48.9

Azerbaijan

48.7

Saint Kitts and Nevis

48.7

Saint Kitts and Nevis

48.3

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

48.1

Tunisia

48.1

Tunisia

45.8

Indonesia

45.8

Indonesia

44.8

Trinidad and Tobago

44.8

Trinidad and Tobago

43.2

Uzbekistan

43.2

Uzbekistan

42.7

Suriname

42.7

Suriname

North Macedonia

40.9

North Macedonia

40.9

Paraguay

40.5

Paraguay

40.5

Jordan

39.1

Jordan

39.1

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

Dominica

38.8

Dominica

38.8

Albania

35.9

Albania

35.9

Grenada

34.3

Grenada

34.3

Botswana

30.1

Botswana

30.1

Philippines

29.7

Philippines

29.7

Palestine, State of

28.7

Palestine, State of

28.7

Saint Lucia

28.4

Saint Lucia

28.4

Ukraine

26.9

Ukraine

26.9

Lebanon

26.9

Lebanon

26.9

South Africa

26.4

South Africa

26.4

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

24.7

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

24.7

Bosnia and Herzegovina

24.4

Bosnia and Herzegovina

24.4

Libya

22.7

Libya

22.7

Moldova (Republic of)

Jamaica

20.6

Jamaica

20.6

Egypt

18.7

Egypt

18.7

Armenia

16.8

Armenia

16.8

Algeria

14.3

Algeria

14.3

Gabon

6.1

Gabon

6.1

Marshall Islands

Bhutan

75.4

Bhutan

75.4

El Salvador

66.9

El Salvador

66.9

Morocco

65.1

Morocco

65.1

India

53.4

India

53.4

Cabo Verde

52.3

Cabo Verde

52.3

Guyana

48.7

Guyana

48.7

Kiribati

44.5

Kiribati

44.5

Lao People's Democratic Republic

44.1

Lao People's Democratic Republic

44.1

Timor-Leste

40.4

Timor-Leste

40.4

Honduras

38.2

Honduras

38.2

Sao Tome and Principe

Pakistan

33.8

Pakistan

33.8

Comoros

30.8

Comoros

30.8

Guatemala

29.9

Guatemala

29.9

Nepal

29.2

Nepal

29.2

Bangladesh

28.1

Bangladesh

28.1

Tajikistan

27.5

Tajikistan

27.5

Vanuatu

25.6

Vanuatu

25.6

Myanmar

24.2

Myanmar

24.2

Zimbabwe

22.5

Zimbabwe

22.5

Eswatini (Kingdom of)

21.2

Eswatini (Kingdom of)

21.2

Solomon Islands

19.3

Solomon Islands

19.3

Nicaragua

18.6

Nicaragua

18.6

Equatorial Guinea

16.8

Equatorial Guinea

16.8

Angola

15.5

Angola

15.5

Kyrgyzstan

15.4

Kyrgyzstan

15.4

Iraq

14.7

Iraq

14.7

Namibia

12.9

Namibia

12.9

Ghana

7.3

Ghana

7.3

Kenya

6.9

Kenya

6.9

Congo

6.8

Congo

6.8

Syrian Arab Republic

4.4

Syrian Arab Republic

4.4

Papua New Guinea

Zambia

1.6

Zambia

1.6

Cameroon

1.5

Cameroon

1.5

Micronesia (Federated States of)

High human development

Medium

human development

Low human development

United Arab Emirates

97.7

88.7

Cuba

88.7

Cuba

Cambodia

82.5

Cambodia

82.5

Rwanda

29.7

Rwanda

29.7

Mauritania

21.4

Mauritania

21.4

Lesotho

16.1

Lesotho

16.1

Mozambique

12.9

Mozambique

12.9

Guinea-Bissau

12.8

Guinea-Bissau

12.8

Guinea

11.7

Guinea

11.7

Togo

11.2

Togo

11.2

Gambia

9.5

Gambia

9.5

Côte d'Ivoire

8.9

Côte d'Ivoire

8.9

Afghanistan

7.8

Afghanistan

7.8

Liberia

7.6

Liberia

7.6

Senegal

7.4

Senegal

7.4

Central African Republic

7.4

Central African Republic

7.4

Uganda

6.8

Uganda

6.8

Djibouti

6.6

Djibouti

6.6

Sierra Leone

6.2

Sierra Leone

6.2

Malawi

5.1

Malawi

5.1

Ethiopia

3.1

Ethiopia

3.1

Nigeria

2.7

Nigeria

2.7

Sudan

2.6

Sudan

2.6

Benin

2.5

Benin

2.5

Niger

Burkina Faso

1.7

Burkina Faso

1.7

Mali

1.6

Mali

1.6

Tanzania (United Republic of)

1.4

Tanzania (United Republic of)

1.4

Madagascar

1.3

Madagascar

1.3

Yemen

1.1

Yemen

1.1

Chad

Haiti

0.8

Haiti

0.8

South Sudan

0.8

South Sudan

0.8

Congo (Democratic Republic of the)

0.1

Congo (Democratic Republic of the)

0.1

Burundi

EritreaEritrea

0 0

Eritrea

122 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

But it has faced insucient funding to purchase vac-

cines and competing national vaccine procurement

strategies.



During the Group of 7 Summit in June

2021, high-income countries announced the donation

of 1 billion vaccines,



to be delivered mainly to devel-

oping countries through the COVAX initiative.

Market mechanisms could also help countries ex-

pand vaccine production. Temporary exemptions on

the protection of intellectual property for Covid-19

vaccines from vaccine-producing countries and man-

ufacturers could help expand vaccine production (see

chapter 3), as could raw material exports, technology

transfers and expanded manufacturing capacity in

low- and middle-income countries.

An evolving disease burden is driving

adjustments to healthcare systems

The Covid-19 pandemic brought to the fore the cen-

trality of communicable diseases in human security,

“

As countries have become better at protecting

basic health, the biggest health threats have

shifted to noncommunicable diseases—

primarily cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular

disease and chronic lung disease

just when healthcare systems were facing increas-

ing pressures from noncommunicable diseases. As

countries have become better at protecting basic

health, the biggest health threats have shifted to

noncommunicable diseases—primarily cancer, di-

abetes, cardiovascular disease and chronic lung

disease. These diseases, on the rise worldwide

over the past decades, are rapidly becoming a cen-

tral public health challenge. Globally, the cause

and distribution of the disease burden are shifting,

from communicable diseases to noncommunicable

diseases, and an increasing share of this new bur-

den of diseases is affecting developing countries

(figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 More people are dying from noncommunicable diseases today than in the past

Source: 

0 20 80 100

Share of deaths caused by noncommunicable diseases (percent)

Sub-Saharan Africa

South Asia

Arab States

Latin America and

the Caribbean

East Asia and

the Pacific

East Europe and

Central Asia

Developed

countries

2019

2010

2000

1990

2019

2010

2000

1990

2019

2010

2000

1990

2019

2010

2000

1990

2010

2000

1990

2019

2010

2000

1990

2010

2000

1990

6040

 123

Noncommunicable diseases together accounted

for 74 percent of deaths in 2019,



most of them in de-

veloping countries (see gure 6.3).



The pressure of

these diseases will likely intensify globally because

the number of people over age 65 is expected to more

than double by 2050 (see table 5.1 in chapter 5).



So-

cial determinants of health shape the prevalence

and distribution of noncommunicable diseases as

well as the mortality associated with them.



For in-

stance, the main behavioural risk factors (unhealthy

diets, tobacco smoking, low physical activity and ex-

cess alcohol consumption) and physical risk factors

(obesity, high blood pressure and diabetes) for non-

communicable diseases are socially patterned, as is

exposure to pollutants that cause specic noncom-

municable diseases.



Mental health has become a

“

The growing burden of noncommunicable

diseases places new demands on healthcare

systems, particularly for preventive or chronic care

human security emergency (box 6.1). Having low so-

cioeconomic status or living in a low- or middle-in-

come country increases the risk of developing type 2

diabetes, chronic pulmonary disease, cardiovascular

disease and lung cancer.



Many noncommunicable

diseases are preventable with policy measures that

address their main risk factors and underlying social

determinants. Eective action goes beyond health-

care systems to include justice, education, social wel-

fare, urban planning and environment protection.



Although people in some developing countries (in

particular those in Sub-Saharan Africa) were still

Box 6.1 The mental health crisis is a human security emergency

Addressing mental health is directly relevant to

advancing human security. Mental disorders place

a massive burden on every aspect of human lives

(including relationships, school, work and commu-

nity participation).

Roughly 10 percent of the global

population suffers from mental disorders.

When

children face hardships or environmental stressors,

long-term physical health problems as well as

damage to the developing brain can result.

Glob-

ally, about 20 percent of children and adolescents

and about 15 percent of people ages 60 and older

have mental disorders.

These numbers are most

likely underestimated.

Social stigma works against

reporting and diagnosing mental disorders. In many

countries access to mental health services is so lim-

ited that people do not have the possibility of seek-

ing treatment or being diagnosed.

Common mental health conditions include de-

pres sion, dementia, bipolar disorder and schizo phre-

nia.

These disorders tend to be associated with poor

education outcomes,

low productivity at work,

poverty,

premature and excess mortality

and poor

overall health.

Mental health issues are also esti-

mated to generate substantial losses in economic

output.

Some of the leading causes of mental health

conditions are adverse life experiences (such as

abuse, trauma, violence and conflict), ongoing

medical conditions (such as cancer and diabetes),

substance abuse (such as alcohol and recreational

drugs), biological factors (such as genes and brain

chemical imbalances) and isolation and loneliness.

Some groups are especially vulnerable. Women, be-

cause they are more exposed to sexual violence and

other potential triggers of mental disorders than

men, tend to be more affected by mental health

conditions (particularly anxiety, depression, post-

traumatic stress and eating disorders).

Major threats to human security, such as conflict,

can foster large-scale, long-lasting mental health

crises. For instance, negative life experiences such

as the Covid-19 pandemic have been linked to

anxiety, depression, stress and disturbed sleep,

while disrupting mental health services worldwide,

particularly in low-income countries.

Often overlooked as a human security issue, men-

tal health is essential for people to enjoy secure lives.

So, failing to address mental health amounts to ne-

glecting a major ongoing threat to human security

and can leave health systems unprepared for future

mental health crises.

Notes

1.WHO 2021e. 2.Mnookin 2016. 3.Center on the Developing Child at

Harvard University 2013; National Scientific Council on the Develop-

ing Child 2020. 4.WHO 2021e. 5.WHO 2017. 6.Ritchie 2018. 7.WHO

2019. 8. Brännlund, Strandh and Nilsson 2017. 9. Bubonya, Cobb-

Clark and Wooden 2017. 10.Callander and Schofield 2018. 11.Sax-

ena 2018. 12.World Bank 2018. 13.Estimates of economic loss due to

mental health issues vary depending on the method of estimation

14.CDC 2018. 15.Mental Health

Foundation 2021. 16.Rajkumar 2020. 17.WHO 2020a. 18.Kola 2020.

124 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

more likely to die from a communicable disease (such

as malaria, HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis), deaths from

communicable diseases have been declining. Mean-

while, deaths from noncommunicable diseases are

on the rise across all regions (see gure 6.3).



Some

countries that are undergoing this transition are fac-

ing a triple burden, with increases in noncommuni-

cable diseases and injuries alongside a substantial

existing burden from communicable diseases.



The

growing burden of noncommunicable diseases plac-

es new demands on healthcare systems, particularly

for preventive or chronic care. Many national health-

care systems that have historically catered to commu-

nicable diseases and maternal and child health are

ill-prepared for these new demands.



Even in some

developed countries the growth of multiple noncom-

municable diseases—such as cancer—is creating new

gaps in healthcare outcomes.



Meanwhile, climate change, biodiversity loss and

food insecurity are expected to intensify in the Anthro-

pocene context (see chapter 2), with unequal impacts

across and within countries. Air pollution and warmer

temperatures resulting from climate change are caus-

ing people’s health to deteriorate through both direct

and indirect channels.



By one estimate, anthropo-

genic climate change contributed to 37 percent of

warm-season heat-related deaths between 1991 and

2018.



The biggest increase in heat vulnerability dur-

ing the past 30 years has been in low and medium HDI

countries.



Air pollution is a key factor behind excess

mortality and low life expectancy, in part by exacer-

bating cardiovascular disease.



Climate change is

contributing to the decline in yield potential for major

crops in many parts of the world and in turn undermin-

ing eorts to curb malnutrition.



As chapter 2 discuss-

es, climate change is expected to become a leading

global risk factor by the end of this century (though

with great inequalities in impact across regions).



Planetary disruptions, health and equity are close-

ly linked. Climate change threatens to undo years

of progress in public health and sustainable devel-

opment outcomes, and adaptation responses are far

from adequate.



These new risks pose serious chal-

lenges to health systems, in addition to disrupting

the social, economic and political conditions for the

operation of healthcare systems. Some communi-

ties and countries are better positioned to cope than

others. First, climate change can drive social and

economic dislocation—say, by reducing food security

or access to water. Second, the health impacts of cli-

mate change are not equally borne across people or

communities. They fall disproportionately on those

left behind socially, poor people and individuals

with underlying health conditions.



Health shocks

can cause families to become and remain poor and

in turn be more vulnerable to the hazards associated

with the Anthropocene context.



The Covid-19 pan-

demic presents a glimpse of how this new reality can

exacerbate human insecurity.

Reinforcing human security though

enhanced healthcare systems

Aordable, comprehensive and equitable healthcare

is vital for human security, both to protect against

illness and to promote health more generally. The

performance of healthcare systems is itself an impor-

tant social determinant of health. Well- performing

healthcare systems are essential for realizing the

human right to health: the right to the enjoyment

of the highest attainable standard of physical and

mental health.



The right to health demands that

healthcare services, goods and facilities be availa-

ble, accessible, acceptable and of decent quality—

and be provided to all without discrimination.



The

right to health also calls attention to the need for

going beyond healthcare systems. As Amartya Sen

notes, “The policy question points to the fact that

good health depends on healthcare, and health care

is something that we can be legislate about. But good

health does not depend only on health care. It also

depends on nutrition, lifestyle, education, women’s

empowerment, and the extent of inequality in a soci-

ety.”



So the right to health “has […] broad demands

that go well beyond legislating good health care (im-

portant as that is). There are political, social, eco-

nomic, scientic, and cultural actions that we can

take for advancing the cause of good health for all.”



“

Well- performing healthcare systems are

essential for realizing the human right to

health: the right to the enjoyment of the highest

attainable standard of physical and mental health

Still, strengthening healthcare systems is one of

the central actions needed to full the human right

 125

to health. Limitations in the performance or equity of

healthcare systems pose a pervasive challenge for en-

hancing human security and addressing major health

challenges, including noncommunicable diseases,

pandemics and unmet mental health needs. People

in countries at all incomes experience the implica-

tions of limitations in healthcare systems.



Contrib-

uting factors include fragmented healthcare delivery,

shortfalls in the healthcare workforce, ineective

health information systems and weak governance

structures.



Healthcare systems are often dicult to

navigate, so much so that they can deter people from

seeking care altogether.



“

Healthcare remains prohibitively expensive

for many people around the world. When people

lack nancial coverage for healthcare, falling ill

can have catastrophic nancial consequences,

which in turn compromise human security

People in lower income countries suer the most

from inadequacies in healthcare.



In low- and mid-

dle-income countries an estimated 8 million people

die each year from conditions that should be treata-

ble by healthcare systems, and 60 percent of deaths

are due to poor quality care.



About a third of pa-

tients in these countries encounter disrespectful care,

short consultations, poor communication or long

wait times in healthcare systems.



One patient in ten

hospitalized in developing countries can expect to

acquire a healthcare-associated infection, compared

with 7 in 100 in high-income countries.



In low- and

middle-income countries 5.7–8.4 million deaths a

year occur due to poor quality care for a selected set

of health conditions (including some communicable,

noncommunicable, and maternal and child health

conditions).



Healthcare remains prohibitively expensive for

many people around the world. When people lack -

nancial coverage for healthcare, falling ill can have

catastrophic nancial consequences, which in turn

compromise human security. Unaordable health-

care directly impedes people’s wellbeing and restricts

their ability to work, pursue education, participate in

social and political life and live otherwise fullling

lives. As stated in Anirudh Krishna’s seminal work:

“People continue to live only one illness away from

poverty.”



In low-income countries 44 percent of

health spending is met by out-of-pocket payments.



If health insurance or other nancing is unavaila-

ble, poor people cannot obtain the care they need.

Where out-of-pocket spending is the primary source

of nancing for healthcare, social inequities arise be-

cause the costs of healthcare weigh more heavily on

those with low incomes. In Sub-Saharan Africa prob-

lems with aordability were the most frequent barri-

er for people unable to access medical care during the

pandemic, followed by fear of catching Covid-19.



The unequitable burden of out-of-pocket spend-

ing is especially disadvantageous in settings where

the burden of noncommunicable diseases is growing.

The costs of treating these diseases can heavily strain

household incomes, contributing to impoverish-

ment.



The link between noncommunicable diseases

and poverty can be a vicious cycle: poverty is associ-

ated with risk factors for noncommunicable diseases,

and the costs of care for these diseases in turn gener-

ate impoverishment.



High out-of-pocket spending

is often related to the cost of medicines, especial-

ly burdensome for people with chronic conditions.



The unaordability of medicines is a major obstacle

for treating many noncommunicable diseases.



High

prices and limited availability make insulin, crucial

for treating diabetes, inaccessible for many people.



Across countries at all incomes, coping with ill

health can be a major burden. In Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

countries 20 percent of health spending is paid di-

rectly by households, on average—ranging from less

than 10 percent in France to more than 30 percent

in Chile, Greece, the Republic of Korea and Mexico.



Evidence from OECD countries shows that private

health spending, such as private health insurance and

out-of-pocket spending on health products and ser-

vices, accounts for a growing share of middle-class

budgets.



Among OECD countries, middle-income

households’ health-related spending rose between

2005 and 2015.



The increase was largest in Chile,

Germany, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Spain and the

United States.



Middle-class households are spending more on

private health insurance than a decade ago. In the

United States the highest expenses have been asso-

ciated with health insurance premiums and out-of-

pocket expenses when facing illness, and a strong

association has been documented between economic

126 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

insecurity and households facing health challeng-

es. Between 2000 and 2010 the average spending of

middle-income households on healthcare increased

by 51 percent, whereas household incomes grew by

30 percent.



By one measure the mean family health

insurance premium in 2016 equalled 30.7 percent of

median household income.



The increasing costs of

long-term services and support for the older people

and their families present a major risk to the econom-

ic security of middle-class families. Family caregivers

who provide unpaid assistance to family members in

need of long-term services and support do so at the

expense of their own economic security.



And car-

egivers are usually women.



Unaordable and low-quality healthcare diminish-

es human security. From the standpoint of enhanc-

ing human security, and in line with strategies that

are based on solidarity, a key contribution would be

to move towards universalism in healthcare. Univer-

sal policies are “those that reach the entire popula-

tion with similarly generous benets independent

of the instruments used.”



Universalism is a mul-

tidimensional concept, incorporating elements of

coverage, generosity and equity.



A variety of policy

instruments and strategies can achieve universalism.

The appropriate reforms to this end are necessari-

ly context-specic, depending on social structures,

economic conditions, state capacities and initial in-

stitutional arrangements.



Because high out-of-pocket health spending drives

impoverishment and poor health outcomes, there has

been a global push towards universal health cover-

age, which is relevant for advancing human securi-

ty.



By WHO’s denition, universal health coverage

is achieved when all people receive the health ser-

vices they need, including health promotion and

prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative

care across the life course without suering nancial

hardship.



Universal health coverage is one target in

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Cov-

erage of essential services—one of two indicators for

monitoring universal health coverage in the Sustain-

able Development Goal framework—has improved

globally since 2000.



Most OECD countries have

near-universal coverage of costs for some health-

care services, including consultations with doctors,

tests and examinations, and surgical and therapeutic

procedures.



In September 2019 UN member states

issued the Political Declaration on Universal Health

Coverage, rearming a commitment to ensure that

by 2030 people would receive the health services they

need without suering nancial hardship.



While universal health coverage seeks to address

nancial protection, the quality of healthcare also

matters greatly for health outcomes. There is growing

recognition that expanding coverage alone does not

translate to better health outcomes, unless healthcare

is also high quality.



Fullling the human right to the

highest attainable standard of health also demands

investments in the quality of care. Improving the qual-

ity of healthcare is important on equity grounds: high

quality healthcare should be accessible to all people

regardless of their status and identities, and eorts

to enhance quality should prioritize people who are

receiving the worst quality care. Enhancing human

security thus requires moving beyond coverage and

towards enhancing quality and equity in healthcare.

“

Improving the quality of healthcare is

important on equity grounds: high quality

healthcare should be accessible to all people

regardless of their status and identities, and

eorts to enhance quality should prioritize

people who are receiving the worst quality care

An important issue in advancing healthcare uni-

versalism relates to public or private provision. Public

provision has long been central in improving popula-

tion health outcomes,



with implications for expand-

ing human development.



Private actors have also

played an important role in health systems, through

provision of care as well as through insurance cov-

erage, pharmaceutical innovation and service de-

livery, among others. There is evidence that private

provision can support some dimensions of univer-

salism—namely coverage, generosity and equity.



can compensate for shortfalls in public provision of

healthcare services. Private actors often enjoy great-

er capacity to spur innovation, experimentation and

technological advances in health. Indeed, the private

sector could play an important role in addressing the

burden of noncommunicable diseases through inno-

vation in diagnostics, treatment and care.



In some settings, however, private responses

can undermine equity, as those able to pay enjoy

higher quality care than those who must rely on

 127

public provision alone. Where private provision has

long dominated healthcare systems, private actors

can form coalitions opposing progress towards uni-

versalism, thus maintaining a status quo of insu-

cient public provision and high inequality.



In health

nancing systems funded primarily by public funds,

expanding voluntary private insurance can contribute

to higher costs and inequity.



Strategies to enhance human

security based on solidarity:

Towards the new generation of

universalism in healthcare systems

The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed many long-

standing weaknesses of healthcare systems around

the world. It has highlighted that nearly anyone

could face a sudden health threat and that even the

most well-resourced health systems could be over-

whelmed by a crisis on such a large scale. In the

Anthropocene context these types of threats are ex-

pected to increase in frequency and intensity, a lack

of preparedness and vast disparities in people’s abil-

ities to weather a health crisis exposed by Covid-19

should serve as a wakeup call. Meanwhile the evolv-

ing burden of disease and growing inequalities be-

tween and within countries in addressing disease

pose additional risks to human security. Beyond

Covid-19 there is abundant empirical evidence that

long-term adversities—such as poverty, racism, vio-

lence against women and girls or unsafe neighbour-

hoods—can increase the possibility of a wide range

of health conditions. These include obesity, diabe-

tes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, substance abuse,

autoimmune diseases, enhanced inammation, im-

paired cognition, interpersonal and self-directed vio-

lence, and chronic mental illnesses.



In this context

the close relationships among meeting basic needs,

promoting freedoms and protecting against shocks

become all the more important. Strategies for the

new generation of human security must reect the

systemic nature of these threats and move beyond

partial solutions that leave the underlying drivers of

insecurity unaddressed.

In this vein the new generation of human security

needs to systematically foster not only protection and

empowerment (dealing with urgent needs while rein-

forcing agency) but also solidarity. Moving towards

universalism in healthcare would be a concrete way

to advance human security in the enlarged perspec-

tive advocated for in chapter 1.

Actions to meet a shared health threat can come

from a wide range of actors using a variety of instru-

ments, going well beyond healthcare systems alone.

Eorts to stem the spread and impact of Covid-19

have come from governments, civil society, the sci-

entic community, industry and individuals acting

on their own with a common purpose. The success

of measures such as movement restrictions, social

distancing and masking relied strongly on public le-

gitimacy, empowerment and accountability. Special

eorts have been needed to reach those furthest be-

hind, such as people otherwise excluded from social

protection systems. And the uneven deployment of

several eective vaccines against Covid-19 around

the world has highlighted shared (in)security—that

the security of one group is not guaranteed unless

that of all others is addressed too.

Linking universalism in healthcare

with human security

Moving towards universalism in healthcare would di-

rectly enhance human security. A genuinely universal

healthcare system would provide protection that is

not conditional, enhancing capabilities through both

prevention and adequate treatment when needed. It

would also be empowering because it is based on ex-

panding agency.

“

Universal healthcare is framed as a strategy

that advances human security through

protection, empowerment and solidarity and

links to a broader international consensus

expressed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development aspiration to leave no one behind

In exposing structural inequalities and the intercon-

nectedness of human security risks, the Covid-19 pan-

demic has further highlighted the need for universal

and systemic responses to health threats that do not

exclude groups and individuals from access to health-

care—not only would that be a direct threat to those

excluded, but it would also put whole populations at

continued risk.



As the inequitable provision and use

128 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

of Covid-19 vaccines show, excluding someone from

access can pose continued severe threats to the health

of many. Experiences during the Covid-19 pandemic

therefore emphasize the vital importance of eective

universal access to adequate healthcare, in a context

of mutual interdependence across countries and peo-

ple when it comes to the conditions that can advance

the pursuit of health as a human right. And it is in this

context that solidarity, along with protection and em-

powerment, acquires heightened relevance.

Universal healthcare is therefore framed as a strat-

egy that advances human security through protec-

tion, empowerment and solidarity and links to a

broader international consensus expressed in the

2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development aspiration

to leave no one behind. It is also expressed in Sus-

tainable Development Goal target 3.8,



in the World

Health Organization’s UHC service coverage index,

in the International Labour Organization’s Social Se-

curity for All and in the Global Partnership for Uni-

versal Social Protection launched by the World Bank

and the International Labour Organization.



Measuring universalism: Introducing the

Healthcare Universalism Index

To measure the extent to which healthcare systems

can be characterized as universal in the sense elab-

orated above, this Report introduces the Healthcare

Universalism Index (HUI). The HUI, which is based

on a comprehensive concept of universalism, incor-

porates not only eective coverage but also generos-

ity and equity (see annex 6.1).

The HUI shows a large gap across countries at dif-

ferent HDI values. Norway, Japan and Sweden top

the index, with values above 0.9, while Afghanistan,

Bangladesh, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria have val-

ues below 0.1. Some developing countries have high

values, with Costa Rica (0.720), Uruguay (0.703),

Kuwait (0.691) and Maldives (0.671) enjoying uni-

versalism comparable to that in more industrialized

countries such as the United States (0.727). Cuba,

another outlier, ranks seventh, higher than histori-

cal leaders on universal provision of services such as

Germany and the United Kingdom.

Among the HUI components, generosity appears to

be the main barrier for healthcare universalism. This

emphasizes the key argument that coverage alone is

not sucient: it needs to be accompanied by sucient

investment in quality and accessibility. Low scores

among developed countries are typically due to im-

balances in achievements across the three dimensions

of universalism. For example, while Uruguay scores

almost equally well across coverage (0.69), generosity

(0.72) and equity (0.70), the United States is charac-

terized by vast dierences in dimension scores—espe-

cially between coverage (0.86) and equity (0.46).



Among developing regions, Latin America and the

Caribbean stands out with high HUI values, despite

persistent weaknesses in healthcare systems.



The

region is followed by the Arab States, Eastern Eu-

rope and Central Asia, and East Asia and the Pacic.

Countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are

lagging behind.

HUI values have improved over time: between

1995 and 2017 the world HUI value increased from

0.395 to 0.472. But there are some points of concern:

• Gaps in universalism between developed and devel-

oping countries are widening on average. In general,

progress in universalism across developing coun-

tries has been too slow to catch up with high HDI

countries (gure 6.4).

• Progress is heterogenous. On the positive side, 80

countries substantially improved on the HUI, with

an increase of more than 0.1. Examples include

populous countries such as China and Indonesia

as well as many African countries, such as the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire,

Liberia and Togo. On the other hand, 37 countries

experienced a deterioration on the HUI, which

mostly reects less generous, more unequal and

overall more segmented healthcare systems. This

trend is most prevalent among countries with me-

dium universalism in 1995 and especially strong

in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries

such as the Central African Republic, Iraq, Sudan,

Venezuela and Yemen also saw deteriorations.

Making healthcare systems more universal to

address new challenges to human security

To what extent can current healthcare systems re-

spond to the new generation of human security chal-

lenges discussed in this chapter?

 129

Recall that healthcare universalism is weaker and

improving less rapidly in developing countries. In ad-

dition, healthcare systems in developing countries

seem to be less eective or not t-for-purpose to deal

with the challenges arising from the burden of non-

communicable diseases and pandemics.

The current generation of healthcare systems is

associated with remarkable achievements in human

security, including the reduction in mortality rates at

all ages—but the progress is heterogenous. The 2019

Human Development Report documents two global

trends. First, inequalities in basic capabilities (prox-

ied by surviving the rst years of life, the focus of the

Millennium Development Goals) are declining: coun-

tries with high initial infant mortality rates are expe-

riencing faster reductions and are therefore catching

up. Second, inequalities in enhanced capabilities (im-

proving health at old ages, in line with the Sustaina-

ble Development Goals) are growing: countries that

already had relatively low mortality rates at older

ages have been recording more progress over the last

decade than countries with higher mortality rates at

older ages.



These patterns may be associated with the univer-

salism of healthcare systems. There is a strong neg-

ative association between HUI value and child (ages

0–5) mortality rate, a proxy of basic capabilities,

up to an HUI value of around 0.6—from there on,

improvement on the HUI does not change the child

mortality rate (gure 6.5).

In contrast, improvement on the HUI changes the

mortality rate at ages 50–80, a proxy for enhanced

Figure 6.4 Progress with inequality: Widening gaps in healthcare over time

Note: Balanced panel of 185 countries. Aggregates are based on simple averages.

Source: 

Gap in average Healthcare Universalism Index value with

respect to very high Human Development Index group

High

Medium

Low

0.34

0.38

0.25

0.30

0.17

0.18

1995

2017

Figure 6.5 There is a strong negative association between

Healthcare Universalism Index value and child probability

of death up to an index value of around 0.6

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Schillings



0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

Probability of death at ages 0–5, 2015

0.0 1.0

Healthcare Universalism Index (HUI) value, 2017

0.2 0.4 0.6

0.8

As HUI value increases up to around 0.6, the

probability of death at ages 0–5 declines

rapidly. After that point the increase in HUI

value does not have a significant impact.

130 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

capabilities, very little up, to an HUI value of about

0.4, but from there on mortality rate drops quickly as

HUI value increases (gure 6.6). This is an indication

of the limited universalism (and thus eectiveness)

of developing country healthcare systems in respond-

ing to emerging health threats to human security that

are associated with enhanced capabilities.

“

Healthcare universalism is weaker and improving

less rapidly in developing countries. In addition,

healthcare systems in developing countries seem

to be less eective or not t-for-purpose to deal

with the challenges arising from the burden of

noncommunicable diseases and pandemics

The impact of limited universalism on the eec-

tiveness of healthcare systems to address the new

health threats to human security can be further ex-

amined by considering the burden of noncommu-

nicable diseases and preparedness for pandemics.

Improvements on the HUI up to about 0.5 reduce

the age-normalized death rate associated with non-

communicable diseases by very little (gure 6.7),

but as HUI value increases from that level, there is a

strong relationship between it and noncommunicable

disease– related deaths.

A similar pattern is observed between the Global

Health Security Index (a metric of preparedness for

pandemic response) and the HUI (gure 6.8).



to an HUI value of about 0.4, HUI value is not asso-

ciated with Global Health Security Index value, but

above that level, the relationship is strongly positive

and signicant. For lower HUI values there is no sta-

tistically signicant association.



The limitations of healthcare systems already ev-

ident in this analysis will determine not only the

wellbeing and agency of people living in developing

countries but also how the world will be able to re-

spond to the compounded threats to human securi-

ty going forward in the Anthropocene context. The

greatest threats to human security are likely to be

where HUI values are lower (gure 6.9). Hazards and

challenges likely to be exacerbated in the Anthropo-

cene context will hit harder in countries with an HUI

value of 0.25 or lower and progressively less as HUI

value increases.

Figure 6.6 At a Healthcare Universalism Index value of

about 0.4 and higher, the probability of death at ages

50–80 drops quickly as index value increases

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Schillings

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

Probability of death at ages 50–80, 2015

Healthcare Universalism Index (HUI) value, 2017

0.0 1.00.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

An increase in HUI value up to around 0.4 is

linked to relatively small reductions in the

probability of death. After that point the

probability declines rapidly.

Figure 6.7 As Healthcare Universalism Index value

increases from 0.5, there is a strong relationship between

it and noncommunicable disease–related deaths

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Schillings



500

1,000

1,500

Death rate per 100,000 people, 2019

0.0 1.0

Healthcare Universalism Index (HUI) value, 2017

0.2 0.4 0.6

0.8

HUI value increases up to around 0.5 do not

have a significant impact on death rates

associated with noncommunicable diseases.

After that point the death rate declines

more rapidly.

 131

But healthcare universalism faces limitations be-

yond developing countries. The pattern of diver-

gence in life expectancy at older age (with groups

with higher socioeconomic status expanding their

advantage over the rest) is taking place in other de-

veloped countries, including Canada,



Denmark,



Finland,



England (United Kingdom),



the United

States



and some other European countries.



Even

in Sweden, which has a robust universal healthcare

system, health outcomes appear to be improving fast-

er among people at the top of the distribution than

among poorer members of the population.



The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in societies

has also depended heavily on socioeconomic status,

even in countries with relatively universal health-

care systems. There is evidence that some groups in

Sweden have faced higher morbidity and mortality

from Covid-19: migrants had higher mortality from

Covid-19 than people born in Sweden, and this has

been explained in part by their poorer socioeconom-

ic conditions.



In the United Kingdom Black, Asian

and ethnic groups—who are more likely to have to

low incomes and nonsalaried jobs—are at higher

risk of death from Covid-19 than White Britons.



Figure 6.8 Up to a value of about 0.4, Healthcare

Universalism Index value is not associated with Global

Health Security Index value, but above that level, the

relationship is strongly positive and significant

Source: Human Development Report Office calculations based on Schillings



100

Global Health Security Index value, 2019

Healthcare Universalism Index (HUI) value

0.0 1.00.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

HUI increases up to around 0.4 are not

associated with changes in Global Health

Security (GHS) Index value. After that point

GHS Index value increases rapidly.

Figure 6.9 The greatest threats to human security in the Anthropocene context are likely to be experienced

where Healthcare Universalism Index values are lower

Note: Each box plots the middle 50 percent of the distribution; the central line is the median. Outside the box the extreme lines are the approximate

minimum and maximum of the distribution. All graphs exclude outliers. Healthcare Universalism Index groups for 2017 are defined as follows: group

I, 0–0.24; group II, 0.25–0.49; group III, 0.50–0.74; group IV, 0.75–1.0. Hot days refer to the number of days with a maximum temperature above 95°F

degrees by 2100 under the Representative Concentration Pathway 4.5 scenario. Inequality loss is based on Inequality-adjusted HDI values.

Source: 

Number of days above 95°F

300

Hot days by 2100

Inequality loss (%)

Inequality in

human development

1.5

GPI value (higher value = less peace)

3.5

Global Peace Index (GPI)

I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV

100

200

2.5

Healthcare Universalism Index group Healthcare Universalism Index group Healthcare Universalism Index group

132 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Affirming solidarity at the core of human security

strategies to address new health threats

The Covid-19 pandemic has shown that human insecu-

rity can indeed be contagious: the uncontrolled spread

of the virus in some countries is a threat to the rest of

the world. This is a moment of shared vulnerability, as

nearly every human on the planet has been aected

by a sense of insecurity or its repercussions. It is also a

moment of shift in the policy mindset. People turned

to their governments and scientists for guidance and

protection. In many countries the Covid-19 moment

brought a new set of social behaviour norms that would

have been unthinkable prior to the pandemic —also

under pinned by a shared sense of solidarity.



At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic exposed

the structural limitations of existing multilateral

mechanisms in the face of an acute global threat to

human security. By many accounts the pandemic was

met with a failure of preparedness, cooperation and

cross-country solidarity, with dire consequences for

the most vulnerable.



As this Report describes, the

new generation of human security challenges involves

complex multidimensional threats that play out on a

global scale in the Anthropocene context. There is an

urgent need for reimagining and reforming multilater-

al systems to meet these challenges. The present mo-

ment is thus a crucial opportunity to rearm a human

security approach in strengthening multilateralism to

better address health threats to human security.

“

Past major health crises have often been

followed by the reform of global health systems

Determinants of health include various “transna-

tional norms, policies, and practices that arise from

global political interaction across all sectors that af-

fect health,” ranging from trade rules to internation-

al aid ows.



Many of these determinants contribute

to poor health outcomes among some groups (for in-

stance, intellectual property rules for lifesaving drugs

or scal austerity measures that constrain spending

on health).



And many cannot be addressed with-

in national healthcare systems alone. Interventions

must sometimes be cross-sectoral, outside the health

sector and cross-country.



An example of the importance of cross-country

action is the eort to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic

through widespread vaccination. The COVAX initia-

tive oered a way of addressing inequitable access to

life-saving vaccines against Covid-19. The eort has

reinforced how essential collaboration and solidar-

ity are for navigating a deadly, fast-moving threat to

human security. However, the COVAX initiative has

been hampered by entrenched power disparities, in-

stitutional stickiness and weak accountability mech-

anisms.



Power imbalances between partners in the

COVAX initiative and its eventual reliance on volun-

tary vaccine donations (as opposed to enabling large-

scale procurement, as initially envisaged) reduced

COVAX’s ability to secure enough, timely vaccine

doses.



The Covid-19 pandemic also exposed the

limitations of the International Health Regulations in

coordinating an eective response to an acute glob-

al health crisis.



These limitations were apparent in

the delayed reporting of the disease outbreak to the

WHO in the early days of the pandemic, the delays in

declaring a public health emergency of internation-

al concern thereafter and the delays in coordinating

national responses.



Taken together, this presents a

failure of protection, empowerment and solidarity in

the face of a very serious and universal human secu-

rity threat.

Past major health crises have often been followed

by the reform of global health systems.



The SARS

outbreak led to major revisions of the Internation-

al Health Regulations in 2005, and the 2006 H5NI

avian u outbreak was followed by the development

of the Pandemic Inuenza Preparedness Frame-

work. Similarly, the global Covid-19 pandemic could

spur evolution in global cooperation on health. A key

eort to this end is the establishment of the Inde-

pendent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Re-

sponse, through World Health Assembly Resolution

73.1 in May 2020.



The panel’s task is to provide an

evidence-based path forward to help countries and

global institutions address health threats, which can

greatly contribute to human security (box 6.2).

The panel’s recommendation on legal instruments

has renewed eorts to establish a new pandemic

agreement.



In May 2021 the World Health Assem-

bly passed a resolution endorsed by 194 countries

to host a special session devoted solely to an inter-

national pandemic agreement.



At the Special Ses-

sion on 1 December 2021 the assembly established

an intergovernmental negotiating body to draft and

 133

negotiate a convention, agreement or other interna-

tional instrument to strengthen pandemic preven-

tion, preparedness and response.



“

As discussions over the form of the new and

reformed international instruments continue,

it is critical to retain the focus of this eort on

human security and on embedding protection,

empowerment and solidarity as key pillars

As discussions over the form of the new and re-

formed international instruments continue, it is

critical to retain the focus of this eort on human

security and on embedding protection, empower-

ment and solidarity as key pillars. A new framework

agreement for human security in the face of health

threats must arm the principle of universalism

in healthcare and tackle prevailing dysfunctions in

global governance that undermine health. Of par-

ticular importance is equity—new institutional ar-

rangements must centre the leadership and input of

those most vulnerable to pressing health challenges,

whose vulnerability has stemmed in part from their

disempowerment in global governance structures.

This entails challenging power disparities that cur-

rently shape health outcomes, including the implicit

assumption underlying existing international health

instruments—that pandemics are largely threats that

emerge from poorer countries and threaten the well-

being of the wealthy.



In the language of the 2030

Agenda for Sustainable Development, a new institu-

tional arrangement to advance health must leave no

one behind and reach the furthest behind rst in a

spirit of solidarity.

Box 6.2 From global institutional weakness to the last pandemic

The work of the Independent Panel for Pandemic

Preparedness and Response is organized around four key

themes:

• Build on the past. Learn from previous pandemics

and the status of the system and actors pre-Covid-19.

• Review the present. Analyse the chronology of events

and activities in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic,

the recommendations made by the World Health

Organization (WHO) and the responses by national

governments.

• Understand the impacts. Review how health systems

and communities responded to the pandemic and

the impacts of response measures.

• Change for the future. Promote analysis and a vi-

sion for a strengthened international system ideally

equipped for pandemic preparedness and response.

The panel found that the outbreak and spread of

Covid-19 reflected “gaps and failings at every critical

juncture of preparedness.”

Containment measures were

too slow, as was emergency response funding, and the

global response lacked coordinated leadership.

These

failures, along with gaps in social protection systems,

led to widening inequalities and disproportionate

socioeconomic impacts on vulnerable and marginalized

people around the world.

At the same time, enormous

efforts by healthcare workers around the world and the

expeditious development of vaccines have been major

strengths in efforts to mitigate the crisis.

The most

successful national responses drew lessons from past

crisis, listened to evidence, engaged communities and

communicated clearly and consistently.

The panel called for a set of immediate measures to

curb Covid-19 transmission, including (but not limited

to) commitments from high-income countries to deliver

more than a billion vaccine doses to the Gavi COVAX

Advance Market Commitment, voluntary licensing and

technology transfer for Covid-19 vaccines from vaccine-

producing countries and manufacturers, and additional

resources from Group of 7 and Group of 20 countries to

the Access to Covid-19 Tools Accelerator.

The panel also presented recommendations for

preventing future disease outbreaks from becoming

pandemics:

• Enhancing political leadership for pandemic

preparedness and response (including through a

new high-level Global Health Threats Council and a

Pandemic Framework Convention).

• Strengthening WHO’s independence, authority and

financing. Investing in national preparedness, with

universal periodic peer reviews through WHO and

an evaluation of economic policy response plans

through International Monetary Fund Article IV

consultation with member countries.

• Establishing a new agile and rapid surveillance

information and alert system by WHO with the

authority to publish information about outbreaks

with pandemic potential immediately and the power

to investigate pathogens with pandemic potential.

(continued)

134 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

Box 6.2 From global institutional weakness to the last pandemic (continued)

• Establishing a prenegotiated, end-to-end platform for

tools and supplies, supported by technology transfer

and commitment to voluntary licencing agreements,

as well as enhanced regional capacities for manufac-

turing, regulating and procuring necessary tools and

supplies.

• Setting up a new International Pandemic Financing

Facility to support preparedness and response.

• Making national pandemic coordinators who are ac-

countable to heads of state and government, with a

mandate to drive whole-of-government coordination

for pandemic preparedness and response.

Notes

1.Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response 2021a.

2.Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response 2021b,

p. 2. 3. Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021b. 4.Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

5.Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021b. 6.Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

2021a.

Recommendations of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response

Make it the

Last Pandemic

Effective national

coordination

Call for immediate actions

to end Covid-19

Elevate leadership

for global health

Strengthen

the WHO

Invest in

preparedness

now

Establish a new global

surveillance system

Establish a

pre-negotiated

platform for

tools and supplies

New

international

financing

for global

public goods

Source: Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response 2021a.

 135

Annex 6.1. The Healthcare Universalism

Index: Coverage, equity and generosity

The Healthcare Universalism Index was developed

by Tobias Schillings and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea

in a background paper commissioned for this

Report on a new generation of human securi-

ty. The index builds on a background paper by

Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea for the

2016 Human Development Report. See Martínez

Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016).

Measuring universal health coverage has been a

key focus in global health literature, at least since the

adoption of universal health coverage as Sustainable

Development Goal target 3.8. Target 3.8 aspires to

“universal health coverage, including nancial risk

protection, access to quality essential health-care ser-

vices and access to safe, eective, quality and aorda-

ble essential medicines and vaccines for all.”



But a

universalist approach to health emphasizes the im-

portance of all aspects of health system performance,

especially eective access throughout the lifecycle.

The universalist approach thus goes further than uni-

versal health coverage to consider generosity and

equity in healthcare services. The Healthcare Univer-

salism Index (HUI) combines measures of coverage,

generosity and equity in a single global index.

Like the Human Development Index, the HUI is

constructed as the geometric mean of normalized

indices in each of the three dimensions of universal-

ism (gure A6.1). The selected indicators for each di-

mension of universalism and their rationales are as

follows:

• Coverage: UHC eective coverage index, which

assesses health system performance relative to in-

dividual countries’ population health needs.



• Generosity: Government health spending as a per-

centage of GDP, which signies public eorts and

commitment to comprehensive and accessible

services for all.



• Equity: Private health spending as a percentage of

total health spending,



which indicates the seg-

mentation of healthcare. A large private sector sug-

gests high segmentation in healthcare and inequity

between wealthier and poorer groups in accessing

quality care.



This measure includes out-of-pock-

et spending, which in most countries accounts for

the bulk of private health spending.

The HUI uses these indicators for three reasons.

First, they provide high-level aggregate measures of

healthcare systems that are likely to be central rep-

resentations of universalism across many dierent

countries. Second, the availability of good data on

these indicators allows for comprehensive measure-

ment of healthcare universalism, across both coun-

tries and time. Third, the HUI’s aggregation approach

favours joint measurement along the three dimen-

sions. Joint measurement reects the premise that

Figure A6.1 Dimensions and indicators used to calculate the Healthcare Universalism Index

Source: Global Burden of Disease Health Financing Collaborator Network 2020.

Dimensions

Indicators

Dimension index

Coverage Generosity Equity

UHC effective coverage index Government health spending

(% of GDP)

Coverage index

(33%)

Private health spending

(% of total health spending)

Generosity index

(33%)

Equity index

(33%)

Healthcare Universalism Index

136 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

the dierent dimensions depend on each other and

so should not be considered in isolation—and that

their combined achievement is necessary to attain

truly universal outcomes.

The HUI aims to provide a globally comparable,

macro-level measure of healthcare universalism.

This high-level measure could be supplemented with

more granular analyses that capture contextually rel-

evant factors shaping the dimensions of universalism

within countries. For instance, an important con-

tribution to this eect would be to develop nation-

al health satellite accounts to evaluate the eects of

health spending on health outcomes.

The HUI uses geometric mean instead of arithme-

tic mean to aggregate the dimension indices because

geometric means favour equal achievement in all di-

mensions. Simple averages imply that reductions in

one dimension can be linearly compensated for by

equal increases in another, whereas geometric means

reduce the substitutability between the index compo-

nents and make each component’s marginal contri-

bution dependent on the level of the others. Like the

Human Development Index, the HUI assigns equal

weight to each dimension index, based on the theo-

retical assumption that all are equally important for

achieving true universalism.

The HUI’s generosity and equity dimension indi-

ces are calculated by normalizing the corresponding

variables based on their minimum and maximum

values. To avoid the impact of extreme outliers, the

minimum and maximum values are dened as the 1st

and 99th percentile of all country-year observations

(table A6.1).

The dimension indices are then calculated as:

D,ij

– x

min

max

– x

min

where I

is the dimension index D for country i and

year j, and x

is the corresponding observation. Be-

cause the equity indicator (private health spending as

a percentage of total health spending) measures the

level of (negative) market segmentation, the result-

ing index is additionally transformed by subtracting

it from 100 percent.

The geometric mean of the two resulting generosity

and equity dimension indices and the UHC eective

coverage index



are aggregated to create the HUI:

HUI

 I

Coverage,ij

* I

Generosity,ij

* I

Equity,ij



⅓

The choice of normalization based on the 1st and

99th percentile results in the key limitation that zero

values in one of the dimensions lead to an overall

HUI value of zero and a loss of information in the

other dimensions. The pragmatic solution to this

issue is to add a marginal score to these zero values

equal to the lowest nonzero country-year observation

(usually equal to 0.1 percent).

Table A6.1 Limits of the generosity and equity indices

Indicator

Minimum

(1st percentile)

Maximum

(99th percentile)

Government health spending as a

percentage of GDP 0.3 9

Private health spending as a

percentage of total health spending 5 85

Source: Schillings and Sánchez-Ancochea 2021.

 137

Greater solidarity:

Towards human

development with

humansecurity

CONCLUSION



140 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

CONCLUSION

Greater solidarity: Towards human development with

human security

The enormous shock of the Covid-19 pandemic has

unmasked the fragility of progress, touching nearly

everyone on the planet. This should serve as a wake-

up call in the face of compounded threats to human

security that are superimposed on the unprecedented

Anthropocene context. It shows that improving well-

being achievements is not a sucient condition for

human security. The pandemic could represent a dry

run of worse things to come — a series of ever-growing

waves crashing into the inability of governments and

the international community to empower and pro-

tect people around the world, but especially the most

vulnerable.

Yet, the pandemic has also given us a glimpse of

how bold action could help tackle the challenges of

our time and improve lives and wellbeing. We have

witnessed the astonishing production of dozens of

highly eective vaccines in record time — some of

them with breakthrough technologies. The vaccine

rollout has been grossly unequal, but less than a year

after the vaccination campaign started, half the world

has received at least one dose of a Covid-19 vaccine

(see chapter 6). Moreover, the pandemic has opened

the doors to aggressive policy interventions, and

many developing countries have implemented some

sort of income support programme, which in turn has

decelerated Covid-19 cases and deaths.



The Anthropocene context, with interlinked

human security threats, calls for a bold agenda to

match the magnitude of the challenges, put forward

with humility in the face of the unknown. The alter-

native is accepting fragmented security approaches,

with responses likely de-equalizing, likely reactive,

likely late and likely ineective in the long term.

This Report argues for expanding the human se-

curity frame in the face of this new generation of

threats: adding solidarity to the human security strat-

egies of protection and empowerment proposed by

the Ogata-Sen report (2003).



Solidarity recognizes that human security in the

Anthropocene must go beyond securing individuals

and their communities to systematically consider in-

terdependence across all people and between people

and the planet. For each of us to live free from want,

from fear and from indignity, all three strategies

must be deployed — for it is protection, empower-

ment and solidarity working together that advanc-

es human security in the Anthropocene. At the core

of this framework is agency: the ability to hold val-

ues and make commitments, regardless of whether

they advance one’s wellbeing, and to act according-

ly in making one’s own choices or in participating in

collective decisionmaking. Emphasizing agency is

a reminder that wellbeing achievements alone are

not all we should consider when evaluating policies

or assessing progress. Agency will also help avoid

the pitfalls of partial solutions, such as delivering

protection with no attention to disempowerment or

committing to solidarity while leaving some lacking

protection.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

and the Sustainable Development Goals provide an

ambitious set of multidimensional objectives that

inform action at all levels and mobilize the interna-

tional community. But eorts remain largely com-

partmentalized, dealing separately with climate

change, biodiversity loss, conicts, migration, refu-

gees, pandemics and data protection. Those eorts

should be strengthened, but tackling them in silos

is insucient in the Anthropocene context. It is im-

perative to go beyond fragmented eorts, to rearm

the principles of the UN founding documents — the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN

Charter — which are also the central ideas underpin-

ning the concept of human security. Echoing the UN

Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda,



doing so

in the Anthropocene implies a systematic, permanent

and universal attention to solidarity — not as optional

charity or something that subsumes the individual

to the interests of a collective but as a call to pursue

human security through “the eyes of humankind.”

When the 1994 Human Development Report was

published, the idea of human security challenged the

conception of security and moved the debate from

territories to people. As we face new global, system-

ic and interconnected threats, recognizing our com-

mon fate as humanity implies that we have agency

to shape our future. We will not be able to face the

systemic, global, interconnected threats individually

or by focusing only on narrow national interests. For

each of us to live free from want, from fear and from

indignity will require that everyone live free from

want, fear and indignity. As the vaccine inequality

problem shows, humanity’s problem is not lack of in-

genuity but an inability to see our security in the secu-

rity of others.

CONCLUSION 141

Notes

and

references

OVERVIEW

1 UNHCR 2021a.

2 Rigaud and others 2018.

3 Albuquerque and others 2016; Badgett,

Hasenbush and Luhur 2017; Romero, Goldberg

and Vasquez 2020; Suriyasarn 2016.

4 Only 25 countries have gender identity or gen-

der expression legislation: Argentina, Belgium,

Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,

Ecuador, France, Greece, Iceland, India,

Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway,

Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand,

the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Viet Nam

(Zhan and others 2020).

5 UNDP 2019a.

6 As second-wave feminism established, “the

personal is political” (Firestone and Koedt 1970,

p. 76), and feminist researchers have analysed

violence in the individual and domestic realm

as a form of political violence and a precondi-

tion for increased violence against women

and girls in the public sphere (Firestone and

Koedt 1970; Hanisch 1969).

7 UNODC 2021.

8 Ogata and Sen 2003.

9 See chapter 1.

10 This finding is based on the generalized trust

question in the World Value Survey: “Generally

speaking, would you say that most people can

be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in

dealing with people?”

11 See chapter 1.

PART I

CHAPTER 1

1 For evidence on Covid-19 and fear, see, for

example, Satici and others (2020).

2 Which the 2020 Human Development Report

(UNDP 2020c, p. 268) defined as “asymmetries

in opportunities, wealth, and power across

groups of people.”

3 UNDP 2019a.

4 Berger 2020; Johnson and others 2020; Kees-

ing and Ostfeld 2021.

5 Lewis 2021.

6 UNDP 2020c.

7 UN 2012.

8 UNDP 1994.

9 Human Development Report Office 2020.

Gasper 2013.

10 Gasper and Gomez 2021.

11 Basu 2018, p. 40.

12 UN 1948.

13 https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda.

14 Walker and others 2013.

15 As is the case in many high-income countries,

see Bénabou and Tirole (2006).

16 As defined in Hodson (1996). This is also the

approach to dignity in Lamont (2000).

17 As argued in Thomas and others (2020).

18 Elster 2015.

19 Lerner and others 2015, p. 807.

20 In particular, evidence suggests that fear in-

duces both stronger risk aversion and less op-

timistic risk assessments than the behaviour

that would take place by a neutral observer

(Lerner and Keltner 2001).

21 For a review of the increased understanding

and recognition of the importance of moti-

vated belief formation and reasoning, see

Bénabou and Tirole (2016). For an experiment

showing how motivated cognition leads to

trust, see Schilke, Reimann and Cook (2015).

22 To use a phrase from Lamont, Welburn and

Fleming (2013), p. 145–146.

23 Douglas 2004, p. 90.

24 Over the last decades several indices have

been created to capture the concept of human

security based on objective and subjective

data. See, for instance, Badaoui (2021), Fund

for Peace (2004), Hastings (2009), Lonergan,

Gustavson and Carter (2000), Piccone (2017),

Randolph, Fukuda-Parr and Lawson-Remer

(2010, 2020) and Takasu and JICA Ogata

Sadako Research Institute for Peace and

Development (2019). The Index of Perceived

Human Insecurity introduced in this Report

contributes to this stream of work with a global

view of perceived human insecurity, based on

information aggregated at the individual level

and comparable over time at the country level.

This effort partially responds to calls for further

innovations in measurement based on percep-

tion data received from expert panelists during

the virtual symposium, “A New Generation of

Human Security” (8–11 June 2021). The informa-

tion about perceptions of insecurity is valuable

and seeks to complement the objective indica-

tors of human insecurity and multiple threats

presented throughout this Report.

25 Based on the I-PHI, people are classified

into three groups: relatively secure, moder-

ately insecure or very insecure. The cutoffs

defining these groups are meant to provide

a general view of the distribution of human

insecurity. The concept of human security is

defined based on freedom from want, fear

and indignity. The expression “freedom from”

conveys a strict criterion for measurement.

If followed literally, less than 2 percent of the

world’s people face no measured insecurity

(based on the indicators used in the index).

Adding some flexibility, we interpret that

someone feels “relatively secure” if the I-PHI is

below 0.2 (less than one-fifth of the weighted

insecurities), someone feels “moderately inse-

cure” if the I-PHI is between 0.2 and 0.5 and

someone fells “very insecure” if the I-PHI is 0.5

or above (experiencing more than half of the

[weighted] insecurities).

26 Affected by most of the (weighted) insecurities.

27 In a similar exercise the average generalized

trust of people feeling relatively secure at least

doubles the level of trust of people feeling very

insecure, across different levels of income and

satisfaction with life. The opposite is not the

case: for people feeling moderately or very

insecure, trust levels remain relatively stable

across different levels of income or satisfac-

tion with their lives.

28 Falk and others (2018) acknowledge that

trust is a belief but also characterize it as an

economic preference, given the importance of

trust for many economic decisions, as argued

in, for instance, Arrow (1972). And Dasgupta

(2000) argues that a reputation for trustwor-

thiness is akin to a commodity, something that

is valuable and sought after.

29 See, for example, Johnson and Mislin (2012)

and Peysakhovich and Rand (2016).

30 Van Lange 2015.

31 Thöni 2017.

32 Elster 2015.

33 Gambetta 2000, p. 228.

34 Butler, Giuliano and Guiso 2016.

35 As recognized long ago in Schelling (1965,

p. 378): “We often thing of trust, reliable com-

munication and enforceable contract as good

things. We like people to overcome distrust,

confusion, and competing interests and reach

an outcome beneficial to both. […] But when

we turn to the Ku Klux Klan, corruption in the

police force, extortion in junior high schools

[…] our concern is to spoil communication, to

create distrust and suspicion, to make agree-

ments unenforceable, to undermine tradition,

to reduce solidarity, to discredit leadership,

and to sever any moral bond that holds the

conspirators together.”

Notes

144 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

36 Henrich (2020) provides evidence of these

correlations. Henrich and Muthukrishna (2021)

suggest that trust is an antecedent of these

outcomes based on cumulative cultural evolu-

tion (Henrich and others 2016). For a review

of arguments defending, and questioning,

the cultural group selection hypothesis that

underpins cumulative cultural evolutions, see

Richerson and others (2016).

37 Glaeser and others 2000.

38 Falk and others 2018.

39 Bruhin, Fehr and Schunk 2018.

40 For instance, there has been a decrease in

trust in science in the context of Covid-19, even

though trust in scientists is an important corre-

late of the effectiveness of the response to the

pandemic (see Algan and others 2021). Declin-

ing trust is also associated with a progressive

erosion of the quality of democracy—and

the support for it—in the world over the last

decade (Alizada and others 2021). This is

consistent with the support of protectionist,

antiliberal views (Alonso and Ocampo 2020).

41 Gambetta 2000, p. 216.

42 Gambetta 2000, p. 219.

43 Kollock 1994.

44 Schilke, Reimann and Cook 2021, p. 240.

Technology is likely to further accelerate the

importance of “distributed trust,” evident from

the shift from traditional to social media and

the growing interest in digital currencies (Bots-

man 2017, 2018).

45 UNDP 1994; Ogata and Sen 2003.

46 Gasper and Gomez 2021.

47 UN and World Bank 2018.

48 Gasper and Gomez 2021, p. 24.

49 UNDP 2020c.

50 UNDP 2020c.

51 UNDP 2020c.

52 ITU 2021a.

53 UNHCR 2021a.

54 UNHCR 2020, 2021a. See also figure 4.3.

55 UNDP 2020c.

56 Miks and McIlwaine 2020.

57 This does not imply that human development

should not be pursued or that human develop-

ment never goes along with human security.

Instead, it suggests that the link between the

two is not inevitable. We support that view,

but those positive links cannot be taken for

granted.

58 Dodsworth 2019, pp. 20 and 34.

59 Franceschet 2005.

60 IHME 2018.

61 Tadjbakhsh 2013, p. 43.

62 Gasper and Gomez 2021.

63 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

2016.

64 Ogata and Sen 2003, p. 10.

65 Ord 2020.

66 Sen 2001, p. 19.

67 Article 7 of ILO 1989.

68 Sen 2001, pp. 18–19.

69 Ogata and Sen 2003.

70 Gasper and Gomez 2021, p. 37.

71 Gasper 2020, p. 577.

72 Even in connection to eminently global issues

such as sustainability, the presence of human

security as a guiding concept has been scat-

tered. See Gasper and Gomez (2021).

73 Martin and Owen 2013, p. 322; see also Correll

(1999).

74 There is a vast literature on global public

goods, but early contributions include Kaul

and Conceição (2006), Kaul, Grunberg and

Stern (1999) and Kaul and others (2003).

75 Slaughter 2009, 2017.

76 Okonjo-Iweala, Shanmugaratnam and Sum-

mers 2021.

77 Kaldor 2020, p. 5.

78 Based on Elster (2015).

79 Petersen 2021; Petersen and others 2021.

80 Guterres 2020.

81 UN 2021d.

82 Sen 2009, p. 130.

83 Hassoun 2021, p. 20, based on Altuire and Has-

soun (2021).

84 The caution, highlighted earlier in the chapter,

about how trust within certain groups can be

not only counterproductive but even some-

thing that we may have reason to undermine

also applies to solidarity within certain groups.

85 UN 2021d.

86 Gasper and Gomez 2021.

87 Bai, Gauri and Fiske 2021.

88 Hirschman 1985, p. 95.

89 UNDP 1994.

90 Ogata and Sen 2003.

91 UN 2013.

92 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security

2016.

93 UNDP 1994.

94 UN 1948.

95 UNDP 1994, p. 3.

96 Krause (2013), as cited in Martin and Owen

(2013), p. 77.

97 UNDP 1994, p. 10.

98 UNDP 1994.

99 Gasper and Gomez 2014.

100 Ogata and Sen 2003.

101 Ogata and Sen 2003, p. 4.

102 Ogata and Sen 2003, p. 4.

103 Ogata and Sen 2003, p. 12

104 UN 2012. As part of the resolution, it is agreed

that “the notion of human security is distinct

from the responsibility to protect and its imple-

mentation” (p. 2).

105 Tadjbakhsh (2013), as cited in Martin and

Owen (2013).

106 See United Nations Trust Fund for Human

Security (2016).

107 Andersen-Rodgers and Crawford 2018.

108 Unpublished document shared by the UN Hu-

man Security Unit.

109 Gasper and others 2020.

110 Gasper 2020, p. 581.

111 Owen (2004) makes a similar argument.

112 See Christie (2013) for a detailed analysis.

113 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018; UN 2000.

114 Paris 2001, p. 88.

115 Khong 2001, p. 232.

116 Johns 2014, p. 3.

117 Based on Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007).

118 Critical examinations such as those in Chan-

dler and Hynek (2010) present important

challenges to address when advancing and

revisiting the human security approach.

119 Haerpfer and others 2021.

CHAPTER 2

1 Comparisons are between dry biomass and

Anthropogenic mass plus waste. Anthropo-

genic mass includes concrete, aggregates,

bricks, asphalt, metals, wood used for paper

and industry, glass and plastic. See Elhacham

and others (2020).

2 IPCC 2021; UNEP 2021.

3 There is a debate over whether the Anthro-

pocene constitutes a new geological epoch

(see Ellis 2018). The term is used here to signify

the context in which humans have become

a transformative force shaping the planet.

Some scholars have suggested that the

Anthropocene could be characterized as an

ongoing event (Bauer and others 2021).

4 Gomez and Gasper 2021.

5 As argued in the 2020 Human Development

Report (UNDP 2020c), the term “balance” is

used recognizing that the Earth system has

displayed many different states over geo-

logical time and is a dynamic system that is

constantly evolving. It is not meant to evoke

an aspiration to return to a more “balanced

state.” Planetary imbalances are simply a

way of expressing planetary changes that are

dangerous for people and other forms of life

on the planet.

6 For instance, indigenous peoples who often

have a record of effective stewards of nature,

including preservation of forests that help miti-

gate climate change, face limited resources

and agency to continue to contribute to the

stewardship of nature (UNDP 2020c). Mean-

while, groups that account for larger shares

of the contributions to planetary change are

likely to face a lower burden of the resulting

NOTES 145

human insecurity. For instance, with climate

change the top 10 percent of the global

income distribution—with likely the ability to

invest in climate adaptation—generates al-

most half of global greenhouse gas emissions

(Chancel and others 2022).

7 IPCC 2021.

8 IPCC 2021.

9 IPCC 2021.

10 “Continued ice loss over the 21st century is vir-

tually certain for the Greenland Ice Sheet and

likely for the Antarctic Ice Sheet” (IPCC 2021, p.

SPM-21).

11 UNDP 2020c.

12 WWF 2020.

13 IPBES 2019.

14 Bar-On, Phillips and Milo 2018; Ritchie 2021.

15 WWF 2020. Using panel data for 2005–2015,

Bjelle and others (2021) find that food con-

sumption has the highest impact on biodi-

versity. But manufacturing and shelter have

the strongest income elasticity of footprint in

high-income countries.

16 The term “land use” refers to the human use of

land, as for agriculture, residential and indus-

trial purposes. According to the Food and Ag-

riculture Organization of the United Nations,

the rate of deforestation has decreased over

the past three decades and was estimated at

10 million hectares a year between 2015 and

2020. The world is not on track to meet the

target of increasing forest area by 3 percent

worldwide by 2030, as set in the United Na-

tions Strategic Plan for Forests (FAO 2020).

17 IPBES 2019, p. 28.

18 UN-Water 2021.

19 Betts and others 2017.

20 Millard 2021; Soroye, Newbold and Kerr 2020.

Up to $577 billion in annual global crops are at

risk from pollinator loss (IPBES 2019).

21 UNEP 2021.

22       

others 2021.

23 Elhacham and others 2020.

24 UNEP 2021.

25 The 2019 Human Development Report (UNDP

2019a) discusses this improvement as a case

of convergence in basic capabilities.

26 FAO 2021b.

27 Coronese and others 2019; UNDP 2020c.

28 https://www.internal-displacement.org/

database/displacement-data, Accessed 10

November 2021.

29 An estimated 1.2 billion people are at risk of

displacement by 2050 (IEP 2020a).

30 Contiguous areas along the coast that are

less than 10 metres above sea level. See Kulp

and Strauss (2019).

31 Kulp and Strauss 2019.

32 Carabine and Dupar 2014; IPCC 2014a.

33 Martyr-Koller and others 2021; Nurse and oth-

ers 2014; Thomas and others 2020.

34 See chapters 2 and 3 in UNDP (2020c).

35 See chapters 2 and 3 in UNDP (2020c).

36 See chapter 2 in UNDP (2020c).

37 See the overview of UNDP (2020c).

38 UNDP 2019a.

39 

figure 1.6.

40 This study works with the population-weighted

country-level per capita GDP distribution (Dif-

fenbaugh and Burke 2019).

41 Leach and others 2018; UNDP 2020c. Recog-

nitional equity refers to recognition of interest

holders and respect for their identity, values

and associated rights. Distributional equity re-

fers to the distribution of resources, costs and

benefits among people and groups. Proce-

dural equity relates to how decisions are being

made in reference to institutions, governance

and participation.

42 Galaz, Collste and Moore 2020; Keys and oth-

ers 2019.

43 FAO and others 2021.

44 In 2019. http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results

-tool, accessed 10 November 2021; IHME 2019.

45 This is summarized in the account by FAO and

others (2021, p. 51): “In the last ten years, the

frequency and intensity of conflict, climate

variability and extremes, and economic

slowdowns and downturns have increased

significantly. The increased occurrence of

these major drivers, now exacerbated by the

COVID-19 pandemic, has led to a rise in hun-

ger and has undermined progress in reducing

all forms of malnutrition, particularly in low-

and middle-income countries.”

46 IFAD 2021.

47 Gheuens, Nagabhatla and Perera 2019.

48 Ray and others 2019.

49 Impacts are mostly negative in Australia, Eu-

rope and Southern Africa, generally positive in

Latin America and mixed in Asia and Northern

and Central America (Ray and others 2019).

50 Wossen and others 2018.

51 Gupta, Somanathan and Dey 2017; Sarker,

Alam and Gow 2012.

52 Niles and Brown 2017.

53 In Africa the frequency and intensity of heat-

waves are projected to continue to increase

through the 21st century (Masson-Delmotte

and others 2019).

54 Tutwiler and others 2017.

55 Castañeda-Álvarez and others 2016; Sharp 2011.

56 This paragraph is based on UNDP (2020c).

57 Ding and others 2017.

58 Different effects interact, as changing environ-

mental conditions can initiate a vicious circle:

infectious disease causes or compounds hun-

ger, which makes affected populations more

susceptible to infectious disease, which in turn

can lower the capacity to use food effectively.

For instance, extreme heat is more likely to

have adverse effects on food-insecure people

(Watts and others 2018).

59 Keesing and others 2010.

60 Rulli and others (2017) show that the Ebola

outbreak in West and Central Africa was

due mostly to human encroachment and

deforestation.

61 McKee and others 2021.

62 MacDonald and Mordecai 2019.

63 Manisalidis and others 2020.

64 WHO 2021k.

65 Lelieveld and others 2020.

66 International trade affects the global distribu-

tion of air pollution. See some evidence for

China in Wang and others (2017).

67 UNEP 2019.

68 Kawser Ahmed and others 2016.

69 Effah and others 2021.

70 Nizzetto, Futter and Langaas 2016; Scheurer

and Bigalke 2018.

71 Sharma and Chatterjee 2017.

72 Waring, Harris and Mitchell 2018.

73 In line with the Sixth Assessment of the Inter-

governmental Panel on Climate Change, we

use the Representative Concentration Path-

way (RCP) 8.5 scenario to illustrate the case of

very high GHG emissions or scenario without

climate change mitigation. About recent chal-

lenges to the assumptions of the RCP8.5 sce-

nario, the report states (IPCC 2021, p. TS-22):

“In the scenario literature, the plausibility of

some scenarios with high CO

emissions, such

as RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5, has been debated in

light of recent developments in the energy sec-

tor. However, climate projections from these

scenarios can still be valuable because the

concentration levels reached in RCP8.5 or

SSP5-8.5 and corresponding simulated climate

futures cannot be ruled out. That is because of

uncertainty in carbon-cycle feedbacks which

in nominally lower emissions trajectories can

result in projected concentrations that are

higher than the central concentration-levels

typically used to drive model projections.”

74 Carleton and others 2020.

75 Carleton and others 2020.

76 Human Development Report Office calcula-

tions using RCP4.5 and RCP8.5 scenarios.

Based on data from Carleton and others

(2020).

77 One indicator of the unequal effect of climate

change is the percentage of people living

in areas with an expected increase in death

rates, which is 97 percent in the Arab States, 95

percent in South Asia, 82 percent in East Asia,

77 percent in both Sub-Saharan Africa and

Latin America and the Caribbean and 56 per-

cent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. (Hu-

man Development Report Office calculations

with data from Carleton and others 2020).

78 Carleton and others 2020.

146 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

79 See the comprehensive review of this topic in

Lövbrand and Mobjörk (2021).

80 See, for example, Blattman and Miguel (2010)

and Hsiang (2015).

81 See, for example, Lövbrand and Mobjörk

(2021) and Mobjörk, Krampe and Tarif (2021)

for recent discussions of the links between the

Anthropocene and violent conflict.

82 Burke, Hsiang and Miguel 2015; Harp and Kar-

nauskas 2018; Koubi 2019.

83 Koubi 2019.

84 ICRC 2019.

85 

86 Ide and others 2020.

87 Harari and Ferrara 2018.

88 Vesco and others 2021.

89 Linke and Ruether 2021.

90 Raleigh, Choi and Kniveton 2015.

91 Adger and others 2021; UNHCR 2019, 2021a,

2021c; UNHCR and UNICEF 2019.

92 UN 2021a.

93 Clement and others 2021; Rigaud and others

2018.

94 Mares and Moffett 2016.

95 Dalby 2013; Kalantzakos 2021; Lazard and

Youngs 2021.

96 Zivin, Hsiang and Neidell 2018.

97 Park and others 2020.

98 Fishman, Carrillo and Russ 2019.

99 Bharadwaj and others 2017; Zaveri and others

2019.; Zivin and Neidell 2013.

100 Baez, Fuente and Santo 2010; McDermott 2012.

101 Baez, Fuente and Santo 2010.

102 Paudel and Ryu 2018.

103 Paudel and Ryu 2018.

104 Physical discomfort caused by heat exposure

can be caused by several factors such as air

temperature, humidity, wind speed, clothing,

exposure to direct sunlight and the intensity

of work. For some occupations factors such

as clothes and exposure to the sun can be

reduced by public and private policies, while

other factors such as temperature and humid-

ity depend largely on climate change.

105 Zander and others 2015.

106 Ma and others 2019.

107 Rode and others 2021a. See also similar esti-

mates in Orlov and others (2020).

108 Kuhla and others 2021. Huang and others

(2020) estimate that an increase in tempera-

ture will reduce an average rural resident’s

time from farm work and increase the time

allocated to off-farm work, which can result

in the outflow of workers from agriculture to

nonfarm occupations.

109 Colmer 2021.

110 Jessoe, Manning and Taylor 2018.

111 Costanza and others 2017.

112 Dasgupta 2021.

113 Of 140 countries studied (UNEP 2018).

114 Chiabai and others 2011.

115 IPBES 2018.

116 World Bank 2017.

117 Hamilton and Casey 2016; Menéndez and oth-

ers 2020.

118 Menéndez and others 2020.

119 Menéndez and others 2020.

120 IPCC 2020.

121 Burrell, Evans and Kauwe 2020.

122 About 76 percent in 2018 (https://www.climate

watchdata.org/ghg-emissions?end_year=

2018&start_year=1990, accessed 10 November

2021). Levesque and others (2018) estimate

that without policy changes, the global

electricity demand from buildings is expected

to increase from 116 EJ a year in 2010 to 120–

378 EJ a year in 2100.

123 See discussion of the literature in Rode and

others (2021b).

124 For instance, Khan and others (2021) show that

mean temperature changes drive increases in

annual electricity demands by 0.5–8 percent

across the United States in 2100, in a scenario

with very high emissions.

125 Wenz, Levermann and Auffhammer (2017)

estimate a significant increase in energy con-

sumption in southern and western Europe and

significant decrease in northern Europe.

126 Peters and others 2020.

127 Rode and others 2021b.

128 See chapter 3 in UNDP (2020c).

129 See chapter 3 in UNDP (2020c).

130 See, for instance, Yigitcanlar and Cugurullo

(2020).

131 See, for instance, Parmentola and others (2021).

132 See, for instance, Mi and Coffman (2019).

133 As Partha Dasgupta (2021, p. 3, as cited in

Morrissey 2021) recently noted, the disciplinary

dominance of Economics and its “exclusion

of nature” from macroeconomic models of

growth and development have brought us to

a key juncture where we need to rethink eco-

nomic production with a new sensibility of the

interconnected human and nonhuman worlds

in which we live: to “break the cycle and revise

the conception we hold of humanity’s place in

the biosphere.”

134 Godber and Wall 2014.

135 Morrissey 2021; Wallace 2016.

136 Gomez and others 2020.

137 UNDP 2020c.

138 UNDP 2020c.

139 Rundle 2019.

140 For vertebrate species, see Schuster and oth-

ers (2019).

141 Walker and others 2020.

142 Renick 2020.

143 For a discussion on factors affecting resilience

of indigenous groups, see Ford and others

(2020).

144 Global Witness 2019.

145 For instance, in the Yellowstone model of

national park management, which has been

used around the world (Sobrevila 2008).

146 Nakashima and others 2012.

147 Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010.

148 Holland 2017.

149 Mfitumukiza and others 2020.

150 Mfitumukiza and others 2020.

151 Díaz and others 2018; Ellis, Pascual and Mertz

2019.

152 Ellis and others 2021.

153 Ellis and others 2021.

154 Díaz and others 2018.

155 Aram and others 2019; Doick, Peace and

Hutchings 2014; Szkordilisz 2014.

156 Lin 2011.

157 Sluijs and Vaage 2016.

158 Ghestem and others 2014.

159 Chausson and others 2020; IUCN 2016.

160 Oral and others 2020.

161 Maiga, Sperling and Mihelcic 2017.

162 Vörösmarty and others 2021.

163 Dibala, Jose and Udawatta 2021; Elevitch,

Mazaroli and Ragone 2018; Keesstra and oth-

ers 2018.

164 Anderson and others 2019.

165 Griscom and others 2017.

166 Brancalion and others 2019; Houghton, Byers

and Nassikas 2015.

167 Seddon and others 2020.

168 UNDP 2019a.

169 Morrissey 2021; UNDP 2020c.

170 See chapters 5 and 6 in UNDP (2020c).

171 On the importance of social capital for resil-

ience, see Aldrich and Meyer (2014) and Butzer

(2012).

172 UNDP 2020c.

173 See Basu (2018).

174 See chapter 4 in UNDP (2020c).

PART II

CHAPTER 3

1 Digital technology is a vast field. This chapter

considers digital security, artificial intelligence

algorithms and digital labour platforms,

based on the relevance of these aspects for

many aspects of life in today’s world (see Hil-

bert 2020). The chapter also covers inequali-

ties in the ability to access technologies and

capacities for driving technological change,

particularly in the context of Covid-19.

NOTES 147

2 Haenssgen and Ariana 2018.

3 Oosterlaken 2009; Oosterlaken and van den

Hoven 2012; UNDP 2020g.

4 Coeckelbergh 2011.

5 UNDP 2016a, 2016b.

6 McLennan 2021.

7 For discussions on applying a human-centric

approach to cybersecurity, see Deibert (2018)

and Liaropoulos (2015).

8 Aneja 2021.

9 Shami 2021.

10 Tunggal 2021.

11 Under cyberthreats, ENISA (2018) includes

malware, web-based attacks, web applica-

tion attacks, phishing, denial of service,

spam, botnets, data breaches, insider threat,

physical manipulation/damage/theft/loss,

information leakage, identity theft, crypto-

jacking, ransomware and cyberespionage. In

2021 ENISA identified supply chain threats as

a separate, ninth category and analysed it in

detail in a dedicated report (ENISA 2021).

12 Purplesec 2021.

13 Purplesec 2021.

14 Calandro 2021.

15 Europol 2021.

16 In recent years Chinese tech firms — such as

CloudWalk, Hikvision, Huawei and Yitu — have

expanded their presence across Africa to be-

come the telecom partners of choice for most

African governments (Bagwandeen 2021; van

der Made 2021). According to Wilson (2019),

Huawei and fellow Chinese telecom group

ZTE are said to have built more than 50 3G

networks in more than 36 African countries.

17 FireEye 2021. “Dwell time” in cybersecurity is

the time between an attacker’s initial penetra-

tion of an organization’s environment and the

point at which the organization finds out the

attacker is there.

18 Calandro 2021.

19 Calandro 2021; https://data.worldbank.org/

indicator/IT.NET.SECR.P6. Three Sub- Saharan

Africa countries with an exceptionally high

number of security servers per million people

are Mauritius (915), South Africa (14,422) and

Seychelles (61,109). The values for Mauritius

and Seychelles are artificially high, caused by

very small population in the denominator.

20 Kshetri 2019; Serianu 2017.

21 Clemente 2013.

22 ITU 2021b.

23 Tunggal 2021.

24 Fisher 2021.

25 Nakashima 2021.

26 ICRC 2021; Kallenborn 2020; Tegmark 2021.

27 Guterres 2018.

28 Deodoro and others 2021a. The International

Monetary Fund argues that financial institu-

tions should take steps now to prepare for the

cryptographic transition to improve overall

cybersecurity resilience. See Deodoro and oth-

ers (2021b).

29 Deodoro and others 2021b.

30 Huang, O’Neill and Tabuchi 2021.

31 Lopez and Livni 2021.

32 Fletcher, Larkin and Corbet 2021.

33 Kode 2018; Roberts 2021.

34 Cox and others 2018; EUROPOL 2021.

35 Alfifi and others 2019; Awan 2017; Cox and oth-

ers 2018; Khawaja and Khan 2016.

36 Cox and others 2018; Parker 2019. See also

Ganor (2021) on the challenges of using AI to

prevent terrorism and Graeber (2015) on mov-

ing from poetic technologies to bureaucratic

technologies.

37 See Dias Oliva (2020) and Newton (2019).

38 Fuller 2020.

39 Dias Oliva 2020.

40 Böke 2021.

41 AI is a broad area of study that deals with

problem solving by machines through

processing information and perceiving its

environment. AI algorithms differ from simple

algorithms by involving learning, mimicking

cognitive functions of humans and actively

perceiving environment. AI applications in-

clude advanced web search engines (such

as Google), recommendation systems (used

by Amazon, Facebook, Netflix and YouTube),

understanding human speech (such as Alexa

and Siri) and text (such as Google Translate),

self-driving cars (such as Tesla), image recog-

nition (Facebook and medical applications),

automated decisionmaking and competing

at the highest level in strategic game systems

(such as chess and Go).

42 Kakani and others 2020.

43 See https://www.businesscalltoaction.org.

44 Hulko 2018.

45 Ahmad and others 2021.

46 See Hilbert (2021).

47 See Hilbert (2021).

48 Pew Research Center 2017.

49 Brady and others 2017.

50 See Hilbert (2021).

51 UNDP 2019a.

52 Stankovich 2021.

53 Knight 2020.

54 Lashbrook 2018.

55 Data2X and Grantham 2020; Niethammer 2020.

56 Eubanks 2018.

57 O’Neil 2016.

58 Madrigal 2013.

59 Perez 2019.

60 Dastin 2018.

61 Stankovich 2021.

62 Mahomed 2018.

63 Zhang 2021.

64 See Stankovich (2021).

65 Nordling 2019.

66 ILO 2021c.

67 Compensation on web-based platforms is

often below minimum wage. See Berg and

others (2018).

68 The findings are from International Labour

Organization surveys conducted among

some 12,000 platform economy workers in 100

countries and interviews with 70 businesses, 16

platform companies and 14 platform worker

associations. See ILO (2021c).

69 ILO 2021c.

70 ILO 2021c.

71 Irani 2015.

72 Rani and Singh 2019.

73 Bloom 2021; De Stefano 2020.

74 Moore, Akhtar and Upchurch 2018.

75 Greene and Alcantara 2021.

76 IFOW 2021.

77 De Stefano 2020; Moore, Akhtar and Upchurch

2018.

78 IFOW 2021.

79 Wachter, Mittelstadt and Floridi 2017.

80 For a discussion on how technological advanc-

es can cause divergence, see UNDP (2019a).

81 Gabredikan and Apuzzo 2021; UN 2021e.

82 Spence, Stiglitz and Ghosh 2021.

83 Krishtel and Malpani 2021; WEF 2021.

84 Prabhala, Jayadev and Baker 2020.

85 Kaplan, Stolberg and Robbins 2021.

86 See, for instance, IFPMA (2020), Pfizer (2021)

and PhRMA (2021).

87 INET 2021.

88 Blenkinshop 2021.

89 See Basu, Gostin and Hassoun (2021).

90 Robbins 2021.

91 Hagiu and Yoffie 2013; UNDP 2001.

92 Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz 2017; Cheng and

Parra 2018.

93 Baker, Jayadev and Stiglitz 2017; Benkler 2010.

94 Cheng and Parra 2018.

95 ILO 2021c.

96 Gawer 2014.

97 Lerner and Tirole 2005.

98 Lunden 2015.

99 Hard 2014.

100 NASA 2015.

101 Mazzucato 2021; NASA 2014.

CHAPTER 4

1 This chapter is concerned with violent conflict

in the broad sense of the phrase. Measuring

148 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

conflict is afflicted with technical and political

challenges, and definitions vary. Much of the

analysis is based on the definitions of the Up-

psala Conflict Data Program, considered the

gold standard in peace and conflict studies.

However, the chapter also expands the analy-

sis to show the need for innovation in data and

metrics to obtain a more comprehensive un-

derstanding of both peace and conflict. The

following definitions underpin the analysis:

State-based conflict: A contested incom-

patibility over government or territory where

at least one party is a state, and the use of

armed force results in at least 25 battle-related

deaths in a calendar year.

Nonstate conflict: The use of armed force

between organized groups, none of which is

the government of a state, resulting in at least

25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.

One-sided violence: The use of armed

force by the government of a state or by a

formally organized group against civilians

that results in at least 25 deaths (excluding

extrajudicial killings in custody).

Battle deaths: Fatalities caused by war-

ring parties that can be directly attributed to

combat, including civilian losses.

Conflict event: An incident in which armed

force is used by an organized actor against

another organized actor or against civilians,

resulting in at least 1 direct death at a specific

location and a specific date.

Conflict-affected population: Number of

people living within 50 kilometres of a conflict

event.

2 UNDESA 2020b; UNODC 2019.

3 UN Women 2020b.

4 Kishi 2021.

5 Loescher 2021.

6 Yuan and McNeeley 2016.

7 Sustainable Development Goal indicator 16.1.4

refers to the proportion of the adult population

who feel safe walking alone in their neighbour-

hood (United Nations Statistics Division 2021).

8 UN and World Bank 2018.

9 UN and World Bank 2018; Vera-Adrianzén and

others 2020.

10 Pettersson and others 2021.

11 UNDP 2019a.

12 UNDP 2019a, 2020c.

13 de Coning 2016, 2020.

14 World Bank 2020b.

15 Carothers and O’Donohue 2019.

16 Balcells and Justino 2014; Cederman, Weid-

mann and Gleditsch 2011; Demmers 2017. See

also Stewart, Holdstock and Jarquin (2002) on

horizontal inequalities and violent conflict.

17 Alizada and others 2021.

18 Alizada and others 2021.

19 As shown in the 2020 Human Development

Report (UNDP 2020c), the number of environ-

mental activists killed has more than tripled

over the past 20 years, and approximately 40

percent of murdered environmental defenders

belong to indigenous communities.

20 van Munster and Sylvest 2021.

21 UN 2021c.

22 Lopes da Silva, Tian and Marksteiner 2021.

23 Official development assistance from mem-

bers of the Organisation for Economic Co-

operation and Development’s Development

Assistance Committee rose to an all-time high

of $161.2 billion in 2020 (OECD 2021a).

24 Lopes da Silva, Tian and Marksteiner 2021.

25 Eurostat 2021a.

26 Documenting the exact number of firearms

is challenging due to lack of data transpar-

ency, concealed ownership and illicit trade.

However, the Small Arms Survey uses a wide

range of sources to monitor the proliferation of

firearms (Small Arms Survey 2018).

27 Karp 2018; Small Arms Survey 2018. Civilian gun

ownership increased by 32 percent between

the 2006 and the 2016 survey. There are large

civilian firearm holdings in high and very high

HDI countries that are not officially in armed

conflict, and for the very high HDI group the

United States drives the results, accounting for

4 percent of global population but 40 percent

of global civilian firearm holdings.

28 Banerjee and Muggah 2002; Buttrick 2020;

Dahlberg, Ikeda and Kresnow 2004.

29 UNODA 2018.

30 J-PAL and IPA 2021; Mousa 2019.

31 J-PAL and IPA (Innovations for Poverty Action)

2021.

32 For example, Human Rights Watch (2020d)

notes continuous abuses and violence against

civilians, human rights defenders and other

community leaders in Colombia, despite the

peace accord and reconciliation efforts.

33 Pettersson and others 2021.

34 Arias 2017; Auyero 2007; Feldmann and Luna

2022.

35 Trejo and Ley 2020.

36 The literature on state capture also notes how

vested interests and corruption erode institu-

tional quality and threaten accountability (Hell-

man, Jones and Kaufmann 2000).

37 Muggah and Dudley 2021; Vera-Adrianzén

and others 2020.

38 UN 2020c.

39 Such as the joint United Nations Department

for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, United

Nations Development Programme and United

Nations Environment Programme Climate

Security Mechanism.

40 Resolution 2250 was adopted by the UN Se-

curity Council in 2015 and recognized the es-

sential role of young people in preventing and

resolving conflicts and in sustaining peace. It

was then reaffirmed in 2018 in Security Council

Resolution 2419.

41 The women, peace and security agenda—

based on UN Security Council Resolution 1325,

adopted in 2000—highlights not only the

disproportionate impacts of war on women

but also the pivotal role women play in conflict

prevention, conflict management and sustain-

able peace efforts.

42 UN 2020a.

43 UN and World Bank 2018.

44 IEP 2021a.

45 UNODA 2018.

46 Autesserre 2007, 2017. For example, research

by Autesserre shows how local conflicts in

the Democratic Republic of Congo became

self-sustaining and continued to kill more

than 1,000 civilians a day even after peace

settlements had been reached, continuing to

violate human security.

47 UN Women 2015.

48 UN 2000.

49 For example, disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration programmes can protect ci-

vilians while helping ex-combatants find alter-

native livelihoods (J-PAL and IPA 2021). And in

violent contexts cognitive behavioural therapy

has been found to change self-images and re-

duce risks of engaging in criminal and violent

behaviour among young men (J-PAL 2018).

50 Tarabah and others 2016.

51 Collier and Hoeffler 2000.

52 Stewart, Holdstock and Jarquin 2002.

53 IPCC 2018.

54 IPCC 2018.

55 Ide and others 2020; Mobjörk, Krampe and

Tarif 2021; von Uexkull and Buhaug 2021.

56 Lövbrand and Mobjörk (2021) provide a

broader discussion on the topic.

57 Buhaug and von Uexkull 2021, p. 546.

58 Smith 2021.

59 Krampe 2021.

60 Lopes da Silva, Tian and Marksteiner 2021.

61 Cottrell and Darbyshire 2021. In 2017 the US

military had a larger carbon footprint than

that of many nations, including Finland,

Morocco and Peru. The reported military

emissions stemming from energy and fuel

consumption account for only a small share

of the military carbon footprint, as indirect

emissions from arms production and military

supply chains more than double the European

Union’s and the United Kingdom’s military car-

bon footprint (Cottrell and Darbyshire 2021).

62 ICRC 2020.

63 Hobbs and Radke 1992.

64 Linke and Ruether 2021.

65 ICRC 2020.

66 For example, flaring, the two-century-old

industry practice of burning excess gas in

oil production, increased during conflicts in

Libya, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, even

when overall oil production stalled (Darbyshire

and Weir 2021).

67 Collins, Florin and Sachs 2021.

68 Sasse and Trutnevyte 2020.

69 Collins, Florin and Sachs 2021.

NOTES 149

70 Aas Rustad 2021b; Krampe, Smith and Hamidi

2021.

71 Global Commission on the Geopolitics of En-

ergy Transformation 2019.

72 Aas Rustad 2021b.

73 Hegre and others 2017.

74 Kosal 2020.

75 Boulanin and Verbruggen 2017; Boulanin,

Brockmann and Bauer 2019.

76 Keane 2020.

77 Johnson 2021.

78 OHCHR 2021.

79 For example, Urbaniak and others (2022)

employ Big Data techniques to analyse the

effects of online personal attacks among

150,000 Reddit users and show how unmod-

erated cyberviolence significantly reduced

victims’ online activity. Furthermore, hateful

online content can spread fast and reach far,

as shown in a study by Mathew and others

(2019). They analysed more than 21 million

posts generated by 341,000 users on the

online platform Gab and found that hateful

content diffused much faster and wider than

nonhateful posts.

80 UNDP 2020c.

81 Allan and others 2015.

82 Ray and George 2021.

83 Stewart, Holdstock and Jarquin 2002.

84 Hillesund and others 2018.

85 Stewart, Holdstock and Jarquin 2002.

86 UN and World Bank 2018.

87 Demmers 2017; UN and World Bank 2018.

88 UNODC 2019.

89 UN 2021b.

90 WHO 2021l.

91 Garry and Checchi 2019.

92 Aebischer Perone and others 2017; Garry and

Checchi 2019.

93 Garry and Checchi 2019.

94 FSIN 2021.

95 Simon 2020.

96 Kishi 2021.

97 Kishi 2021.

98 Pettersson and others 2021.

99 Aas Rustad 2021a.

100 UNODC 2019.

101 UNODC 2019.

102 Bergman 2018; Muggah and Aguirre Tobón

2018; Yashar 2018.

103 Corral and others (2020) undertook a similar

effort, but the definitions differ and do not

include lower intensity conflicts.

104 See OECD (2020) for the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development

framework for identifying fragile contexts.

105 Examples include reduced likelihood of

giving birth at a health facility (Østby and

others 2018), higher risk of maternal death

(Kotsadam and Østby 2019), lower likelihood of

secondary education (Gates and others 2012)

and greater food insecurity (Martin-Shields

and Stojetz 2019)

106 DeCou and Lynch 2017; Garbarino and others

1992; Guterman and Cameron 1997.

107 Cuartas and Roy 2019.

108 UNHCR 2021a.

109 MSF 2017. The Office of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees has also

called for granting refugee status to “a signifi-

cant percentage” of people fleeing the zone

(UNHCR 2015).

110 Clement and others 2021; Rigaud and others

2018.

111 Sharkey 2018; Yuan and McNeeley 2016.

112 Valera and Guàrdia 2014; Yates and Ceccato

2020.

113 IEP 2021b.

114 IEP 2021b.

115 de Coning and Gelot 2020.

CHAPTER 5

1 See Sen (2005b) for a discussion of how en-

hancing the agency of women improves lives

more broadly.

2 Sen 2005a.

3 UN 1948.

4 Nussbaum 2011, pp. 30–31.

5 Sen 2008.

6 UN 1948.

7 UNDP 2019a.

8 For instance, when people’s social status is

linked to their personal responsibility through

the narrative of meritocracy (Sandel 2020).

The “American Dream” and similar narratives

(with a focus on material success and self-

reliance) can create pressure for the upper

middle class and stigmatization across low-

income populations. See Lamont (2019).

9 Chenoy 2009.

10 Bialasiewicz and others 2007; Gentry, Shep-

herd and Sjoberg 2018.

11 Young 2003.

12 Nussbaum 2001, 2006.

13 Some of these are analysed in the next sec-

tion, in terms of age, sexual orientation and

gender identity, race and ethnicity, and migra-

tion status.

14 Crenshaw 2017.

15 Ogata and Sen 2003.

16 UNDP 2019a.

17 IACWGE 1999. The UN Inter-Agency Com-

mittee on Women and Gender Equality

notes five aspects: violence against women

and girls; gender inequalities in control over

resources; gender inequalities in power and

decisionmaking; women’s human rights; and

women (and men) as actors, not victims.

18 UNDP 2020c.

19 UNDP 2020c.

20 WHO 2020d.

21 Avidor, Palgi and Solomon 2017; Canudas-

Romo 2018; WHO 2015a.

22 Adverse childhood experiences are defined

by the World Health Organization (WHO) as

“(…) multiple types of abuse; neglect; violence

between parents or caregivers; other kinds of

serious household dysfunction such as alcohol

and substance abuse; and peer, community

and collective violence.” WHO includes events

that also “occur outside the boundaries of

home and family. These experiences can in-

clude violence in the surrounding community,

the experience of living in unsafe neighbor-

hoods, homelessness, bullying, discrimination

based on race or ethnicity, and income inse-

curity” (UNICEF 2021c, pp. 60–61).

23 Østby, Aas Rustad and Forø Tollefsen 2020.

24 The UN Security Council has identified and

condemned six grave violations against

children in times of war: killing and maiming

of children, recruitment or use of children in

armed forces and armed groups, attacks on

schools or hospitals, rape or other grave sex-

ual violence, abduction of children and denial

of humanitarian access for children (UNICEF

2021b).

25 UNICEF 2021a.

26 UNICEF 2020a.

27 Bertoni and others 2019; Dabalen and Paul

2014; Diwakar 2015.

28 Gao and Hayes 2021.

29 OPHI and UNDP 2021.

30 Nayyar and Rivera Vazquez 2021.

31 Rodgers 2020.

32 Inanc 2020. Compilation based on the US

Bureau of Labor Statistics’ monthly labour

force statistics from the Current Population

Survey. Moreover, Black people are 24 percent

less likely to receive unemployment benefits,

further exacerbating the impacts of unem-

ployment (Kuka and Stuart 2021).

33 Inanc 2020.

34 Jones, Mitra and Bhuiyan 2021; UN Women

2017.

35 Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on

Youth 2021.

36 Nkrumah 2021.

37 Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on

Youth 2021.

38 Cuevas-Parra 2021; UN 2021f.

39 Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on

Youth 2021; UN and Folke Bernadotte Acad-

emy 2021.

40 UNDESA 2019.

41 WHO 2021j.

42 WHO 2021j.

150 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

43 UNDESA 2016a.

44 WHO 2015b.

45 Dependency ratios are the relationship of

those not typically active in the workforce

(children under 15 and people over age 65) to

the active population (ages 15–64). It is used

to understand the pressures on the active

population and the level of financial stress

that will be faced by the need for support from

dependent populations. The old-age depen-

dency ratio refers specifically to the amount

of people over age 65 per 100 working-age

people.

46 Ferraro, Kemp and Williams 2017.

47 MacGuire 2020.

48 Garrett and others 2019.

49 Pechey and Monsivais 2016.

50 Volaco, Cavalcanti and Précoma 2018.

51 Wood and others 2006.

52 Erlangsen and others 2017.

53 OECD 2019c.

54 UNDESA 2016b.

55 UNDESA 2016b.

56 Olivera and Tournier 2016.

57 Ye and others 2020.

58 Donizzetti 2019.

59 Moosa and Luyckx 2021.

60 Moosa and Luyckx 2021.

61 UNDP 2020a; UN Women 2020a.

62 Bonnet, Vanek and Chen 2019.

63 ILO 2020; UNDP 2020b; UN Women 2020a.

64 Benyacoub 2021.

65 Maitra 2018; Smith and others 2003.

66 FAO and others 2020; UNDP 2020c; UN Wom-

en 2020a.

67 UNDP 2020c.

68 Maitra 2018; Smith and others 2003.

69 FAO and others 2020; UNDP 2020c; UN Wom-

en 2020a.

70 UNDP 2020c.

71 Madgavkar and others 2020.

72 UNDP 2020b, 2020e; UN Women 2020b.

73 UNDP 2019a, 2020d.

74 UNDP 2020c.

75 UNDP 2019a.

76 UN Women 2021a. Gender-based violence

could include violence against men, provided

the violence stems from a man’s gender iden-

tity or presentation. Violence against women

and girls is more specific, as it refers only to

women, who experience most of the gender-

based violence, so to that extent, gender-

based violence and violence against women

overlap (Dominguez Gonzalez and others

2019).

77 UNFPA, UN Women and UNDP 2017.

78 Galtung 1969, 1990; Galtung and Fischer 2013.

79 A series of strategies, gestures, comments

and actions of daily life that are subtle, almost

imperceptible, but perpetuate and transmit

violence against women and girls from one

generation to another (Gómez 2015).

80 UN Women 2021a. Forms of violence against

women and girls include physical and sexual

violence, human trafficking, female genital

mutilation, child marriage, psychological and

emotional violence and economic violence.

See also spotlight 4.1 in UNDP (2019a).

81 Confortini 2006; Galtung 1990.

82 As the second-wave feminism established “the

personal is political” (Firestone and Koedt 1970,

p. 76), and feminist researchers have analysed

violence in the individual and domestic realm

as a form of political violence and a precondi-

tion for increased violence against women

and girls in the public sphere (Firestone and

Koedt 1970; Hanisch 1969).

83 Alkan, Özar and Ünver 2021; Muluneh and oth-

ers 2020.

84 Fawole 2008.

85 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

86 WHO 2021m.

87 Douki and others 2003.

88 UNICEF 2020b.

89 Garcia-Moreno and others 2006; Kishor and

Johnson 2004, 2005; WHO 2021m.

90 Harrison and Esqueda 1999.

91 Although racial categories are socially con-

structed and many people fail to fit into one or

more of the categories that are recognized in

different contexts, they have impacts on peo-

ple’s lives via structural patterns of discrimina-

tion. It is important to acknowledge that social

constructs around race and ethnicity have

tangible impacts on people’s dignity and need

to be prioritized for as long as inequalities

and discrimination based on those constructs

exist.

92 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018; Khalid

2019.

93 Stewart 2016.

94 OHCHR 2005.

95 See Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou

(2016) and Stewart (2005).

96 Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011;

Denny and Walter 2014.

97 Ahuja 2016.

98 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

99 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018.

100 OHCHR 2005; UNDESA 2016c, 2018.

101 UNDESA 2018.

102 Gubert and others 2017.

103 Bloomfield 2019.

104 United Nations Inter-Agency Support Group

on Indigenous Issues 2014.

105 Kamwenda 1997; Maseko and Ndlovu 2013.

106 Nesterak 2019.

107 Lajimodiere 2012.

108 Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg 2018; Leigh and

Weber 2018.

109 UNDP 2020c.

110 According to Dimick and others (2013, p. 1046),

“Black patients actually tended to live closer

to higher-quality hospitals than white pa-

tients did but were 25–58 percent more likely

than whites to receive surgery at low-quality

hospitals.”

111 He and others 2019. Warmth refers to being

perceived as tolerant, warm, good-natured

and sincere, reflecting how “likable” a target

is; competence refers to being perceived as

competent, confident, independent, competi-

tive and intelligent and generally reflects how

“respected” a target is.

112 Dabone and others 2021; Odoms-Young 2018.

113 Ghandnoosh 2014; Waldron 2020.

114 UNDESA 2020a.

115 This section, due to its limited extension, can-

not assume to faithfully represent the human

security challenges for all human mobility

categories. It uses terms and definitions as

put forth by the International Organization

for Migration’s (IOM) Glossary on Migration

(IOM 2019a). It uses the term “migrant” as an

umbrella term (as per IOM’s definition: “An

umbrella term, not defined under international

law, reflecting the common lay understanding

of a person who moves away from his or her

place of usual residence, whether within a

country or across an international border,

temporarily or permanently, and for a variety

of reasons. The term includes a number of

well-defined legal categories of people, such

as migrant workers; persons whose particular

types of movements are legally defined, such

as smuggled migrants; as well as those whose

status or means of movement are not specifi-

cally defined under international law, such as

international students.”). It defines “displaced

persons” as “Persons or groups of persons who

have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave

their homes or places of habitual residence,

either across an international border or within

a State, in particular as a result of or in order to

avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations

of generalized violence, violations of human

rights or natural or human-made disasters.”;

It uses the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees’ definition of refugee (UNHCR

1951): “A person who, owing to a well-founded

fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,

nationality, membership of a particular social

group or political opinion, is outside the coun-

try of his nationality and is unable or, owing

to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the

protection of that country; or who, not having

a nationality and being outside the country

of his former habitual residence as a result of

such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is

unwilling to return to it.”). And it limits its scope

to people who move across borders.

116 Nagabhatla and others 2020.

117 Nagabhatla and others 2020.

118 Hauer and others 2020.

NOTES 151

119 UNHCR 2021a.

120 IDMC 2021.

121 ILO 2021b.

122 Szaflarski and Bauldry 2019.

123 UN 2016.

124 This Report uses the terms lesbian, gay,

bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LG-



security and discriminatory practices high-

lighted herein are also relevant to addressing

violence and discrimination on the basis of

sexual orientation, gender identity and sex

characteristics against people who identify

with or use other terms.

125 Even though the distinction between sex and

gender has been clear since the 1950s, still

not everyone is aware of the differences and

their implications for policymaking around

the world. Often, even in research, the terms

sex and gender are used as if they were in-

terchangeable, but they are not. “Sex” refers

to each person’s biological characteristics. In

this classification individuals can identify as

female, male or intersex. Intersex people are

born with physical sex characteristics different

from male or female bodies. For some intersex

people these are apparent at birth, while

for others they emerge later in life, often at

puberty. Intersex people may have any sexual

orientation and gender identity. “Gender” is

a social construct. Gender identity refers to

the experienced sense of one’s own gender,

whereas gender expression refers to actions

and appearance that reflect the way in which

a person expresses gender. When gender and

sex are aligned at birth, the term “cisgender”

can be used. But one’s gender identity or

expression may or may not be aligned with

the sex assigned to them at birth or sexual

orientation. “Nonbinary” and “queer” are

terms that refer to gender identities that are

neither male nor female and that are outside

the gender binary. “Trans” and “transgender”

are both terms used to describe people with a

wide range of gender expressions and identi-

ties—including transsexual people, people

who cross-dress, people who identify as third

gender, people who identify outside of the

male/female binary and others whose ap-

pearance and characteristics are perceived

as gender atypical and whose sense of their

own gender is different from the sex that they

were assigned at birth. Some transgender

people seek surgery or take hormones to bring

their body into alignment with their gender

identity; others do not. Trans people may have

any sexual orientation and sex characteristics.

Finally, “sexual orientation” refers to a person’s

physical, romantic and/or emotional attrac-

tion towards other people. Most people have a

sexual orientation, which is part of their identi-

ty. Gay men and lesbian women are attracted

to individuals of the same sex as themselves.

Heterosexual people are attracted to individu-

als of a different sex from themselves. Bisexual

people may be attracted to individuals of the

same or different sex. Lesbian, gay and bi-

sexual people may have any gender identity

or sex characteristics. Sexual orientation, gen-

der identity and sex characteristics are not the

same. They are each distinct but intersecting

aspects of a person’s identity; hence it is im-

portant to respect people’s choice of terms,

names, and pronouns to refer to themselves.

(Adapted from OHCHR 2019 and information

from United Nations Free & Equal campaign

website and factsheets.)

-

siderably across the world. Important progress

has been achieved on several fronts, and pub-

lic opinion has, overall, seen rising acceptance

in some countries and regions. For example,

rising acceptance of homosexuality has been

recorded in several countries in the past two

decades (Pew Research Center 2020), and

evidence from the United States also shows a

shift in views on same-sex marriage over the

past decades (Gallup 2021). As of December

2021, same-sex marriage is legal in 30 coun-

tries (Council on Foreign Relations 2021).

126 Hagen 2016.

127 Albuquerque and others 2016; Badgett,

Hasenbush and Luhur 2017; Romero, Goldberg

and Vasquez 2020; Suriyasarn 2016.

128 Yogyakarta Principles 2007.

129 Only 25 countries have gender identity or gen-

der expression legislation: Argentina, Belgium

Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark,

Ecuador, France, Greece, Iceland, India,

Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway,

Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand,

Uruguay, Viet Nam and the United Kingdom

(Zhan and others 2020).

130 Lanham and others 2019. Their experiences

were characterized by verbal abuse, being

forced to alter their gender expression to get

the document or being totally refused the

identification. These experiences of discrimi-

nation made the participants feel humiliated,

affecting their dignity and mental health.

131 Ecker 2016; Ecker, Aubry and Sylvestre 2019.

132 Ecker, Aubry and Sylvestre 2019.

133 UNDP 2016c.

134 Badgett, Waaldijk and van der Meulen Rodg-

ers 2019.

135 Evans and others 2016. This study included on-

ly lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans populations.

136 UNDP 2019b.

137 Johns and others 2019; Johns and others 2020.

138 UNDP 2019b.

139 Human Rights Watch 2020c.

140 UNDP 2019b. This study included only lesbian,

gay, bisexual and trans populations.

141 Berthélémy 2019; Leufer 2021.

142 GLAAD 2021. Facebook (75 percent), Twitter

(24 percent), YouTube (21 percent), Instagram

(24 percent) and TikTok (9 percent).

143 OHCHR 2015, 2019.

144 Stotzer 2009.

145 OHCHR 2016, 2019.

146 UNDP 2021.

147 Allende 2020.

148 Balaji 2011; Henricks 2016; Nazroo, Bhui and

Rhodes 2020.

149 Dunn, Clare and Holland 2008.

150 Extending the use of concepts described by

Molyneux (1986) and Moser (1989).

151 A key principle outlined by Gasper and Gomez

(2021).

152 ILGA 2020.

CHAPTER 6

1 Ogata and Sen 2003.

2 Anand 2012.

3 Ritchie 2019.

4 Roser and Ritchie 2013.

5 UNAIDS 2021. AIDS-related deaths have de-

clined by 47 percent since 2010 and by 64 per-

cent from the peak in 2004.

6 Roser and Ritchie 2019.

7 Dadonaite, Ritchie and Roser 2019.

8 Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance 2020; Global Pre-

paredness Monitoring Board 2019; Marani and

others 2021.

9 UNDP 2020f.

10 UN Platform on Social Determinants of Health

2016; WHO n.d.

11 WHO 2020c.

12 WHO 2021a.

13 Ruger 2004.

14 WHO 2021i, p. 45.

15 WHO 2021i. WHO notes that the pace of im-

provements in service coverage has slowed

since 2010 and that at the current rate of

progress, there will be a shortfall of 710 million

against the target of 1 billion more people

benefiting from universal health coverage —

without accounting for Covid-19-related eco-

nomic contraction and disruptions to health

services.

16 The Economist 2021; Johnson and Roberto

2020.

17 Nettle and others 2021.

18 IHME 2021.

19 IHME 2021.

20 Fore and others 2020; Headey and others

2020; UN 2020b.

21 See UNDP (2020c, 2020f). For instance, in

South Asian countries around 391 million chil-

dren were kept out of schools at the primary

and secondary levels, and up to 5.5 million

may drop out of school altogether (Shiva Ku-

mar, 2021).

22 IMF 2021b.

23 The data referenced here are from IMF (2021a).

This discussion also uses the International

Monetary Fund’s classification of countries.

24 IMF 2021c.

25 IMF 2021c.

26 IMF 2021c.

152 NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE / 2022

27 WHO 2021b.

28 IMF 2021c.

29 Likewise, many economies implemented mul-

tiyear fiscal actions, but a large part of fiscal

support is expiring, and Covid-19 emergency

fiscal support measures are winding down in

emerging economies (IMF 2021b.). Growth in

emerging and developing economies, which

have been constrained by uneven access to

vaccines and waning emergency fiscal sup-

port, is expected to slow considerably by 2022,

and income per capita gains in fragile and

conflict-affected low-income countries have

been set back by at least a decade (World

Bank 2021b). Thus, not only will the recovery

depend on the extent of the response mea-

sures, the effects of recently expired or limited

extensions of fiscal support measures remain

uncertain, and the inequalities in recovery

spending may set us on very unequal recovery

paths, potentially exacerbating pre-existing

gaps. Concerns include what will happen to

employment protection programmes and

whether there will be mass layoffs once the

emergency fiscal support is suspended (IMF

2021e). The insecurity faced by people due

to shocks can last even after recovery in

macroeconomic output — for instance, people

experiencing unemployment may be unable

to bear out-of-pocket healthcare costs for

some time and thus delay getting the care

they need.

30 IMF 2021d. According to the Global Dashboard

for Vaccine Equity, by December 2021 approxi-

mately 65 percent of people in high-income

countries had at least one dose of a Covid-19

vaccine, compared with approximately 8 per-

cent of people in low-income countries. See

UNDP, WHO and University of Oxford (2021).

31 Human Development Report Office calcula-

tions based on data from https://ourworldin-

data.org/ (accessed 9 November 2021). Simple

averages. See also IMF (2021d).

32 Wouters and others 2021.

33 World Bank 2021a.

34 Wouters and others 2021.

35 BBC 2021.

36 WHO 2020b.

37 WHO 2021f.

38 For instance, ageing is expected to be the

main driver of noncommunicable diseases in

Europe. See Devaux and others (2020).

39 Marmot and Bell 2019.

40 Marmot and Bell 2019.

41 Sommer and others 2015.

42 WHO 2013. Additional key principles and ap-

proaches enshrined in WHO’s Global Action

Plan include promoting human rights, equity

and empowerment, using a life-course ap-

proach and universal health coverage. See

also Marmot and Bell (2019) and WHO (2014).

43 WHO 2020b.

44 Karn and Sharma 2021; UN Platform on So-

cial Determinants of Health 2016. Others (for

instance, Abera and others 2017) have noted

the existence of a “double burden” of commu-

nicable and noncommunicable diseases.

45 Bollyky and others 2017; Kruk, Nigenda and

Knaul 2015; Kruk and others 2018.

46 For instance, cancer is a key factor behind the

mortality gap across different socioeconomic

groups in New Zealand. See Teng and others

(2017).

47 Ebi and Hess 2020; Patz, Grabow and Limaye

2014.

48 Vicedo-Cabrera, Scovronick and Gasparrini

2021.

49 The Lancet Countdown 2021.

50 Lelieveld and others 2020.

51 Atwoli and others 2021.

52 See also results in Carleton and others (2020).

53 The Lancet Countdown 2021.

54 IPCC 2018.

55 Hallegatte and others 2014.

56 The right to health goes even further than

access to healthcare to also consider the

underlying determinants of health, such as

adequate nutrition and housing, and health-

related education, which help people lead

healthy lives. See OHCHR and WHO (2008).

57 OHCHR and WHO 2008.

58 Sen 2008.

59 Sen 2008.

60 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,

and Medicine 2018; WHO, OECD and World

Bank 2018.

61 For a discussion of these factors, see National

Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and

Medicine (2018).

62 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,

and Medicine 2018.

63 Kruk and others 2018; WHO 2018.

64 Kruk and others 2018.

65 Kruk and others 2018.

66 WHO, OECD and World Bank 2018.

67 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering,

and Medicine 2018, p. 2.

68 Krishna 2010, p. 17.

69 WHO 2021c.

70 Swindle and Newhouse 2021. In countries

where the urban population accounts for a

larger share of the total proportion, such as

Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Senegal, “fear

of contracting Covid-19” was also more fre-

quently answered. “Hospital had insufficient

supplies” was the third most reported barrier.

71 WHO 2010a.

72 WHO 2010a.

73 Beran, Pedersen and Robertson 2019; Saksena,

Xu and Durairaj 2010.

74 Beran, Pedersen and Robertson 2019.

75 WHO 2021d.

76 OECD 2019a.

77 OECD 2019b.

78 OECD 2019b.

79 OECD 2019b.

80 Komisar 2013.

81 Emanuel, Glickman and Johnson 2017.

82 Komisar 2013.

83 Komisar 2013.

84 Schillings and Sánchez-Ancochea 2021.

85 See annex 6.1 and Martínez Franzoni and

Sánchez-Ancochea (2016).

86 Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea

2016.

87 Anand 2012.

88 WHO 2021g.

89 WHO and World Bank 2017.

90 OECD 2014.

91 High-level Meeting on Universal Health Cover-

age 2019.

92 Kruk and others 2018; WHO, OECD and World

Bank 2018.

93 See Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-

Ancochea 2016; Sen 2015.

94 Anand and Ravallion 1993.

95 Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea

2016.

96 Laryea and Cueni 2019; Smith, Corrigan and

Exeter 2012.

97 Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea

2016.

98 The Lancet Commission on Global Health

2035 2013.

99 Dallman 2010; Danese and others 2014;

Danese and Lewis 2017; Evans and Wachs

2010; Hackett and Steptoe 2017; Hughes and

others 2017; Morris and others 2019.

100 Hussain and Arif 2021.

101 UN 2015b. See also Leisering 2020.

102 ILO 2011, 2016; WHO 2010b.

103 Due to the structure of the HUI as a geometric

mean, these imbalances in achievement are

amplified in the overall score, highlighting the

importance of all dimensions for achieving

true universalism.

104 See Filgueira (2007); Martínez Franzoni and

Sánchez-Ancochea (2018); Pribble (2013).

105 UNDP 2019a.

106 The Global Health Security Index is a joint

project of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health

Security, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and

The Economist Intelligence Unit. The Index

measures countries’ capabilities for prevent-

ing and mitigating epidemics and pandemics

using 140 questions in six categories (preven-

tion, detection and reporting, rapid response,

health systems, compliance with international

norms and risk environment). The index is

scored based on desk research for a sample

of 195 countries. Some results might appear

ambiguous in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.

NOTES 153

In fact, some of the highest scoring countries

are among the most affected by Covid-19,

such as the United States (1st), the United

Kingdom (2nd), the Netherlands (3rd), Sweden

(7th) and Slovenia (12th). Therefore, some of

the results should be interpreted with cau-

tion and take into account underreporting in

less developed countries. See https://www.

ghsindex.org/about/. See also Schillings and

Sanchez-Ancochea (2021).

107 Some measuring factors can influence these

results in the case of the Global Health Security

Index. It is possible that the index methodology

suffers from potential biases or measurement

errors when scoring the preparedness of less

developed health systems because there

appears to be a large clustering of scores

around the average index value of 35. Also,

universalism is only relevant for some aspects

of the index and overall health disaster pre-

paredness: mainly for treatment and, in part,

for rapid response. Other factors, such as pre-

vention, detection, global cooperation and risk

environment, also play an important role that

might outweigh the impact of universalism.

See Schillings and Sanchez-Ancochea (2021).

108 Baker, Currie and Schwandt 2017.

109 Brønnum-Hansen 2017.

110 van Raalte, Sasson and Martikainen 2018.

111 Nazroo 2017.

112 Currie and Schwandt 2016.

113 Majer and others 2011.

114 Chen, Persson and Polyakova 2020; Katikireddi

and others 2020.

115 Rostila and others 2021.

116 Aldridge and others 2020.

117 UNDP 2020c.

118 EIU 2020; UN 2020d.

119 The Lancet–University of Oslo Commission on

Global Governance for Health 2014, p. 633.

120 The Lancet–University of Oslo Commission on

Global Governance for Health 2014.

121 The Lancet–University of Oslo Commission on

Global Governance for Health 2014.

122 The Lancet–University of Oslo Commission on

Global Governance for Health 2014.

123 Storeng, Puyvallée and Stein 2021.

124 Gostin, Habibi and Meier 2020.

125 Gostin, Habibi and Meier 2020. Moreover,

some government responses have not re-

spected the International Health Regulations.

See Gostin, Habibi and Meier (2020) and

Habibi and others (2020).

126 Nakatani, Katsuno and Urabe 2020.

127 World Health Assembly 2020.

128 Gostin, Halabi and Klock 2021; Nikogosian

2021a.

129 World Health Assembly 2021.

130 WHO 2021h. There is also increased attention

on the possibilities for reforming the Interna-

tional Health Regulations (Ginsbach, Mona-

han and Gottschalk 2021; Wilson, Halabi and

Gostin 2020). A pandemic treaty under Article

19 of the WHO Constitution could go hand in

hand with International Health Regulations

reform — a treaty would also have a more ex-

pansive scope to address political, legal, insti-

tutional and multisectoral issues, on which the

scope of the regulations is limited (Nikogosian

2021b).

131 Fukuda-Parr, Buss and Yamin 2021.

132 UNDESA 2021.

133 Lozano and others 2020.

134 Global Burden of Disease Health Financing

Collaborator Network 2020. A limitation of

using government health spending as a per-

centage of GDP as an indicator is that it does

not distinguish between wasteful and efficient

spending. However, the use of a geometric

mean to determine the HUI alleviates this

limitation, as it rewards equal achievement

across the dimensions. The HUI should differ

between cases of inefficient versus efficient

spending as the former would not translate

into the second dimension, effective coverage,

as much as the latter.

135 Global Burden of Disease Health Financing

Collaborator Network 2020.

136 See Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea

(2016). An alternative measure of equity would

be the proportion of out-of-pocket spending,

which reflects inequity in healthcare. While

out-of-pocket spending is important in the

context of risk protection (particularly in rela-

tion to catastrophic expenditure), the focus of

the equity dimension of the HUI goes beyond

risk protection, to consider segmentation more

broadly and resulting inequalities in access to

healthcare.

137 As the UHC effective coverage index is already

normalized, no further rescaling is necessary.

CONCLUSION

1 Fajardo-Gonzalez and Sandoval 2021.

2 Ogata and Sen 2003.

3 UN 2021d.

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